




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

**STUDENT NON-VIOLENT
COORDINATING COMMITTEE
(SNCC)**

PART 12 OF 14

BUFILE: 100-439190 SECTION 14 (CONTINUED)

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"A UNITED AFRICA: AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANS; SOCIALISM"

PATRICE LUMUMBA



A GUERRILLA WARFARE

curriculum

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Handbook #3



Guerrilla war has become the political phenomenon of the mid twentieth century, the visible wind of revolution, stirring hope and fear on three continents.

In the world at large, it is destroying the last vestiges of feudalism and of traditional colonialism where these remain. Its full vigor is turned now against neo-colonialism and against what, in Marxist terminology, is called imperialism - the economic and political (and often military) domination of the weak, industrially poor nations by the rich, powerful, and technologically superior ones.

It is a confrontation, in its essence, of the world's "haves" and the world's "have-nots", of the rich nations and the poor nations. It is reshaping the world that we have known, and its outcome may well decide the form and substance of the foreseeable future, not only in the present theatres of war, which are vast and shadowy but everywhere.

Nationalism, social justice, race, religion - beneath all of these symbolic and abstract "causes" that are rallying cries of the revolutions of the past two decades, one discovers a unifying principle: a common mainspring. Limitations that were formerly accepted all at once become intolerable. The hint of imminent change suggests opportunities that had not been glimpsed until now. The "will to act" is born. It is as though people everywhere were saying: "Look, here is something we can do, or have, or be, simply by acting. Then what have we been waiting for? Let us act!"

The defeat of the military enemy, the overthrow of the government, are secondary tasks, in the sense that they come later. The primary effort of the guerrilla is to militate the population, without whose consent no government can stand for a day.

The guerrilla is subversive of the existing order in that he is the disseminator of revolutionary ideas; his actions lend force to his doctrine and show the way to radical change. Yet it would be an error to consider

him as a being apart from the seed bed of revolution. He himself is created by the political climate in which revolution becomes possible, and is himself as much an expression as he is a catalyst of the popular will toward such change.

One view on guerrilla warfare is the "Conspiracy Theory": The view that revolution is the (usually deformed) offspring of a process of artificial insemination, and that the guerrilla nucleus (the fertilizing agent, so to speak) is made up of outsiders, conspirators, political zombies - in other words, actual or spiritual aliens who somehow stand separate from their social environment, while manipulating it to obscure and sinister ends.

Another view is the "Methods Fallacy", held, at least until very recently, by most American military men: the old-fashioned notion that guerrilla warfare is largely a matter of tactics and techniques, to be adopted by almost anyone who may have need of them, in almost any irregular warfare situation.

The first view is both naive and cynical. It lacks confidence in popular decisions; it tacitly assumes that people in the mass are simpletons, too ignorant, unsophisticated, and passive to think for themselves or to have either the will or the capacity to wage a revolutionary war. Ergo, the revolution which in fact exists must be due to the machinations of interlopers. The guerrillas must be the dupes or the wily agents of an alien power or, at least, of an alien political philosophy.

On the more naive level, it seems to be assumed that people would scarcely choose the revolutionary path of their own accord; certainly not if the revolution in question were out of joint with the political traditions and ideals held dear by Americans. To quote former Pres. Eisenhower in this connection, relative to the war in South Vietnam:

"We must inform these people (Vietnamese) of what is happening and how important it is to them to get on our side. Then they will

Eisenhower's. General

Most American foreign policymakers and experts of the new politico-military science of counterinsurgency (the theory and practice of counter revolution) appear more cynical than General Eisenhower. It is manifest in their pronouncements that all modern revolutions are, or are likely to become, struggles between two world "systems," the Communist on one side, the Americans and their allies on the other, with the people most directly involved merely pawns, to be manipulated by one side or the other.

Since it is the United States that is, more often than not in this era, the interloper in almost any revolutionary situation that comes to mind (Viet Nam, Cuba, Iran, Guatemala, Brazil, Congo, Venezuela, to name a few), it is not surprising that the Cold War psychology should lead us to look for our Russian or Chinese counterpart in the given area of contention, and, finding him, or thinking so, to assign to him a major role. To do so, however, is to succumb to a curious illogic, in which our powers of observation seem to fail us.

The following excerpt from an article entitled "Plea for 'Realism' in Southeast Asia" by Roger Hilsman, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, is fairly typical:

"Any analysis of the situation in South Vietnam should probably start with the realization that we are not dealing with a war. The problem is more political than military, involving acts of terrorism rather than battles. Out of a population of 14 million, the Communist Viet Cong numbers only 28,000 to 34,000 regular guerrilla troops plus 60 - 80,000 part-time auxiliaries. Its campaign is more like the gangland warfare of the 1930's and the teenage terrorism of New York today than the war in Korea or World War II. In a very real sense, the FBI has had more experience in dealing with this kind of problem than the armed services."

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Hilsman's article appeared in the N.Y. Times magazine, August 23, 1964.

his counterpart in teenage terrorism. Indeed, Hilsman's analysis suffers from grave defects of observation and interpretation. Out of a population that is closer to 16 million than to 14 million, the Viet Cong did not have only 28,000 guerrillas, etc. It had AS MANY AS 28,000, and President Johnson's decision early in 1965 to expand the war by the punitive bombing of military targets in North Viet Nam made it amply clear how potent a force it was.

Fidel Castro's Cuban guerrillas, fighting on an island with a population of close to 7 million, NEVER AT ANY TIME EXCEEDED 1500 ARMED MEN. Yet when the decisive battle of Santa Clara came in December of 1958, cutting the island in two, the whole city, except for the isolated military garrison, became involved in the conflict. And when Batista finally fled the country on the last day of the year, virtually the entire population of Cuba claimed participation in the victory. Far from being isolated or indifferent, all had been rebels, it seemed.

With respect to the question of popular support of the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam, Hilsman himself admits "...the vast majority of the Vietcong are recruited in the South; their food and clothing are procured in the South, and they collect taxes in the South to import other supplies through Cambodia."

On this same question, Walter Lippman wrote in the N.Y. Herald Tribune in April, 1964: "The truth, which is being obscured for the American people, is that the Saigon Government has the allegiance of probably no more than 30% of the people and controls (even in daylight) not much more than a quarter of the (national) territory."

It should be fairly obvious that when a Vietnamese army of 400,000 men, supported by two divisions of American "advisors", an immense armada of fighter planes, jet bombers, and helicopters, and financial infusions on the order of close to 5 million dollars a day cannot control an insurgency, something more than "teenage" terrorism is involved. The error that the Viet Cong insurgency is the work of a fanatical minority directed from outside the country nevertheless persists, fostered by Washington for reasons which will be examined in subsequent chapters.

Guerrilla tactics do
Against Guerrillas ?

But successfully

strike. His every opponent must wait, and while waiting, he must be on guard everywhere

The answer is negative. To suppose otherwise is to fall into the "Methods Fallacy." Indian fighters do not become Indians by taking scalps. A spotted jungle suit does not make a United States marine a guerrilla.

The experience of World War II and of every conflict since then has made it clear that commando troops are not guerrillas. Nor can the so-called "counter insurgency" forces now being developed in a more sophisticated school be considered guerrillas, although they may employ some of the more obvious techniques of the guerrilla fighter - the night raid, the ambush, the roving patrol far from a military base, and so on.

Such techniques are as old as warfare itself. It is possible to conceive of their use by Cro-Magnon man, whoever he was, against the last of the Neanderthals.

The distinction is simple enough. When we speak of the guerrilla fighter, we are speaking of the "Political Partisan," an armed civilian whose principal weapon is not his rifle or his machete, but his relationship to the community, the nation, in and for which he fights.

In surgency, or guerrilla war, is the agency of radical social or political change; it is the face and the right arm of revolution. Counter insurgency is a form of counter-revolution, the process by which revolution is resisted. The two are opposite sides of the coin, and it will not do to confuse them or their agents, despite superficial similarities.

Because of the political nature of the struggle, the disparity of the means at the disposal of the two forces, and, above all, the total opposition of their strategic aims, the most fundamental tactics of the guerrilla simply are not available to the army that opposes him, and are available only in the most limited way to the counter insurgency specialist, the U.S. Special Forces officer, let us say, who may try to imitate him.

The reasons are clear. First the guerrilla has the initiative; it is he who begins the war, and he who decides when and where to

Both before and after the war has begun, the government army is in a defensive position, by reason of its role as policeman, which is to say, as the guardian of public and private property. The military has extensive holdings to protect: cities, towns, villages, agricultural lands, communications, commerce, and usually some sort of industrial base to defend. There is also the purely military investment to consider: garrisons, outposts, supply lines, convoys, airfields, the troops themselves and their valuable weapons, which it will be the first tactical objective of the guerrillas to capture, so as to arm more guerrillas. Finally, there is a political system, already under severe strain if the point of open insurrection has been reached, to be preserved and strengthened. In all of these areas, the incumbent regime and its military arm present highly vulnerable targets to an enemy who is himself as elusive and insubstantial as the wind.

For, while the army suffers from an embarrassment of wealth, and especially of expensive military hardware for which there is no employment, the guerrilla has the freedom of his poverty. He owns nothing but his rifle and the shirt on his back, has nothing to defend but his existence. He holds no territory, has no expensive and cumbersome military establishment to maintain, no tanks to risk in battle, no garrisons subject to siege, no transport vulnerable to air attack nor aircraft of his own to be shot down, no massed divisions to be bombarded, no motor columns to be ambushed, no bases or depots that he cannot abandon within the hour.

He can afford to run when he cannot stand and fight with good assurance of winning, and to disperse and hide when it is not safe to move. In the extremity, he can always sink back into the peaceful population - that sea, to use Mao Tse-tung's well-worn metaphor, in which the guerrilla swims like a fish.

The population, as should be clear by now, is the key to the entire struggle. Indeed, although Western analysts seem to dislike entertaining this idea, it is the

the government soldier can (for if the regime were not alienated from the people, whence the revolution?), fights with the support of the noncombatant civilian populace: it is his camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service.

Without the consent and active aid of the people, the guerrilla would be merely a bandit, and could not long survive. If, on the other hand, the counter insurgent could claim his same support, the guerrilla would not exist, because there would be no war, no revolution. The cause would have evaporated, the popular impulse toward radical change - cause or no cause - would be dead.

Here we come to the vital question of AIMS, in which the strategy and tactics of both sides are necessarily based. The guerrilla fighter is primarily a propagandist, an agitator, a disseminator of the revolutionary idea, who used the struggle itself - the actual physical conflict - as an instrument of agitation. His primary goal is to raise the level of revolutionary anticipation, and then of popular participation, to the crisis point, at which the revolution becomes general throughout the country and the people in their masses carry out the final task - the destruction of the existing order and (often but not always) of the army that defends it.

By contrast, the purpose of the counter-revolutionary is negative and defensive. It is to restore order, to protect property, to preserve existing forms and interests by force of arms, where persuasion has already failed. His means may be political insofar as they involve the use of still more persuasion, the promise of social and economic reforms, bribes of a more localized sort, counter propaganda of various kinds. But primarily the counterinsurgent's task must be to destroy the revolution by destroying its promise - that means by proving, militarily, that it cannot and will not succeed.

To do so will require the total defeat of the revolutionary vanguard and its piecemeal destruction wherever it exists. The alternatives will be to abdicate the military effort in favor of a political solution - for example,

...tion, etc. In other words, compromise or complete surrender.

That military victory against true guerrillas is possible, seems doubtful on the basis of modern experience, barring the use of methods approaching genocide, as applied notably by the Germans in certain occupied countries during World War II.

The counter insurgent cannot win by imitating the insurgent, because he is the alien in the revolutionary situation, and because his tasks are precisely the opposite of those of the guerrilla, where symmetry exists at all. The guerrilla's mere survival is a political victory: it encourages and raises the popular opposition to the incumbent regime. This he can afford to run and to hide. The counterinsurgent gains nothing by running and hiding. He surrenders everything. The guerrilla can disguise himself as - in fact he can be - a peaceful agrarian worker, and still spread his revolutionary message. In a similar role, the counterinsurgent would be merely a police spy, and would accomplish little, spread no message. The guerrilla can hit and run. Every successful raid gives him more arms and ammunition, and more favorable publicity. The counterinsurgent can gain nothing by such Red Indian tactics - even if similar targets were available to him - and they are not. His military campaign must be sweeping, continuous and cumulative in its effects. Either he clears the country of guerrillas, or he does not. If he does not, he continues to lose.

The distinction made here between guerrilla war as a politico-military technique and mere guerrilla-ism (banditry on the one hand or the application of irregular warfare techniques by regular military organizations on the other) is by no means as arbitrary as it may at first appear.

Popular insurrections have occurred throughout history. They have usually failed, or in any case have produced only limited victory, because the techniques they can exploit today were then irrelevant to the historical situation. This is simply another way of saying that, until now, the popular majorities, the laboring, unspecial-

were able to exert very little political or economic leverage.

The serfs of the medieval period, for example, were unable to resist the feudal military power not merely because they lacked arms and skills, political consciousness, and cohesion, but because they had no other means to affect the political and economic processes of their world.

Economically, they were manageable because they lived too close to the level of bare existence to be otherwise. They could not even think of withholding their labor - their only economic lever. Isolated by their brute conditions and their ignorance, they lived below the level of politics. If they starved, or rebelled and were slaughtered, there was no one to care, no economically or politically potent class to whom it would make the slightest difference.

Subsequent revolutions, from the Renaissance to the Russian revolution and not excluding Mexico, 1910-1917, have been bourgeois in character, or have quickly been converted into bourgeois movements, after an initially populist period. "Liberté, égalité, fraternité" applied only to the great and petite bourgeoisie of France, after a brief Jacobin interval (significantly, all bourgeois historians loathe and fear the proletarianism of the Terror), because, in the end, only the bourgeoisie had the lever - wealth and the tools of production - to assume leadership in a confrontation with the landowning feudal aristocracy. Although there was now some class mobility and a greater need of democratic slogans, the landless, unspecialized masses remained submerged. They could remain idle and starve. All the better. It reduced beggary and banditry. Isolated, they could be slaughtered and no one would care.

History brings us to a pass in which (for a variety of reasons but principally because of the complexity of the productive processes, the fragmentation, specialization, and interlocking nature of the industrial society and the importance of disciplined labor and huge consumer markets, relative to the profit system) the laboring masses assume political potency. Their new role in the industrial society - as producer, as distributor, as con-

sume their work, if they are slaughtered, if they cease to buy and to consume, the same thing happens. If they are slaughtered, there are worldwide repercussions, based, in the final analysis, on economic considerations.

The modern industrial society cannot function, and its government cannot govern, except with popular participation and by popular consent. What is true of the industrial states is also true, with minor qualification, of the non industrial states and colonies on which the former depend for the raw materials of their industry, and, often, for their export markets.

For the best of economic reasons, modern governments must seem to be popular. They must make great concessions to popular notions of what is democratic and just, or be replaced by regimes that will do so. The governments of the dominant industrial states themselves, even more than those they dominate, are strapped politically by this factor of the domestic "image".

This fact makes such governments extremely vulnerable to a sort of war - guerrilla war with its psychological and economic weapons - that their predecessors could have ignored, had such a war been possible at all in the past.

They are vulnerable because they must, at all cost, keep the economy functioning and showing a profit or providing the materials and markets on which another, dominant economy depends. Again, they are vulnerable because they must maintain the appearance of normalcy; they can be embarrassed out of office. And they are triply vulnerable because they cannot be as ruthless as the situation demands. They cannot openly crush the opposition that embarrasses and harasses them. They must be woools as well as doers. These are modern weaknesses. They invite a distinctly modern development to exploit them, and that development is modern guerrilla warfare. The weaknesses peculiar to the modern, bourgeois democratic, capitalist state make popular war possible, and give it its distinctive forms, which clearly cannot be imitated, except in the most superficial way, by the armies of the state itself.

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Fundamentally, the guerrilla's tactics and those of the counter insurgent differ because their roles differ. They are dissimilar forces, fighting dissimilar wars, for disparate objectives. The counter insurgent seeks a military solution: to wipe out the guerrillas. He is hampered by a political and economic impediment: he cannot wipe out the populace, or any significant sector of it. The guerrilla for his part, wishes to wear down his military opponent and will employ suitable tactics to that end, but his primary objective is political. It is to feed and fan the fires of revolution by his struggle, to raise the entire population against the regime, to discredit it, isolate it, wreck its credit, undermine its economy, over extend its resources, and cause its disintegration.

Essentially, then, the guerrilla fighter's war is political and social, his means are at least as political as they are military, his purpose is almost entirely so. Thus we may paraphrase Clausewitz: Guerrilla war is the extension of politics by means of armed conflict. At a certain point in its development it becomes revolution itself.

Guerrilla War = Revolutionary War: the extension of politics by means of armed conflict.

CHAPTER 2: THE EVOLUTION OF REVOLUTION

The policy of hitting the enemy when he is weak, evading him when he is strong, taking the offensive when he falls back, circling around when he advances - all of this is only common sense. There is no great novelty in it.

What IS new, is the application of guerrilla activity, in a conscious and deliberate way, to specific political objectives, without immediate reference to the outcome of affairs as such, provided only that the revolutionaries survive.

The explanation seems to baffle conventional military men, yet it is simple enough: guerrillas who know their trade and have popular support cannot be eliminated by the force available to most governments. And on the other hand, few governments can stand the political, psychological, and economic stresses of guerrilla war, no matter how strong they may be militarily.

In general, warfare involves the same basic problem: how to use one's strength to exploit the enemy's weaknesses and so to overcome him. In an internal war, the government's strength is its powerful army, its arsenal, and its wealth of material means. Its weaknesses are social, political, and economic in the sense that the economy, while an asset, is vulnerable from several points of view. It provides both military and psychological targets.

On the military level, a regular army, under whatever political system, has disadvantages that are owing to the very size and complexity of the organization, and again to its defensive role, as the guardian of the national wealth and of the whole of the national territory.

The guerrilla, for his part, finds his strength in his freedom from territorial commitments, his mobility, and his relationship to a discontented people, as the spokesman of their grievances, the armed vanguard, as Che Guevara puts it, of militant social protest.

His weakness is merely (the word is used advisedly) is a military weakness. He lacks the arms, and usually the manpower, to risk a military decision. Under these circumstances, it is obvious what the guerrillas's tactics must be:

(1) POLITICALLY - he must seek to aggravate such social and political dissension as exists and to raise the level of political consciousness and of revolutionary WILL among the people. It will also be part of his design to bring about an intensification of the political repression that already exists, so deepening popular opposition to the regime and hastening the process of its dissolution.

(2) MILITARILY - his tactics will be designed to wear the enemy down, by chipping away at the morale of the government troops and by inducing the maximum expenditure of funds, material, and manpower in the effort to suppress him. At the same time he will endeavor to build his own forces through the capture of government arms and by recruitment from an increasingly alienated populace, avoiding a military confrontation

an equalization of forces can be obtained.

An army deals from strength, seeking out the enemy's weaknesses in order to destroy him. The guerrilla is sometimes said to deal from weakness, but this is an absurdity. In fact, he exploits his own kind of strength, which lies in the extreme mobility of lightly armed forces without territorial or hardware investments, a bottomless well of manpower from which to recruit, and the fact that TIME which is both money and political capital, works in his favor.

Analogically, the guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough, the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws and to rake with his claws.

But in practice, the dog does not die of anemia. He merely becomes too weakened - in military terms, overextended; in political terms, too unpopular; in economic terms, too expensive - to defend himself. At this point the flea, having multiplied to a veritable plague of fleas through long series of small victories, each drawing its drop of blood, each claiming the reward of a few more captured weapons to arm yet a few more partisans, concentrates his forces for a decisive series of powerful blows.

Time works for the guerrilla both in the field - where it costs the enemy a daily fortune to pursue him - and in the politico-economic arena.

Almost all modern governments are highly conscious of what journalism calls "world opinion." For sound reasons, mostly of an economic nature, they cannot afford to be condemned in the United Nations, they do not like to be visited by Human Rights Commissions or Freedom of the Press Committees; their need of foreign investment, foreign loans, foreign markets, satisfactory trade relationships, and so on, requires that they be members in more or less good standing of a larger community of interests. Often, too, they are members of military alliances. Consequently, they must maintain some appearance of stability

in order to assure the other members of the community - the alliance that contracts will continue to be honored, that treaties will be upheld, that loans will be repaid with interest, that investments will continue to produce profits and be safe.

Protracted internal war threatens all of this, for no capitalist investor will wish to put his money where it is not safe and certain to produce a profit, no bank lends without guarantees, no ally wishes to treat with a government that is on the point of eviction.

It follows that it must be the business of the guerrilla, and of his clandestine political organization in the cities, to destroy the stable image of the government, and so to deny it credits, to dry up its sources of revenue, and to create dissension within the frightened owning classes, within the government bureaucracy (whose payrolls will be pinched), and within the military itself.

**The outbreak of the insurgency is the first step - it is a body blow that in itself inflicts severe damage on the prestige of the regime. The survival of the guerrilla force over a period of time, demonstrating the impotence of the army, continues the process. As the guerrilla's support widens - and this will come automatically as the weakness of the government is revealed - political trouble is sure to follow, in the form of petitions, demonstrations, strikes. These in their turn will be followed by more serious developments - sabotage, terror, spreading insurrection.

In such circumstances, it will be a remarkable government that will not be driven to stern measures - curfews, the suspension of civil liberties, a ban on popular assembly, illegal acts that can only deepen the popular opposition, creating a vicious circle of rebellion and repression until the economy is undermined, the social fabric torn beyond redemption, and the regime tottering on the verge of collapse.

** This by no means indicate that the evolution of Guerrilla Warfare will follow the exact mentioned pattern.

In the end, it will be a question whether the government falls before the military is destroyed in the field, or whether the destruction of the military brings about the final deposition of the political regime. The two processes are complementary. Social and political dissolution bleeds the military, and the protracted and futile campaign in the field contributes to the process of social and political dissolution, creating the "climate of collapse."

This is the grand strategic objective of the guerrilla: to create the "climate of collapse." It may be taken as the key to everything he does.

Insurrection is a phenomenon, revolution a process, which cannot begin until the historical stage has been set for it. Since guerrilla war is, in our definition, a revolutionary process, it can only come out of a revolutionary situation. For this reason, one should agree with Che Guevara when he writes in "Guerrilla Warfare":

"Naturally, it is not to be thought that all conditions for revolution are going to be created through the impulse given to them by guerrilla activity. It must always be kept in mind that there is a necessary minimum without which the establishment and consolidation of the first center (of rebellion) is not practicable. People must see clearly the futility of maintaining a fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate. When the forces of oppression come to maintain themselves in power against established law, peace is considered already broken.

"In these conditions, popular discontent manifests itself in more active forms. An attitude of resistance crystallizes in an outbreak of fighting, provoked initially by the conduct of the authorities.

where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted."

We have defined guerrilla war as the extension of politics by means of armed conflict.

It follows that the extension cannot logically come out of all acceptable peaceful solutions - appeals, legislative and judicial action, and the resources of the ballot box have been proved worthless. Were it otherwise, there would be no hope of enlisting the popular support essential to revolutionary activity. If people are to accept the risks and responsibilities of organized violence, they must believe first that there is no alternative; second, that the cause is compelling; third, that they have reasonable expectation of success. The last named is perhaps the most powerful of motives.

Where the cause appears just, the situation is intolerable, and oppression past all appeal, the way to action is clear. Even then, however, much groundwork must be done before a guerrilla campaign will become feasible.

The experiences of Algeria, of Cuba, and of other successful revolutions indicate that, in most circumstances, guerrillas require the active support of a political organization outside of their own ranks but dedicated to their cause, an urban arm of the revolutionary movement, that can provide assistance by means both legal and illicit, from placing bombs to defending accused revolutionaries in the courts of law (provided that these still exist). Hence the creation of the R.A.P.

Isolation, military and political, is the great enemy of guerrilla movements. It is the task of the urban organization to prevent this isolation, to provide diversions and provocations when needed, to maintain contact, to keep the world aware of a revolution in progress even when there is no progress to report.

Usually the revolutionary political organization will have two branches: one subterranean and illegal, the other visible and quasi-legitimate. On the one hand, there will be the activists - saboteurs, arms runners, fabricators of explosive devices, operators of a clandestine press, distributors of political pamphlets, and couriers to carry messages from one guerrilla sector to another, using the towns as communications centers.

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of the underground, operating the most part within the law, but sustaining the efforts of the activists, and of themselves, accomplishing far more important tasks. The visible organization will, of course, have invisible links with the revolutionary underground, and through it, with the guerrillas in the countryside. But its real work will be to serve as a respectable facade for the revolution, a civilian front, or, as the Cubans called it, "resistencia civil", made up of intellectuals, tradesmen, clerks, students, professionals, and the like - above all, of women - capable of promoting funds, circulating petitions, organizing boycotts, raising popular demonstrations, informing friendly journalists, spreading rumors, and in every way conceivable waging a massive propaganda campaign aimed at two objectives: the strengthening and brightening of the rebel "image," and the discrediting of the regime.

SECTION 3: TRANSITION TO CIVIL WAR

Let us say that a cause exists. Peaceful alternatives have been exhausted. The revolutionary organizations have come into being, perhaps only in skeletal form, but sufficient to the immediate need. Somewhere in the remotest province, which will be the most revolutionary because the most neglected and the most favorable to guerrilla action because the most primitive and inaccessible, insurrection breaks out and spreads.

A rebel band springs into existence, composed of armed civilians who call themselves patriots, and whom the government will call bandits or Communists.

A government arsenal is assaulted, a police post is burned, a radio station is briefly seized, and a proclamation is issued in the name of the revolution. The hour is at hand, the people are in arms, the tyrant (or puppet, or foreigner) must go. A blow has been struck for national liberation and the lines of battle are drawn.

The aims and principles of the revolution are specified in appropriate rhetoric, with patriotic references and historical footnotes. They are just aims, worthy principles. Who would propound any others? They involve

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The government is not concerned about the loss of a few policemen, or even an arsenal, but it is terrified of the attendant publicity, which casts doubts on its stability, and thus on the future of the economy. Besides, who knows what other insurrections may not be brewing?

Reassuring statements are issued, provincial garrisons are quietly reinforced. An expedition is sent, with as little fanfare as possible, to extirpate the bandits, root and branch.

Now is the crucial time for the revolution. If the insurrection has been well timed, the terrain well chosen, and the guerrilla leaders competent and determined, the military effort will fail. The experience of scores of guerrilla campaigns in the era since World War II - indeed, of the Peninsular War in Spain (1804-14) - shows that it is virtually impossible to stamp out guerrillas in rural areas where they have room to maneuver and to hide, assuming that they have also the support of the rural population. Conceivably it may be accomplished by exterminating the rural population itself, but such draconian methods failed even the Nazis in eastern Europe, and not for scruples or lack of determination on their part.

This is not to say that guerrillas can win battles. In the early stage of the insurgency they will have NO BUSINESS TO SEEK BATTLES AND EVERY REASON TO SHUN THEM. Rather, the rebel strategy will be:

(1) To attack only when assured of success by the overwhelming superiority of firepower, position, and the element of surprise, and only in pursuit of limited objectives, such as the capture of arms, or to create a diversion from some other action, or to avoid encirclement;

(2) To use the campaign as an educational tool and a propaganda weapon by disclosing the impotence of the enemy, showing that he can be defied with impunity; to proselytize among the rural population by identifying with its grievances and aspirations and by putting the burden and the blame of blood-

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In the beginning, only small actions in isolated sectors will be possible. Later, as the guerrillas grow stronger, they will divide their forces, to take their revolutionary message into new areas, and to harass the army on a broader scale, forcing it to extend its lines so that its defenses are weakened, and small units can be reduced, one at a time.

Throughout the campaign to the final stage, the rebel strategy will be to avoid a military decision, until an equalization of forces has been reached, and the government army can be confronted on the battlefield with clear assurance of success.

At the onset, defiance will be enough. The existence of insurgency will in itself serve to discredit the government and so to advance the rebel cause. The difficulty will be to continue to make political capital of an uprising that can consist, initially, of only small actions. Just as the regime depends for its life on an appearance of stability and progress, so does the rebel leader depend on action as the means of asserting his intransigence and winning mass support.

If their clandestine organization in the towns is up to it, there will now be incidents of industrial sabotage, communications sabotage to heighten the crisis. If there are atrocities on the way of reprisal on the part of the authorities, they must be well publicized. If there are martyrs, there must be big funerals, protests led by the mothers of the slain, outbursts of popular indignation. Ideally, there will be a general strike. With it will come further repression, a curfew, beatings, arrests, creating further alienation of the populace from the regime, perhaps creating new martyrs, new incidents.

As it becomes clear that the government can no longer maintain order and cannot suppress the insurrection, the revolutionary tide begins to rise and swell. Students join the ranks of the underground. The working class and liberal middleclass elements of the towns - housewives, white-collar workers, the "out" political factions, the economic nationalists, idealists of one sort or another, and bedisaffected of all classes - join the

popular protest against persecution and... organization rise to the countryside to join the guerrillas, and peasants who have become the victims of a military campaign which is sure to claim innocent casualties, or who have fallen under suspicion for their association with the rebels, also swell the insurgent force.

As it grows, it becomes capable of acting over wider territory; even more important, it becomes capable of establishing guerrilla bases in areas which the military can no longer control. With the establishment of such bases come into being a rebel government and a guerrilla economy, capable of supporting the guerrilla fighters independently of raids and smuggled supplies from the towns.

In a later phase, the base areas are expanded, continual pressure being maintained against the government forces on their perimeters, until the guerrillas hold or operate freely in most of the rural territory of entire regions, confining the army, except for excursions which will grow shorter and more dangerous as time passes, to their fortified strong points in the towns.

At this point, the conflict begins to resemble a civil war between territorial entities of the same nation, each with its separate economy and government. There will, however, be significant differences:

- (1) The territory of the guerrillas will be rural and its economy agricultural and primitive, while the economy of the enemy will be industrial - continuing to present targets for sabotage - and his territory increasingly restricted to urban areas;
- (2) The legitimate government will continue to suffer all the pangs and pressures, political, diplomatic, economic, of a regime confronted by open insurgency which it cannot suppress, while the rebels will only gain prestige and popular appeal by their successful insurgency.

We have discussed characteristic developments in a revolutionary situation, from the start of an insurgency to the point at which a relative balance of forces is reached. The

All follow - military or political. We believe that the decision will be political.

The Cuban revolution provides an excellent example of the process that we have been discussing in hypothesis. The stage had been set much as described above.

In December of 1956, Fidel Castro and 81 armed followers disembarked from a leaking motor cruiser on the lonely shore of Cuba's easternmost province of Oriente, arriving from Mexico. In the month that followed, the force was reduced to a round dozen, most of the other men being killed or captured in a military ambush before they could make their way into the mountains.

THE CUBAN EXAMPLE

Fidel Castro's military activities during the next 6 months were minuscule. They consisted of small raids on isolated army posts (yet the first produced sufficient captured weapons to double the force, when recruits were found), sugar mills, and villages on the edge of the Sierra Maestra range. In April of 1957, Castro had perhaps 100 followers. Half of these had arrived only 2 weeks before from Santiago, the provincial capital, where they had formed the bulk of his urban underground.

The biggest single action of the "fidelistas" during this period was an attack, May 28, 1957, on the small military outpost of Ubero, manned by about 70 soldiers. Rebel losses came to 8 dead; military losses were put at 30. Other actions during the first year were on a similar scale, or smaller, and at no time during the entire insurrectionary period did battles involve more than a few hundred men on either side. In almost all cases of unprovoked attack, where there was no prior move by the Batista military, the rebel purpose was to capture weapons with which to arm the guerrillas.

EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA VICTORIES

The scale of the action was miniature, yet propaganda victories came early and were international in their scope. One followed the other. The reports of the N.Y. Times correspondent Herbert Matthews made Fidel Castro's name a household word in the U.S.; subsequent publicity carried it around the world.

The effect, on the political and economic

embargo against the government of Fulgencio Batista, to discourage investment and restrict credits to such an extent as to put a severe strain on the regime, and to cause, gradually, a failure of nerve within the administration that spread to the military and made it practically impotent long before most of the troops had ever heard a rifle shot.

The Batista regime was hopelessly corrupt and inefficient. When it fell, it appeared, superficially, to have fallen of its own weight and weakness. Foreign journalists covering the story could not quite believe that Castro's handful of bearded riflemen had had much to do with it, except on the propaganda level.

At first, Batista had been disdainful of what appeared to be a small band of political adventurers, almost completely isolated in the remote Sierra Maestra. After the first fitful attempts to flush the guerrillas out of the mountains, he was inclined to dismiss the danger, and to cede to Castro by default a territory so remote, inaccessible, thinly populated and uneconomic as to be scarcely worth bothering about. Bandits had existed in the Sierra before; they had attracted little attention and had done no great harm. Doubtless Batista reasoned that the publicity would soon die away and that in due time the adventurers would be starved out of their sanctuary, or grow weary of a gruitless campaign and give it up.

Later he was to feel that he had grossly underestimated the threat, and to see rebels everywhere - even when there were none. With a secure mountain base, Castro was able to recruit a strong irregular force, and to make what he had seem many times stronger than it actually was. Fast-moving guerrilla patrols, sometimes of only a half dozen men, managed to be everywhere at once. No army patrol was quite safe in the mountains; no outpost, sugar plantation, or village was safe in the foothills or within striking distance of them.

When Castro grandiosly announced a "total war" in March of 1958 and warned of "columns" moving quickly north, east and west toward key objectives in all parts of the island, the army reacted as to an invasion. It had no way of knowing that the "columns" consisted

led of fewer than 200 men. All, or that a so-called "second front" announced at the same time, had been opened in northern Oriente by a force of no more than 65 guerrillas - their heaviest weapon a 30 caliber Browning automatic rifle.

At the onset of the insurrection, Batista had sent 5,000 soldiers to the Sierra Maestra to cordon off the area and eliminate the guerrillas. The Sierra runs more than 100 miles east and west and is 15-25 miles deep. Simple arithmetic shows how impossible was the task set for the army, given a trackless terrain of precipitous and thickly wooded mountains. It would have been impossible with twice the number of troops.

Aircraft were used against the guerrillas but as Castro noted, the thick, wet woods blotted out the effects of high explosive bombs and napalm within 25 to 50 yards. There was little danger even had the bombardiers been accurate and the location of the guerrillas known - and neither of these "ifs" ever prevailed. The only damage done by the aircraft was to the thatched "bohios" of the mountain dwellers, living in cultivated clearings.

The Sierra quickly became the first "territorio libre" of the revolution, and the first year was devoted by the free-ranging guerrillas to building a rear-base economy - small shops for the fabrication of uniforms and equipment, for making crude explosive devices and for repairing arms, for canning foodstuff, and so on - and proselytizing the inhabitants of the zone.

The harassment of the outlying districts and the interception of army patrols were undertaken as a matter of course. It was relatively easy because of the superior military competence of the guerrillas - thanks to the cooperation of the "Guajiros". Seldom was a military patrol able to come within ten or a few miles of the "fidelistas" force without the guerrillas becoming aware of it.

One of Castro's first acts on entering the Sierra had been to execute 2 bandits, accused of rape and murder, so dramatically establishing a revolutionary government with a code of law which could be looked to as a stabilizing factor in an area long neglected by the Havana government.

The next step, important in winning a following politically and recruiting militarily, was to promulgate an agrarian reform law that conferred title on hundreds of small tenants, sharecroppers, and squatters, who were told that they now owned the land they tilled.

SECOND FRONT - FRANK PAIS

Similar tactics were followed in the more densely populated, rich coffee-growing upland of the so-called "Segundo Frente, Frank Pais, opened by Raul Castro. A code of law was imposed, taxes were collected, and certain benefits - schools, hospitals - were conferred in return. Supplies were scrupulously paid for - in cash. The villagers were treated much as they would have been treated by any ordinary government - except that political indoctrination was more intense and more was demanded of them, in the way of identification with the revolution and adherence to its goals.

The few rural guard posts in the area were quickly eliminated. Since they consisted of no more than a few men at each post, they presented no obstacle for even so small an "army" as that of Raul Castro, with 65 men, all of whom could be concentrated on a single objective at a time.

Army columns sent into the area were ambushed as they entered, and then after brief resistance, allowed to pass. As they returned, they were likely to be ambushed again at other points - and again permitted to pass.

If pursued, the guerrillas simply withdrew into the wooded hills, dispersed, and regrouped elsewhere. When the zone was clear, they returned to the villages. After a few weeks of this futile exercise, the army ceased to send patrols, and contented itself with strengthening the garrisons in the towns on the outskirts of the free territory. But as the rebel force grew from internal recruitment and its economy prospered, these garrisons, too, became unsafe, and had to be reduced in number for reasons of security.

In terms of both expense and of military manpower, it became simply uneconomical for the government to attempt to hold dozens of tiny villages and farms and to police an area of several thousand sq. miles in extent; and so

ages were abandoned to the rebels, the military having the larger towns and the uneasy provincial capital to defend. In this manner, the liberated territory was gradually extended. At its expanding periphery, a no-man's land was created, visited by both rebels and Batista troops but held by neither. Slowly bits of this neutral strip were also nibbled away, as not worth fighting for, and the free zone continued to grow.

Within 3 months, the army found itself unable to protect the big American nickel and cobalt mines on Oriente's northern coast, except in daylight. For reasons of political expedience, these were permitted to continue in operation. But the rebels helped themselves to such motor transport as they were able to use - several dozen jeeps and trucks from the mines - and earthmoving equipment for building new roads and improving those that existed.

A rebel guard post was actually established within a few yards of the entrance to the great U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. When the Americans were found to be fueling Batista's military aircraft on one occasion and supplying the air force with rockets on another - this after an arms embargo had been declared by the U.S. - Raul Castro's guerrillas promptly kidnapped 50 odd American sailors and marines on an outing, along with their excursion bus, and simultaneously swooped down on the mining communities and a United Fruit Company experimental station to seize half a dozen executives and engineers as hostages.

The resultant embarrassment to Batista was great. It effectively demonstrated, to a world largely unaware of the dimensions of the guerrilla campaign in remote Oriente, that the dictator no longer had control of a considerable part of his country.

That the "great" U.S. itself could be defied by a few hundred Cuban guerrillas was a further political lesson - and a powerful one. It naturally increased pressure on Batista to "do something." In the circumstances, it is hard to see what he could have done. Short of exterminating his own people and burning their villages, he was helpless. In the extremity of the final months, a few military commanders in the

beginning of the year 1958, a scorched earth campaign. But by then it was far too late.

* * *

The rebels had built a strong force and a viable economy in secure rear-base areas. In northern Oriente, they had control of the entire national coffee crop, worth some \$60 million; since the government had to have it and could not get it in any other way, it was allowed to come to market, and was duly taxed by the guerrillas.

Other farm produce was also marketed. In addition to the revenue it brought, it provided the guerrillas, in exchange, with supplies which they were unable to obtain within the liberated territory. The government needed the crops for the sake of its own economy; it was also in the position of having to maintain an appearance of normality (a pretense of business-as-usual (venality also played a part), and for these reasons tolerated a commerce that nourished the rebellion.

Guerrilla action continued, slow, sporadic and small-scale, often serving merely as a distraction while the rebel build-up within the free zones continued, yet always having definite objectives: the gradual extension of the territorio libre, the capture of arms, the training of new recruits.

A similar process had been going on in the middle of the island, in the mountains of the Escambray in Las Villas Province, on a smaller scale. In the late summer of 1958 2 columns from the Sierra Maestra, having taken part in the defeat and capture of a regiment-sized expedition sent into the mountains in June, left the Sierra to join the rebels in the Escambray, arriving in early September.

The campaign gradually intensified on both fronts. Guerrilla patrols began to interdict the main roads and the national highway, railroad bridges were destroyed, traffic in the country was brought to a virtual standstill; except for the movement of large military convoys; then these, too, began to come under fire.

rillas became a swarm. Guerrillas and terrorism were stepped up in the towns. On occasion, rebel jeep patrols drove boldly into cities to reconnoitre the suburban areas. Small towns along the national highway were isolated and their garrisons reduced. Santiago was cut off. In mid-island, an armored train carrying troops to defend the city of Santa Clara was derailed and set afire, and its military passengers captured, along with a huge supply of arms, enough to supply all of the young volunteers in the city.

The demoralized Batista soldiers, restricted first to the towns and then to their own fortified barracks, found no military profit in venturing out; since the guerrillas would not stand and fight, unless assured of overwhelming odds. On the other hand, the troops risked ambush and capture or death whenever they traveled in less than company or even platoon strength. Slowly, lacking unified leadership, their communications destroyed, they allowed themselves to be sequestered. When the hour of decision came, most of them were on guard within their own isolated fortresses, controlling not even the towns they were supposed to defend.

The army general staff and the government meanwhile, had been shattered by a general crisis of nerves, with no member of the establishment able to trust another and each preparing to sell out or get out at the first sign of the regime's collapse. The loss of confidence in Batista had proceeded to such an extent that the ambassador of the "all-powerful" United States, on whom the Cuban economy depended and whose puppet the government was for all practical purposes, was in the process of negotiating with the political opposition, seeking a conservative alternative to Batista, when the latter precipitately fled the country, along with his generals and the ranking members of his government.

To summarize the Cuban revolution in this way is to neglect the part played by the urban underground and the civic resistance movement - both of which contributed much, in the way of strikes, demonstrations, sabotage, and propaganda work, to undermine the morale of the government and to destroy the prestige without which it could no longer direct the economy nor continue to exist.

guerrilla. In a war of attrition, slowly nibbling away the rural areas, gradually expanding the free territories and building a military force with captured arms while strangling the army in its barracks, whose action was decisive.

Virtually all of the weapons to arm some 1500 men, save a few hundred small arms smuggled in from the United States, were captured from Batista's troops, a few dozen or at the most, a hundred at a time. The fall of the Oriente capital of Santiago put tanks and artillery into the hands of the rebels. Further surrenders in Las Villas gave them the means to confront any remaining army regiments that might have been disposed to fight.

But by that time, Batista had already fled, a general strike had put Havana in insurgent hands, the principal garrison at Camp Columbia, outside the capital, had surrendered without firing a shot, the navy had rebelled, and the war was over.

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SECTION 4: REVOLUTIONARY PROTRACTED WAR: A NECESSITY AND AN ADVANTAGE TO THE GUERRILLA

Revolutionary wars are generally, of necessity, wars of long duration. The seeds of revolution are slow to germinate; the roots and tendrils spread out silently and ground long before there is any sign of sprout or bud. Then suddenly one day, like new wheat springing up in a cultivated field there is a blaze of color, an overnight growth: the rebels are there and everywhere.

It is customary to speak of guerrilla wars as wars of attrition. The phrase is not perfectly accurate. Guerrilla warfare is not so much abrasive as subversive. It is a growth that penetrates the crevices of a rotting structure and one day bursts it asunder.

Yet attrition does, after all, play a great part. In the political sphere, the government is subjected to a constant, wearing pressure that comes from the great expense and anxiety of the anti-guerrilla

***Attrition: the gradual act of wearing something down by friction. (as resources)

campaign and from the cry of the opposition, the banks, the business community: "When will it all end? What are you doing about it?"

Economic attrition has already been discussed. Sabotage is one aspect of it. The loss of credit and investment suffered by a country engaged in civil war is the other, far more important aspect. No small nation, and few great ones, can stand the deprivation indefinitely. Yet the astounding fact is that the guerrillas, for their part, can carry on indefinitely.

Having no vested interest, no political opposition within their own ranks, no economic problems other than those that can be solved by extending the war and capturing what they need, the insurgents have nothing to lose and everything to gain by continuing the struggle. And, on the other hand, they have nothing to gain and everything to lose by giving up. In fact, once the banner of rebellion has been raised and blood has been shed, it is no easy matter to give up. The rebels begin to fight for whatever reason: they continue because they must.

They fight, then, in order to survive. Given their inferiority of resources, they can survive only by avoiding direct confrontation with a superior enemy; that is, battle on the enemy's terms. Guerrilla strategy is dictated from the start by this consideration. The result - if the guerrillas are to be successful and to avoid extermination - is a protracted war. The conflict must continue until the movement has recruited and trained enough men, and come into possession of enough arms, to build a revolutionary army capable of defeating the regular army in open battle.

Failing this, it must continue until political developments resulting from the campaign have brought about the desired end: the rising of the masses of the people and the overthrow or abdication of the discredited government.

In Cuba, the Batista regime collapsed before the military confrontation had fully developed. The army, lacking leadership, its general staff gone, found no reason to continue the struggle, and surrendered. A general strike in Havana - in other words, a

rising of the people - was sufficient to make it clear to the military that there would be no further purpose in fighting; Batista fled and his designated heirs could not be forced on the rebellious country. Nothing but a revolutionary government would be accepted.

Cuba is a prototype. It is typical of the dependent, semi-colonial countries in which revolution can be attained without the bloody necessity of full-scale war. In such countries, it will be sufficient, barring intervention by the dominating colonial power to create by guerrillas warfare the conditions in which a discredited government (discredited because it can no longer keep order and assure a profit to the country's capitalists) falls from lack of support, and the revolutionaries rush in to fill the political vacuum.

Popular revolutionary forces can defeat regular armies. This is the fundamental lesson of China. Popular forces, to put the matter more precisely, can BECOME armies, making the transition from guerrilla activity to mobile warfare, that will be superior on their own ground to regular troops equipped with all of the heavy weapons produced by modern industry.

How can a nation that is not industrialized defeat that is? The answer, which applies to any agency anywhere, as against the mechanized army, is guerrilla warfare.

Where the industrial nations stressed such tangible military factors as arms, logistic and manpower, Mao looked to the Intangibles: time, space, and will. Lacking the arms with which to confront well-equipped armies in the field, Mao avoided battle by surrendering territory. In so doing, he traded space for time, and used the time to produce WILL: the psychological capacity of the Chinese people to resist defeat.

This is the essence of guerrillas warfare. The basic premise of Mao's theory is that political mobilization may be substituted for industrial mobilization with a successful military outcome. That is to say, his fundamental belief is that only those who will admit defeat can be defeated. So if the totality of a population can be made to resist surrender, this resistance can be turned

into a war of attrition which will eventually and inevitably be victorious.

So Mao's real military problem was not that of getting the war over with, the question to which Western military thinkers have directed the greater part of their attention, but that of keeping it going.

Mao's problem, then: how to avoid a military decision. His answer: hit and run, fight and live to fight another day, give way before the determined advance of the enemy, and, like the sea, close in again as the enemy passes. The formula, "space" for "time", is well conceived. Mao makes it clear that nothing is gained unless the time is used to produce political results, by raising the revolutionary consciousness, the "will" of the masses:

"When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but to agitate the masses, to organize them, and to help them establish revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence."

PLEASE NOTE:

Political mobilization - raising the level of political consciousness of the people and involving them actively in the revolutionary struggle - is the first task of the guerrillas; and it is the nature of this effort, which necessarily takes time, that accounts for the PROTRACTED CHARACTER OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR.

Furthermore, time is required, not alone for political mobilization, but to allow the inherent weaknesses of the enemy to develop under the stress of war.

Mao makes this point more than once in his military writings, in several different contexts. In the Sino-Japanese War, for ex., Japan, an industrial power, had the great advantage of a superior war machine, capable of striking devastating blows at the poorly armed troops of semi-feudal, semi-colonial, unindustrial China. Yet such an advantage, unless immediately decisive, could not compensate for defects that would become apparent in prolonged conflict.

The first of these was that Japan, while powerful militarily, lacked the base in natural resources and manpower to sustain her war machine, far from home and in a vast, populous country over a long period of time. In deed, the war had been started to compensate for the defect, but extended through conquest Japan's paucity of material resources. Insofar as this was true, war was an act of desperation, and a contradiction, putting the cart before the horse. For what would happen if the war was NOT quickly won, and the new wealth quickly absorbed and exploited?

Japan was seeking, of necessity, a war of quick decision. The correct military response was to deny it, by avoiding a military confrontation and fighting along the lines of guerrilla and mobile warfare, trading the vast space of China for the time necessary--

- (1) To let the inherent weaknesses of Japan develop and show themselves under the stresses of a protracted war;
- (2) To build Chinese resistance forces to the strength and degree of organization needed to confront the gradually weakened Japanese war machine.

As Mao analyzed the situation:

"...Japan's war is conducted on the basis of her great military, economic and political organizational power, but at the same time, it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economic and political organizational power is great but qualitatively inadequate. Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in manpower and in military, financial and material resources, and she cannot stand a prolonged war. Japan's rulers are endeavoring to resolve this difficulty through war, but again they will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is to say, the war they have launched to resolve this difficulty will only add in addition to it and even in exhausting Japan's original resources."

Other defects were apparent:

"...the internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale, but also to approach final collapse. In terms of development, Japan is no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought by

...of Japanese imperialism. This is what we mean by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is this reactionary quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism, that gives rise to the peculiar barbarity of Japan's war. All of which will arouse to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, the antagonism between the Japanese and the Chinese nations, and the antagonism between Japan and most other countries of the world.

"...while Japan can get international support from the fascist countries, the international opposition she is bound to encounter will be greater than her international support. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually will not only cancel out support but even bear down on Japan herself.... To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in her great capacity to wage war, and her disadvantages lie in the reactionary and barbarous nature of her war, in the inadequacy of her manpower and material resources, and in her meager international support."

Against the Japanese war-making capacity were pitted the Chinese advantages of space, time, and will. The long struggle for national liberation, as Mao notes, had tempered the Chinese people; social and political gains had created a WILL that was capable of great sacrifice and resistance over long periods of time; and:

"Again by contrast with Japan, China is a very big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population, and plenty of soldiers and is capable of sustaining a long war."

(1) Space in which to maneuver; (2) abundant manpower; (3) strong international support; and (4) the Chinese will to resist aggression -- these were China's advantages. These were also the reasons for avoiding a quick decision in favor of a protracted war, one in which Japan's single advantage, superior arms and organization, would be worn away.

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In the beginning (of guerrilla warfare) and the first phase may last for many months - territory is nothing, attrition is everything. The enemy is permitted, even encouraged to expand where he will. - The guerrillas give

only harassing, not circling... fighting always in the enemy's rear areas and presenting no continuous front for the foe to smash.

(1) The enemy is engaged, during this period, in a strategic offensive, with the object of wiping out the guerrillas. On his part, the action is characterized by a series of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns (compare the so-called "clear and hold" efforts in South Viet Nam today, under American leadership) during which the effort is made to occupy territory and to rid it of guerrilla infestation, piecemeal.

The contradiction implicit in this effort is that it converts increasingly large parts of the national territory into government "rear areas" where guerrilla operations work best. The repressive forces succeed in encircling areas of guerrilla activity - no stops them - but in the process they themselves become encircled by guerrillas, and while the guerrillas can almost always slip out of any given encirclement, by dispersal and exfiltration, how can the army slip out? Where is the front? It does not exist. Movements of men and material become progressively greater and more expensive; the lines of supply and communication become ever longer, more attenuated, and more vulnerable to guerrilla attack. In effect, the army, in occupying broad expanses of rural territory, abets the guerrillas by providing them with broad and easier targets and more accessible sources of arms and ammunition.

The guerrilla strategy remains constant during this period, although tactics vary with the situation. The strategy is to force the enemy to spread himself as thin as possible, by harassing him all along the line, wherever he is weak, and then to concentrate all available guerrilla strength to annihilate never merely to rout - inferior enemy units one at a time.

"Ours are guerrilla tactics," writes Mao. "They consist mainly of the following points:

"Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy."

"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."

a powerful enemy, employ policy of circling around."

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"Arouse the greatest numbers of the masses in the shortest time by the best possible methods."

"These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be able to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to deal with the enemy."

In areas where little opposition is met, the net is cast. The guerrillas disperse, to carry on the work of political indoctrination, to strengthen the internal economy of the revolutionary movement, to establish rear base areas - bases which, it should be noted, can be expanded or contracted, or even abandoned, on short notice.

Where opposition is strong, the net is drawn in. The guerrillas are able to concentrate heavy forces - Mao recommends two, or three, or even six times the enemy strength - against a single enemy weak point.

Battles are not prolonged. On the contrary, it is Mao who has invented the "five-minute tactic"; it consists of a sudden onslaught, brief and furious interval of fighting, and then the assault is broken off as suddenly as it began and the guerrillas rapidly reappear, having inflicted as many casualties and taken as many arms as possible during the brief period but not lingering even a minute longer. Mao stresses the battle of quick decision - the very opposite of Western military strategy. Where the army backed by heavy artillery is able to make a long-drawn technological contest of each battle, relying on the superiority of equipment and logistics to win in the end, the guerrillas must rely on their superior position, and locally, superior firepower, and must break off the engagement before the superiority of heavy weapons can take its toll.

As we have remarked before, the guerrilla fights the war of the flea. The flea bites, and bites again, nimbly avoiding the blow that would crush him. He does not seek to kill his enemy at a blow, but to bleed him, to feed on him, to plague and bedevil him, to keep him from resting and to destroy his morale. All of this requires

tion must become an epidemic, as one by one the areas of resistance link up, like spreading ink spots on a blotter.

(2) The Second Phase of the campaign, the period of equilibrium, a stalemate sets in. The government finds it cannot destroy the guerrillas; for the moment it can only seek to contain them, while preparing new offensives for the future. The guerrillas cannot destroy the army: They continue to harass it, taking advantage of lulls in the conflict to expand the revolutionary base areas, nibbling away at the fringe of no-man's land that surrounds each liberated zone, improving the internal economy of crops, workshops, arms repair depots, and using the time to agitate the people, to forward the war of propaganda, and to sharpen the internal conflicts that shake the enemy camp as the long, expensive anti-guerrilla campaign bogs down and the end appears hopelessly far away.

(3) The third Stage, that of the revolutionary strategic offensive, or general offensive, begins when the opposing forces of the government and those of the guerrillas have reached a balance, and the insurgents seize the military initiative, now no longer as pure guerrillas, but as mobile columns up to divisional strength, capable of confronting and destroying the army in open battle.

Where the insurgents formerly gave way at the approach of the enemy, or depended on hit-and-run ambushes, they will now give battle, using small units, to pin down the main forces of the government while their regular troops are thrown - always in superior numbers - into concentrated attacks on the most vulnerable objectives along the enemy's attenuated lines of support or weakest points of concentration.

When encircled, the rebels, instead of dispersing and exfiltrating under cover of darkness, as before, will concentrate and make a powerful breakthrough at a chosen point in the enemy's lines - again, perhaps, using secondary troops to pin down the army in other areas.

Gradually, sometimes using guerrilla tactics, at other times concentrating for powerful strategic blows, the rebels will succeed in cutting the enemy's main lines of communi-

insurgents will themselves begin to hold territory, first expanding their rural bases until they have blotted up most of the countryside, making it untenable for the enemy, then seizing the villages and the larger towns, driving the army back into its urban strong points, which, once isolated, can be reduced piecemeal.

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As the strong points are reduced and the army's manpower is whittled down, with big units captured or annihilated and others defecting (as may be expected if they are native troops), the rebels will come into possession of heavy weapons - tanks, artillery - which can be used to reduce even larger strong points, until at last a siege of the cities, aided by popular uprisings, brings the war to its successful termination in the destruction or surrender of the army and the collapse of the government.

* * * *

A principle can be observed throughout this entire process: the more the enemy holds the more he has to defend and the broader the insurgent target area. Yet on the other hand, the more the insurgent fights and wins, the more he has with which to fight and to win - in arms, in manpower, in material resources. Thus the objectives of the government and of the insurgent must be diametrically opposed. The army seeks to end the war as quickly as possible, in order to minimize its losses; the insurgent seeks to prolong it, since he has everything to gain by it.

It is clear that the guerrilla objectives cannot be accomplished overnight, or even within any predictable period. It is a basic premise of Mao's theory that the phases of the campaign will overlap, that on many occasions setbacks will occur, mobile units may have to be dispersed, again to become guerrilla bands, the third phase may slip back into the second, territory that has been won may be surrendered, and may change hands many times before it can finally be consolidated as part of the spreading Red territory.

On a map, the areas of guerrilla activity will appear as tiny ink spots. Gradually they will become splotches, and the splotches will grow larger until they finally run together

will progress from east to west or north to south, but from the outside in, from the mountains and the jungles to the cultivated rural areas, then to the villages within those areas, then to the towns, and along the national highways, and only in the final struggle to the diminishing pin-pricks of the cities.

The principles of the operation may be observed in the Communist war on Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops in the period immediately following World War II. Analysing a campaign of 17 months duration in 1946-47, during which 640,000 Nationalist troops were killed or wounded and 1,050,000 were captured Mao lists the following points of insurgent strategy:

(1) Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong forces later.

(2) Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.

(3) Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city or place will be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.

(4) In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (2, 3, 4, and sometimes even 5 or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all-out strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or break even. In this way, although inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we shall be absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on we shall become

(5) Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.

(6) Give full play to our style of fighting courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest).

(7) Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy-fortified points and cities.

(8) Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and material are at the front.

(9) Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train, and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training, and consolidation should not be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.

As to the question of supplies, it is a part of guerrilla theory, not only in China but in all revolutionary wars, that the enemy must be the main source of weapons and ammunition. One advantage is that one always finds the proper calibers of ammunition close at hand. Another, greater advantage is that logistical problems are reduced to a minimum. The enemy supply lines serve both armies, and often serve the guerrilla army better than they do that of the adversary.

Guerrillas can gain the initiative if they find the weak points of the enemy. Because of the enemy's insufficient manpower, guerrillas can operate over vast territories; because the enemy is the oppressor and the exploiter, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen.

In guerrilla warfare select the tactics of coming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the

Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people, and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus political in character.

On the other hand, in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.

NOTE: This is the essential contrast between conventional war and guerrilla war. The army fights to occupy territory, roads, strategic heights, vital areas; the guerrilla fights to control people, without whose cooperation the land is useless to its possessor.

VIETMINH VS. THE FRENCH

The Vietminh were organized on three levels:

(1) The so-called "Chu-luc" regulars - permanent guerrilla fighters who could be employed strategically wherever needed and who carried the main campaign, when insurgent forces were concentrated for a major strike;

(2) Regional Guerrillas - fought only in their zones, and could always return to their civilian character as peasants and workers if hard pressed;

(3) The Village Militia, the "du-kich", guerrillas by night and peasants by day, carrying out limited assignments -sabotaging a bridge here, ambushing a patrol there, mining the roads, carrying messages or funds - and fading back into their farms and villages at the first approach of military opposition.

"At the first shots of the imperialist invasion," (writes General Giap) "General Leclerc estimated that the reoccupation of Vietnam would be a military walk-over. When encountering resistance in the South, the French generals considered it weak and

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"Why did the French colonialists make such an estimate? Because they considered that to meet their aggression, there must be an army. . . It was not possible for them to understand a fundamental and decisive fact: the Vietnamese Army, although weak materially, was a people's army. . . In provoking hostilities, the colonialists had alienated a whole nation. And the whole Vietnamese nation, the entire Vietnamese people rose against them. Unable to grasp this profound truth, the French generals, who believed in an easy victory, went instead to certain defeat."

Allowing for rhetorical exaggeration, there is still much in what General Giap says. The French forces, concentrating on strong points and other objectives of conventional warfare strategy, found themselves "submerged in a sea of armed people." The arms, in the main, came from the French Expeditionary Corps, which became unwittingly the supplier of the Vietnam People's Army with French even U.S. arms.

As for the organization of resistance, Giap notes that it was primarily POLITICAL and only secondarily military:

"Our party advocated that, to launch the people's war, it was necessary to have 3 kinds of armed forces: It attached great importance to the building and development of self-defense units and guerrilla units. Militia was set up everywhere. Thanks to the founding of (the) people's administration everywhere in the countryside, and the existence of Party branches in every place, the militia spread far and wide and the people rose to fight. In the enemy's rear, guerrilla units, in coordination with the regular army, scattered and wore out the enemy, mailed them to their bases, so that our regular army could launch mobile fighting to annihilate them. They turned the enemy rear into our front line and built guerrilla bases as starting points for our regular army's offensive, right in the heart of the enemy. They protected the people and their property, fought the enemy and kept up production, and frustrated the enemy's schemes to use war to feed war and Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese. In the free zones, guerrilla units effective."

administrative and local Party; at the same time, they were the shock force in production, transport, and supply. Through combat and work, the guerrilla units became an inexhaustible and precious source of replenishment for the regular army, supplying it with men and officers who were politically well educated and rich in fighting experience."

Both sides made serious mistakes in the early phase of the 8-year struggle. The French for their part, devoted a full 5 mos. of 1947 to the fruitless task of attempting to capture Ho Chi Minh and his staff, thinking in this way to cut short the war. The effort was wasted. Even if they had captured Ho, it probably would not have affected the course of a war, the outcome of which depended not on individual military genius but on a strategy that any Communist leader, aware of the lesson of China, would have applied.

Here it may be well to observe that, to a very great extent, guerrillas fight as they do because they must. Their situation determines their course of action. Lacking the heavy weapons and disciplined divisions with which to fight conventional military campaigns, they are confined to nibbling at the edges of the opposing army and fighting in the enemy's rear areas. Materially unable to face a military decision, they must of necessity await a political decision. In a revolutionary situation, political decisions will tend to favor their side, since these will come in the course of a protracted war while the enemy is neither politically nor psychologically able to stand, whatever the condition of his military forces.

VIETNAM : ONE EXAMPLE OF THE FLEA

The silence that follows the fall of Dien Bien Phu is but a moment in the span of his tory, an all too brief breathing spell. Scarcely 5 years separate the First Indochina War from the start of the Second. Since then, events have made Viet Nam again the focal point of global concern, the storm center around which swirls a vast political conflict, a clash of ideologies and empires

...er from a certain view... little seems to have changed in the essential situation. To the South Vietnamese peasant looking up from his rice paddies, the war-planes that whine overhead on their way to distant targets in the North, the helicopters clattering toward some battle rendezvous, are indistinguishable from the planes and helicopters that carried French troops into battle against the Vietminh a decade ago. To a Communist guerrilla in the brush or in the villages, today's battle is like that of yesterday and last year and the year before that; the war is all of a piece, and many young men cannot remember when there was no war.

American uniforms have replaced French uniforms in Saigon; directives come from Washington instead of Paris. The Vietminh are now called the Viet Cong; and the new invaders, for a long while given the courtesy title of "military advisers" but now finally acknowledged to be combatants, are called Americans.

It makes little difference: French or Americans, Vietminh or Viet Cong, the war goes on, both sides pursuing the same objectives as before, by the same familiar methods. It is the struggle of dog and flea; and the flea continues, slowly but inevitably, to multiply and to win.

A UPI news analysis of Mar. 24, 1965, disclosing in a few telling paragraphs the dilemma of the American forces in Viet Nam, could almost have been written a decade earlier, with respect to the French situation of that time:

"The U.S. is now deep into the 4th year of an increasingly bloody battle for this land of mountains, jungles, rice paddies, and Communist guerrillas.

"Since May 1961, when the U.S. first committed itself to support the anti-Communist Saigon government, ** it has poured in vast quantities of men and machines.

**But this is to overlook the fact that the U.S. was supplying the French with war material even before Dien Bien Phu, footing the cost of the Indochina war to the extent of \$1.25 billion dollars.

United States... worth of the most sophisticated weapons in its arsenal.

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"It has given freely of its brains, its blood, and its lives. All has been to no avail. The world's mightiest nation has been unable to find the key to success in South east Asia.

"From the day it set foot in this land, the United States' course in the fight against the Communists has been downhill."

Despite political statements about aid from "aggressors in the North," the simple fact is that probably 90% of Viet Cong arms consist of American weapons captured from the government troops.

Most Vietcong weapons are new U.S. military weapons, captured in ambushes on Government units and attacks on outposts. Often a Viet Cong unit is organized initially with no weapons. The political organizer tells his men and women they must fight at first with handmade arms - spears, daggers, sword and crude shotguns. To get better weapons, the unit must capture them from the enemy.

* * * *

The rebel casts himself in the role of David, and makes it his business to force the enemy into the role of Goliath in the public mind. His every act and announcement play on the sympathies and sense of justice of the global witnesses of the struggle, creating the picture of a courageous people fighting for independence against the monstrous forces of tyranny and oppression.

FAILURES IN THE WAR OF THE FLEA

Mao's analogy of the guerrilla, swimming like a fish in the sea of the population, contains an essential truth: It expresses the fundamental principle of guerrilla warfare. But what happens when the fish is removed or REMOVES ITSELF from the water?

The answer explains the reason for the failure of the few guerrilla movements that have been successfully suppressed.

Philippines
perhaps, a third.

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All three show what happens when guerrillas are cut off, or deliberately cut themselves off from popular contact and support. Each of these histories is too lengthy to go into in this handbook but suffice it to say that in the case of the Hlaks one of their signal weaknesses seems to have been their failure to establish anything like a popular front during a period when urban support, the participation of students, industrial workers, and the poorer white collar class, was clearly required. The insurrection was a peasant movement and remained confined to the rural areas. (DANGERS OF BECOMING ISOLATED)

In postwar Malaya, the guerrillas also allowed themselves to become isolated. What is more important in this case is the tremendous cost in lives and arms of putting down this rebellion.

Nine months of continuous effort by an entire battalion, backed by artillery and aircraft, with the expenditure of more artillery and mortar shells and aerial bombs than exist in the arsenals of some Latin American republics - to eliminate "35" guerrillas.

At such cost, the defeat of the Chinese Communists in Malaya can be nothing less than inspirational to potential guerrillas of other, less sternly guarded countries. How many of the shaky Latin American regimes could meet the expense, let alone the political risks, of such a campaign, if it involved not 35 but a thousand determined guerrillas? For how long?

We come to Greece - a case history of another sort. The 3-year Greek revolution, successfully put down by a Rightist government with the help of Britain and the U.S., offers instruction to those interested in knowing how NOT to conduct a guerrilla war.

In Greece (1946-49) virtually all of the lessons of experience were ignored, all of the rules laid down by the theoreticians of revolutionary warfare were broken.

It is not unfair to say that to a very great extent, it was destroyed (the revolution-

the terrorists practiced against civilians, their dependence on foreign bases and supplies, and their premature decision in 1948 to hold ground and to expose large formations to a numerically, technologically, logistically, and organizationally superior army cost them a series of defeats from which there was no recovery.

Their loss was twofold. They were defeated militarily. And the Greek army's success spelled defeat for the revolutionary movement politically, as well.

Again, at the risk of being repetitive:

The object of the guerrilla is not to win battles, but to avoid defeat; not to end the war, but to prolong it, until political victory, more important than any battlefield has been won.

Revolution is by definition a mass phenomenon. Greece, Malaya, the Philippines - all illustrate the axiom that without mass participation, or at least popular support, there can be no revolution. The Hlaks lost it, the Chinese in Malaya never had it, the Greek Communists threw it away.

BEWARE !!!!!!!

THE ART OF WAR

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity.

When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near.

Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.

When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him.

Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under a strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him.

Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you. These are the strategists keys to victory.

ives formidably multiply striking power of the arrow; tanks are better than shields; trucks and helicopters offer (but not always) swifter and more dependable transportation than mules and camels. The problems of generalship remain the same. The variable factors of terrain, weather, space, time, population, and, above all, of morale and strategy still determine the outcome of battles and campaigns.

The guerrilla is a political insurgent, the conscious agent of revolution; his military role, while vital, is only incidental to his political mission. His insurgency is dedicated to a single purpose: the overthrow of the government and the destruction of the existing political or social or, it may be, economic system.

Each battle will be a lesson, designed to demonstrate the impotence of the army and so discredit the government that employs it. Each campaign will be a text, intended to raise the level of revolutionary awareness and anticipation of the popular majority. These attitudes will determine the outcome of the struggle.

Guerrilla actions will have certain obvious military objectives: to obtain weapons, ammunition, and supplies, to inflict casualties, to force the enemy to overextend his lines so that his communications may be disrupted and small units picked off, one at a time, by locally superior rebel forces.

But psychological and political objectives will be paramount. Local military success will serve no purpose if the guerrilla campaign does not also weaken the morale of the government and its soldiers, strain the financial resources of the regime, and increase political pressure on it by creating widespread apprehension and dissatisfaction with the progress of a war in which there is no end in sight.

In the potentially revolutionary situation, spontaneous insurrections may be expected: they are likely to arise out of almost any sort of social conflict - a strike, a dispute over land or wages or prices or rents or schools or any one of a score of other social "problems." Often they will come in reaction

authorities. For example, when the efforts of the police to curb a popular demonstration turn into

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In other circumstances, disorder may be deliberately created. In Cuba, Algeria, Cyprus, as examples that come readily to mind, the war of the flea was initiated by the deliberate acts of the revolutionary nucleus, proclaiming its defiance of authority and banking on popular support in an open declaration of revolutionary war.

The means are not important. The important element is the leadership itself. Bandits are not revolutionaries, looters are not guerrillas. In order to attract a following, the revolutionary leaders must stand on firm moral ground; they must have some greater purpose than the furtherance of personal ambition. This in turn implies an ideology or a clear "cause" to explain their decisions and the reasons of their insurgency. **THEY CANNOT BE MERE OPPORTUNISTS.**

When conflict occurs, whether spontaneous or induced, the revolutionary leaders must be capable of explaining and rationalizing its confused and often apparently accidental character. Isolated acts of defiance must be given coherency within a revolutionary frame of reference. (Ex. Fred Ahmed Evans, H. Rap Brown, Huey P. Newton, etc.) (Detroit, Watts, Newark...)

The leadership must be prepared to make the most of every opportunity to accelerate the process of social ferment and political disruption. The first task of the revolutionary cadres must be to relate each incident and each phase of the conflict to a great "cause," so that revolutionary violence is seen as the natural and moral means to a desired end, and the masses of the people are increasingly involved. The struggle cannot be allowed to seem meaningless or chaotic. It must be given a progressive character in all its phases; it must arouse great expectations and appear crucial at every stage, so that no one can stand outside of it.

How is it possible for a relative handful of armed men to oppose a vastly superior army? The secrets are (1) superior intelligence, and (2) terrain.

entire population. The population hides them, and at the same time it reveals them, from day to day and hour to hour, the disposition and strength of the enemy.

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"We always know where the soldiers are, but they never know where we are. We can come and go as we like, moving through their lines, but they can never find us unless we wish them to, and then it is only on our terms."
(Fidel Castro)

Where a choice of ground is possible, the terrain for guerrilla operations should be carefully selected. The ideal will be found in a country that is more rural than urban, mountainous rather than flat, thickly forested rather than bare, with extensive railway lines, bad roads, and an economy that is preponderantly agricultural rather than industrial. The relative dispersion or concentration of the population is also of great importance: A region with a widely scattered rural population, living in small hamlets and isolated farm dwellings is much more vulnerable than one of tightly knit, large country towns separated by wide areas of open farmland.

The terrain should afford both natural concealment and obstacles to hinder the movement of military transport - mountains and swamps where tanks and trucks cannot go, woods and thick brush that provide cover from aerial observation and attack, forests from which to strike quickly and safely at enemy rail and highway communications and in which to ambush small military units.

There should be sufficient space to maneuver freely, without the danger of being caught in a closing spiral of encirclement. The greater the area of operations, the more difficult it will be for the army to locate the guerrillas and the more the government will have to disperse its troops and extend its lines of supply and communication.

Yet the guerrillas cannot choose the remotest and most rugged areas in which they would be safest. They must remain constantly in contact with a rural population from which to recruit, to draw supplies, and to obtain reliable couriers who will carry messages and

This necessity indicates the choice of an area with a dispersed rather than concentrated rural population. Such an area will usually afford the natural concealment and natural obstacles to army operations found in desolate areas, and will provide a further advantage: It will not be economic for the government garrison.

Large rural towns can be garrisoned; tiny hamlets cannot. Where there are many of the only a few soldiers can be assigned to each and to create such rural outposts is worse than useless, since each individual post can easily be overwhelmed, its soldiers captured or killed, their arms and ammunition seized and another propaganda victory thus scored by the insurgents.

Since there will be no great government stake in any given hamlet, farm, or village in economic or strategic terms, the natural decision of the army will be to withdraw to safer ground. Yet each such withdrawal will widen the area of guerrilla control and favor the insurgency, providing it with more supplies, more recruits, more room in which to maneuver.

There is another consideration: The possession of populated areas will usually provide almost as much safety for the insurgents as would the remote areas in which they cannot be located or attacked. Political considerations, if not those of humanity, will usually offer some safeguard against bombing or artillery attacks, since the government cannot afford to kill civilians indiscriminately. (This does not always apply in later stages of insurgency, E.G. consider Vietnam)

The danger of being isolated far from populated areas has been demonstrated by the experience of guerrillas in Malaya and the Philippines. In both instances, the military succeeded in isolating the insurgents, cutting them off from the source of their strength, with results fatal to the insurgency. On the other hand, the possibility of fighting a successful guerrilla war on a small island with little room to maneuver and no real emergency sanctuary has been proven by the Cretan fighters of EOKA. When pressed, the guerrilla bands commanded by Grivas in the

alked above their heads without discovering them. Others sallied forth at night forays from hiding places under the floors of homes where they had lain all day, their presence unsuspected. They were, in the most literal sense, "underground."

In well policed, large cities, a sympathetic population can protect active insurgents. The draconian methods used by the French in Algiers virtually stamped out the FLN underground there, but only because the Moslems of the Casbah were already separated, racially and physically from the French population. Soldiers, especially foreigners, can suppress urban rebellion by treating the entire metropolis as a city under wartime siege, controlling all movements, and ruthlessly killing the inhabitants of any quarter where resistance is offered. Gradually an urban population can be starved and terrorized into submission. But such methods scarcely apply to the civil war situation in which there is no sure way of knowing friend from foe.

Terrain and local conditions ultimately decide the size and organization of the guerrilla band. Guerrillas will not give battle until the terrain favors them. When fighting begins, it will be on ground of their own choosing - preferably from commanding heights with dense cover and limited visibility, where a few determined men can hold up an army.

Ambushes will be prepared in such a manner that a small portion of the advancing military column - its vanguard - will be separated from the rest when firing commences. The fire of the main body of the guerrillas will be concentrated on this vanguard. The object of the ambush must be the complete destruction of the advance group and seizure of its arms and ammunition, the latter task being accomplished while a small guerrilla rear guard delays the rest of the military column.

Che Guevara writes:

When the force of the guerrillas band is small and it is desired above all to detain and slow down the advance of an invading column, groups of snipers, from 2 to 10 in number should be distributed all around the column

will begin at a moment from the left flank - at another moment from the rear guard or from the vanguard and so forth."

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"With a very small expenditure of ammunition it is possible to hold the enemy in check indefinitely."

While the column is delayed, the main body of the guerrilla force quickly gathers its military booty and moves on toward the next prepared position, or circles around and steps out in a new direction. The snipers withdraw and rejoin the main force before the troops have recovered sufficiently to launch a counter attack, all of this occurring within a matter of a few minutes.

The process is repeated again and again. When it has been determined that a military column is sufficiently isolated that the arrival of reinforcements can be delayed for some hours or days, the guerrillas may even attempt an encirclement, or may create the appearance of an encirclement by stationing squads of snipers on commanding ground in such a way as to bring the troops under fire in whichever direction they attempt to move. If the troops launch a determined assault, the guerrillas have only to give way, circle around, regroup, and again withdraw.

The superior mobility and small size of the guerrilla force are its main assets. The danger that they themselves may be encircled is usually more apparent than real.

Night, as Che has noted, is the best ally of the guerrilla fighter. Che's prescription: Take adequate measures to impede the advance of the enemy until nightfall and then exfiltrate - a relatively simple matter for a small group of men in country well known to them, where the cover is good.

In the first months of the insurgency, when the army is on the offensive, the tactics of ambush and evasion are standard and sufficient. The activities of the army itself are enough to advertise the rebel cause. Mounting military casualties cannot be kept secret. The high cost of the anti-guerrilla campaign will be an embarrassment to the government, which will be hard put to explain what it is

...the morale of their military opponents.

CHE: "The guerrilla soldier ought always to have in mind that his source of supply of arms is the enemy and that, except in special circumstances, he ought not to engage in a battle that will not lead to the capture of such equipment."

The enemy vanguard is made a special target of guerrilla fire for a sound psychological reason: to induce the fear, or at any rate the excessive caution, that will paralyze the will and retard the free movement of the enemy. When the soldiers in the first rank invariably are killed, few will wish to be in the vanguard, and without a vanguard there is no movement. (Such reasoning may not always apply to professional troops. Professional officers are trained to accept casualties as the price of battle. Nevertheless it has been a constant complaint of American military advisers in South Vietnam that the Vietnamese field commanders commonly refuse to advance against strong guerrilla positions without artillery support and preparatory air strikes that give the Viet Cong guerrillas time to retire from the field.)

The insurgency continuing, the military may be expected sooner or later to give up the futile pursuit of the guerrilla force and leave it to its wilderness sanctuary, if for no other reason than the political. As has been remarked before, few governments can long sustain the political embarrassment of an expensive and well-publicized campaign in which there is no progress to report. Within a matter of weeks or months, the government will be forced to announce a victory, having failed to produce one. The public outside of the war zone will be informed that the insurrection has been suppressed, the bodies of a few civilian casualties may even be displayed by way of evidence, and the troops will be withdrawn to posts and garrisons in more settled territory, falling back on a strategy of containment of the insurrection.

If the insurgency is to succeed, the guerrillas must, of course, refuse to be contained. They will now assume the offensive, taking advantage of their new freedom to organize night raids on the small military

...using the attacks on such outposts as bait to lure military reinforcements into ambush on the road.

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As successful action provides more arms, new guerrilla units are organized, and new zones of operations opened. Guerrillas filtering through the army lines attack isolated military and police units in the villages on the periphery of their free zone, forcing the army to pull back to reinforce these points. With still more room in which to maneuver, rebels occupy the outlying farms, move into small hamlets that cannot be defended economically. Efforts will now be made to discourage, although not absolutely to prevent, military convoys from entering certain zones. The roads will be mined, tank traps dug, defenses in depth constructed so that the troops will have to fight their way into rebel territory through a series of ambushes, the guerrillas at each stage offering light resistance and then falling back on the next position.

As rebel strength grows, the army is confronted with a difficult dilemma. Having superior numbers and heavier arms, it will still be able to enter the rebel zones in strength, but only at the cost of some casualties, and with no advantage, since the ground gained will have no strategic or economic value commensurate with the cost of occupying it. If the troops should remain in force, the guerrillas would simply transfer their operations to another zone: The army cannot be everywhere. Yet if the troops do not remain, the territory is, in effect, ceded to the insurgents, who proceed to turn its agricultural economy and its rural population to their own purpose. This is the dilemma of the military commander.

It is, of course, sharpened by political problems. Large chunks of the agricultural economy cannot be surrendered to the insurgents without political consequences. Those whose fortunes are affected - traders, absentee landowners, and the like - will be certain to put pressure on the government to do something. They may seek political alternatives. The general public will be excited and divided by the deterioration of the government's position, as it becomes more apparent. The more radical elements of urban society will be emboldened: revolution

the government will grow progressively more fearful and repressive.

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In such circumstances and considering that no army can occupy ALL of the national territory, the logical and natural course of the regime will be the gradual withdrawal of troops from the countryside to the larger centers of population. The rural areas thus will be slowly and reluctantly surrendered to the insurgents. With expanded resources of manpower and material, the insurgency will continue to grow. As it gains strength, guerrilla bands will become guerrilla armies. The larger villages will be captured. The railway bridges will be blown and the highways cut. One by one the towns and then the cities will be isolated, their vital supplies restricted, civilian transport reduced to a trickle. Military convoys may still come and go, but not without peril, and not with any important effect, in a country most of which will already be in the hands of the revolution.

When the enemy concentrates on the rural areas we strike in the cities.

Small bands can damage the 8 major dams that supply most of the electricity. Electricity means mass communications.

Gasoline can be poured into the sewer systems in major urban areas and then ignited. This would burn out communications lines in an entire city.

The guerrilla succeeds because he survives. He flourishes because his methods are progressive. With a pistol, a machete, or, for that matter, a bow and arrow, he can capture a rifle. With 20 rifles he can capture a machine gun, and with 20 rifles and a machine gun he can capture a military patrol or destroy a convoy that carries 5 machine guns & 10,000 rounds of ammunition. With a dozen hovels and a few gallons of gasoline he can destroy a tank, and with its weapons he can shoot down an airplane or a helicopter that also carries weapons.

Artillery is useless against him because it never catches up with him. A 500 lb. aerial bomb will dig a crater 10 ft. deep and 15 ft. wide, but it will not disturb a guerrilla in

over a 100 acres of woodland, but it will have no effect unless the guerrillas happen to be in that 100 acres, out of the thousands through which they roam.

Once the war of the flea has reached settled rural regions, even these limited means become ineffective, because aircraft cannot attack guerrillas without killing the civilians whose support the government must win and they all look alike from the air. Great faith was placed in helicopters; they were of service in the Sahara but have failed to come up to expectations in the jungles of Vietnam, where the Viet Cong has learned to set successful traps for them and crew casualties are heavy.

U.S. military handbooks on irregular warfare techniques discuss various biological and chemical weapons that can be employed against guerrillas. These are recommended especially for situations in which guerrillas have mingled with an innocent civilian population that cannot - or not ought - to be killed.

The object of the so-called biologicals is to induce temporarily incapacitating viral diseases that will reduce the ability of guerrillas to resist attack, so that infantry can rush into a target area and quickly kill or capture them without harming non combatants - a device, so to speak, for separating the sheep from the goats.

Various nonlethal gases - carried like the biologicals, in artillery shells or aerial bombs, or sprayed by low-flying planes or helicopters - have been designed for the same purpose, to sicken all within a given target area and so reduce resistance to infantrymen on their arrival, without unnecessary bloodshed.

On the 3 occasions in which nonlethal gas (a mixture of vomiting gas and tear gas, or the type used to control rioters) was used in South Vietnam during early 1965, the practical results were nil. Twice, the gas simply blew away, without any effect. On the third occasion, it sickened a few residents of the target area, but the infantrymen who soon arrived found no guerrillas in the area.

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H A N D B O O K

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STREET FIGHTING:

In the military sense of the word (or term) what after all is a street? A street is a defile in a city. A defile is a narrow pass through which troops can only pass and move through which considerably narrows their front, and therefore make themselves a good target for the enemy. A defile is a difficult place for soldiers to maneuver in, especially if the flanks of the defile are held by the guerillas. A mountain pass is a defile the sides of which are constituted by the natural slopes of the mountain sides, as at the scalp. A bridge over a river is a defile, the sides of which are constituted by the river. A street is a defile, the sides of which are constituted by the houses in the street.

To traverse a mountain pass with any degree of safety the sides of the mountain must be cleared by flanking parties ahead of the main body; to pass over a bridge the banks of the river on each side must be raked with machine gun or rifle fire while the bridge is being rushed; to take a street properly barricaded and held on both sides by forces in the houses (guerillas), these houses must be taken by hand-to-hand fighting. A street barricade placed in a position where artillery cannot operate from a distance is impregnable to frontal attack. To bring artillery within a couple of hundred yards—the length of the average street—would mean the loss of the artillery if confronted by even imperfectly drilled troops armed with rifles.

The Moscow revolution, where only 80 rifles were in the possession of the insurgents, would have ended in the annihilation of the artillery had the number of insurgent rifles been 800.

The insurrection of Paris in June 1848 reveals how districts of towns, or villages, should be held. The streets were barricaded at tactical points, not on the main streets but commanding them. The houses were broken through so that passages were made inside the houses along the whole length of the streets. The side walls were loopholed, as were also front walls, the windows were blocked by sandbags, boxes filled with stones and dirt, bricks, chests, and other pieces of furniture with all sorts of odds and ends piled up against them.

Behind such defenses the insurgents poured their fire upon the troops through loopholes left for the purpose.

In the attack upon Paris by the allies fighting against Napoleon, a village held in this manner repulsed several assaults by the Prussian allies of England. When these Prussians were relieved by the English these latter did not dare attempt a frontal attack, but instead broke into an end house on one side of the village street, and commenced to take the houses one by

one. Thus all the fighting was inside the houses, and musket fire played but a small part. On one side of the street they captured all the houses, on the other they failed, and when a truce was declared the English were in possession of one side of the village, and their French enemies of the other.

The truce led to a peace. When peace was finally proclaimed the two sides of the village street were still held by opposing forces.

The defense of a building in a city, town, or village is governed by the same rules. Such a building left unconquered is a serious matter even if its supports are all defeated. If it had been flanked by barricades, and these barricades were destroyed, no troops could afford to push on and leave the building in the hands of the enemy. If they did so they would be running the danger of perhaps meeting a check further on, which check would be disastrous if they had left a hostile building manned by an unconquered force in their rear. Therefore, the fortifying of a strong building, as a pivot upon which the defense of a town or village should hinge, forms a principle object of the preparations of any defending force, whether regular army or insurrectionary.

In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 the chateau, or castle, of Geissberg formed such a position in the French lines on August 4. The Germans drove in all the supports of the French party occupying this country houses, and stormed the outer courts, but were driven back by the fire from the windows and loopholed walls. Four batteries of artillery were brought up to within 900 yards of the house and battered away at its walls, and batallion after batallion was hurled against it. The advance of the whole German army was delayed until this one house was taken. To take it caused a loss of 23 officers and 329 men, yet it had only a garrison of 200.

In the same campaign the village of Bazielles offered a similar lesson of the tactical strength of a well defended line of houses. The German army drove the French off the field and entered without a struggle. But it took a whole army corps seven hours to fight its way through to the other end of the village.

A mountainous country has always been held to be difficult for military operations owing to its passes or glens. A city is a huge maze of passes or glens formed by streets and lanes. Every difficulty that exists for the operation of regular troops in mountains is multiplied by a hundredfold in a city. And the difficulty of the commissariat which is likely to be insuperable to an irregular or popular force taking to the mountains, is solved for them by the sympathies of the populace when they take to the streets.

The general principle to be deducted from a study of the example we have been dealing with is that the defense is of almost overwhelming importance in such warfare as a popular force like the People's Army might be called upon to participate in. Not a mere passive defense of a position whose location threatens the supremacy or existence of the enemy. The genius of the commander must find such a position, the skill of his subordinates must prepare and fortify it, the courage of all must defend it. Out of this combination of genius, skill and courage alone can grow the flower of military success.

URBAN WARFARE

Consider, on the one hand, the military importance of towns. All governments reside in towns, all vital industries are concentrated in towns. All military dumps and depots lie in towns. All good landing places around shores are, because they are good landing places, built over; the navy depends for its command of the oceans upon ports and naval bases, one and all of them cities. Overlooking these, remember this one fact, namely, that all road and rail communications pass through towns. Think for a moment of the system of supply to an army; all road and rail communications pass through towns.

Consider the advantages of the defence in towns. Notice how in the recent wars towns have held out long after the country around them has been overrun. Consider how the enemy official doctrine teaches that towns shall be by-passed and attacked later by troops specially detached for the purpose. They recognize that a town is a strong point, and they follow their doctrine of by-passing the strong point. But note that they also recognize the necessity of attacking the town. The reason is this: that both their armoured divisions and their infantry divisions depend for supplies upon wheeled vehicles: those vehicles run on roads and rails; and all road and railway communications pass through towns.

The primary task of any guerilla is not to try and defend a city! for more reasons than one; towns are vulnerable to air and artillery bombardment. Experience shows that there is a tremendous need for air superiority. If an overwhelming concentration of air and artillery force has to be collected each time a town is encountered, lightning advances will be a thing of the past.

Possession of a town maintains a grip upon the life line that can strangle an offensive. Towns are the ready-made answer to the BLITZKRIEG. Properly held they must slow an advance.

Note: PLEASE READ THIS DOCUMENT WITH AN ALERT AND CHALLENGING MIND. FOR IF WE, THE ASSIMILATORS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE WRONG, IT IS YOU WHO WILL DIE, NOT US!

CONDITIONS DICTATE METHODS: The fittest survive, because they best understand and adapt themselves to the conditions in which they live. Street fighting is carried on in unique, unnatural conditions; only the fittest survive. It is above all necessary to analyse and understand the peculiar features of ground which go to make street fighting such a highly skilled form of warfare.

It is difficult in thinking of cities to discard the many familiar details and to focus upon the simple features which alone are of military significance.

- (1) The ground upon which most towns are built upon are ordinary, slightly rolling land, inter-sected by rivers, streams and hedgerows, and patched with woods. The woods and hedges have for the most part been cut to make way for masses of human habitations, but every town retains small areas of park and woodland.
- (2) Vast human effort has gone to the perfection of communications in urban areas. Today towns may, generally speaking, of communication to them, here and there cut by railroads, canals and other lines of communications.
- (3) In the masses of homes that have been built, wealth has drawn distinctions.

The rich, though they may work in towns and cities, generally choose to live in the country. Where, owing to the size of a city, they cannot easily escape, they occupy a central position. They build their houses strong and big, either detached and standing in their own grounds, or in rows surrounding a railed square of lawns and gardens.

The houses of the poor are usually situated near a great factory or industrial center. Normally they consist of lines of small, two or three story houses, ill-built, on either side of wide, straight streets, backed by little yards and the rear of another row of houses. These yards are usually a conglomeration of fences, sheds, shelters, bins, and other forms of obstacles and cover from view.

From the early nineteenth century onwards, unprecedented growth of population and industry demanded masses of hastily built houses for the new middle and lower middle classes. The advent of town planning and the fact that whole areas were built over by one firm gave us the modern suburbs which have grown round the outside of nearly every town. They consist of rows of small "semi-detached" or detached, lightly built, two story houses, standing between front and back gardens, fitting in a large design of criss-crossing streets. An enormous number of hedges and fences have been built to enclose these properties, so that back gardens offer both good cover from view and, cumulatively, great obstacles to an advance.

Spaced throughout the cities are shopping and commercial centers, usually consisting of very tall, strongly built houses, flanking main arterial streets. In many cities building has followed the haphazard layout of old centers of commerce, and we find the same buildings facing each other across narrow, winding streets, flanked by alleyways and passages.

Whatever the class of house or area, three generalizations can be made which are of the most vital importance, giving rise as they do to the basic principles of street warfare. It is these three which must be understood and digested:

1. No other type of country is either so open or so close. In every street are coverless stretches, ideal fields of fire, death traps to the unwary attackers. Bordering every street are a hundred protected firing positions, a hundred hiding-places, a hundred ambush positions.
2. It is possible to climb 30, 50, perhaps 100 feet in as many seconds. Street fighting thus possesses a third dimension, not often present in field warfare.
3. Cities present exceptionally blind and disjointing conditions. In no other form of warfare are there such narrow horizons, or such ruthless divisions between units of the same force.

It is not intended to discuss the rules of good street fighting. One such may, however, be given pride of place, for upon its unvarying observance depends not merely the life of any particular soldier but the attainment of the object he is ordered to achieve.

It has been said above "No other country is either so open or so close." It is well nigh impossible to be more than five yards from cover.

In the first few paragraphs of the urban community the military features of built up areas were analyzed. In this and the following, conclusions are drawn from them, which form, so to speak, rules of conduct: and suggested methods of obedience to them are laid down. How many of these methods are put into practice must depend upon the precise nature of the attack and the time allowed for defence.

In this country two conditions of attack seem likely to present themselves. For the first, the regular land advance, the defender will probably have ample time to prepare a formidable reception.

The second type of attack allows no time for preparation. A company of enemy parachutists can land on a green space three hundred yards square and be ready to move or fight in under fifteen minutes. This will allow no time for elaborate booby traps, barricades of wiring.

In placing the members of any unit, the following points should be borne in mind:

- A. The system of defence must pivot around the automatic weapon. In built up areas fields of fire tend to be very narrow. The high rate of fire of the automatic weapon makes it a weapon of inestimable value.
- b. The 360° field around any house is normally split into several narrow fields of fire. Riflemen should be used to cover all of the most important approaches.
- C. "Interior lines" abound in built up areas. The distance between the defence of the next is often the width of a house. Full advantage should be taken of this.
- D. It is easier to fire to one's left than to one's right. For this reason Brothers should be instructed to use weapons left and right handed. When firing to the left, the rifle comes out of a window before the body: when firing to the right, the body must be exposed before the rifle can be brought to bear.
- E, In every street there are hiding places in which men may lie low until the enemy has passed, and open fire from behind. If these men wish to fire to their left they must be on the side opposite to those prepared to fire on an approaching enemy. These two parties can therefore have the additional task of covering each other's doorways.
- F. Two men are far more than twice as strong as one, both for psychological reasons and because there are four sides to a house and at least two lines of approach.

On the other hand, a whole section placed in one house will find themselves surrounded without having been able to fire, unless sections are very plentiful.

It can be taken as a guide, therefore, that a house should be held by never less than two men and rarely more than five.

G. The automatic machine gun should be sited in a house selected for its dominant field of fire, its strength of construction and its unobtrusive position. Normally the house which is selected is at the end of a street, looking down the street, satisfying the first condition at the expense of the third. From a corner house it is possible to fire in three directions. Although often desirable, such a selection does not avoid the obvious: the position must be made very strong, and alternative positions prepared. The enemy will look for these positions also. A house lying farther back from the road than its neighbors will often have the priceless advantage of being shielded by them from enemy covering fire. German street fighting tactics are based on an attack from the rear. It is essential, therefore, to have a well rounded defense.

PREPARATION FOR HOUSE DEFENSE:

Given time, there is practically no limit to the number of improvements which can be made to a defensive position in a house. Below is a long list of possible improvements. It is obvious that in every case or nearly every case time will not allow for all of them to be carried out. It should be equally obvious that it will be equally criminal on that account to ignore them.

FIRE POSITIONS SHOULD BE SELECTED:

- (1) For their good field of fire.
- (2) For Strength
- (3) For unobtrusiveness

These three characteristics of a good defensive position should be exaggerated in every conceivable way.

(1) GOOD FIELD OF FIRE:

(a) the best field of fire is obtained from the lowest possible firing position. Many houses have basements whose windows that just clear the surface of the ground: these should be used if possible. In other cases a ventilator may be used by enlarging a hole in the wall.

(b) the farther forward the belt-fed automatic weapon is placed the wider will be the field of fire: on the other hand, the more vulnerable will be to enemy fire. If it is necessary to have a wider field of fire, loopholes may be made in the side walls for riflemen.

(2) STRENGTH—every fire position can, given time, be made proof against the collapse of the house in which it is sited:

(a) remove breakables and inflamables, e.g. window glass, ornaments, curtains, rugs, etc.

(b) send a man around the neighborhood "liberating" extinguishers, water buckets, etc.

- (c) Shore-up the fire position.
- (d) Build an emplacement.

(1) These can be made of sandbags or rubble between boards, in chests of drawers, etc. The emplacement should be roofed over with timber: joists taken from another room are suitable.

(2) The emplacement must have a solid foundation. It will generally be necessary to remove part of the floor.

(3) A man fires over the following heights:

Rifle or machine gun (automatic or belt-fed)

standing.....4 ft. 6 in.

kneeling or sitting.....30 in.

lying.....12 in.

sitting.....24 in.

Inside dimensions:

5 ft. long

3 ft. 6 in. wide

5 ft. high

LOOPHOLES: Build them with narrow exits, widening towards the inside to allow for traverse. Duplicate them freely as they are impossible.

(e) All entrances must be barricaded or, where it is impossible to hide a barricade, mined. This applies to all doors and windows. Booby traps should be laid in the hall and on the staircase.

(f) A line of withdrawal must be left. In the case of attached houses, go next door, find a cupboard on the pantry wall and knock a hole in the back into the defended house; then close the cupboard. With detached houses knock a hole into a lean-to-shed or bush: or lean a wheelbarrow, bin or other article against the hole. If necessary place a dummy booby trap over the hole.

(g) Knock loopholes in walls to cover every approach to the house: a loophole from the occupied room to cover the front hall is also useful.

(h) Use some fine wire-mesh and wire over all the windows to prevent grenades being thrown in. Cut a slit in the wire to allow the dropping out of grenades.

(i) Make a dummy position. A bolster hung on a wire at the back of a room three doors away can be connected by a wire run through the intervening walls. A jerk will deceive, and will certainly distract enemy observers.

(j) Prepare an alternate position. The Germans used tracked guns to blow a house to pieces; no amount of strengthening will withstand a direct hit.

(k) Make a gas-proof room and stock it with candles (the electric light is bound to fail), torches, water, medical and food supplies, and ammunition.

UNOBTRUSIVENESS: When all improvements to the field of fire and strengthening of the house are complete, it is essential to remove any clues which may betray your position to the enemy.

There are two principal methods:

(a) CONCEALMENT

Be sure there is no external sign of a barricade. Remove the trail of sand and rubble which almost certainly leads up to the door.

Put muslim curtains over the windows. They are opaque from the outside and transparent from the inside—besides being the very symbol of respectability.

(b) DUPLICATION

Work which cannot be hidden must be duplicated. If yours is the only door in a damaged street which is tight shut (to conceal a barricade), shut others in the street. Clear of glass the windows in half a dozen houses, and wire them over. Make dummy loopholes in your own house and in the houses whose doors you have closed and windows you have cleared of glass. If the field of fire has had to be cleared so much as to become obvious, treat the other houses in the same way.

POSITIONS OTHER THAN HOUSES:

Having considered the defense of a house at such length, one is apt to forget that there are in built-up areas other excellent positions. Slit trenches offer better cover against air and artillery bombardment than any house: they are not, however, useful against a land attack, as they can be commanded from the upper floors of neighboring houses. In street fighting one expects the enemy to take refuge in houses. A thick hedge, the branches of a tree, a heap of refuse, a pile of rubble may all provide excellent surprise positions. It must be quite clear, however, that most of these positions depend upon concealment: Discovery will render one as vulnerable as if one were standing motionless in the middle of a street.

ANTI-TANK DEFENSES:

Tanks suffer from serious handicaps in built-up areas, for the following reasons:

(a) The guerillas can erect road blocks which cannot be seen from a distance.

(b) The guerillas can remain concealed until a tank is directly beneath his position.

(c) Tanks cannot fire more than, at an average, 30 degrees above the horizontal.

(d) Visual contact between tank units is lost, and direction is very hard to keep.

It is clear, however, that they suffer from these handicaps only as long as the enemy is prepared to take advantage of them. The most suitable positions for an ambush are:

(1) On the upper floors of a strongly built house:

(2) Above road blocks or a point where the enemy is likely to stop at first sight of a road block.

The same weapons may be used against tanks in streets as in the fields. The anti-tank gun or a bazooka is an excellent weapon for destructing tanks, (also the molotov cocktail which is equally as effective, but one must be within a 30 yard range for best effectiveness). The third dimension in street fighting and the fixed nature of the defense are ideal for the use of the heavier.

STREET OBSTACLES:

(1) Trenches, or barricades, of wagons, cars, furniture, etc. may be very useful in holding up enemy troops or vehicles, especially if placed just around a corner to effect surprise. They are not, however, effective as fire positions because they can be commanded from tops of buildings.

(2) Wire is the best possible obstacle to advancing troops. A street properly wired and covered by a tri-pod 50 caliber machine gun or its equivalent (preferably an automatic weapon no less than a .30

is a death-trap to the attackers. It forces the attacker to commit the great, and invariably the last, sin of street fighting—HANGING ABOUT IN THE OPEN. Wire should be placed far enough away from the defended house to prevent the enemy from throwing grenades and should not be so laid as to give away the position of the house to the enemy. Tins with pebbles inside should be hung on the wire to raise the alarm should the enemy try to remove it under cover of darkness.

KNOW THE ENEMY———THE ATTACK BY THE ENEMY

(1) FORMS OF ATTACK:

Broadly, attacks in built-up areas have one or both of two (2) main objectives:

- (a) To penetrate to a certain area.
- (b) To clear a certain area of the "enemy."

It is impossible to say what precise forms attacks in cities or towns will or should take. They will vary with the object, the ground, and other particular circumstances. The following is a general impression of the lines which a modern attack may follow, and is intended more to stimulate thought rather than to prophesize events. The process may be one of neutralization and infiltration.

(1) The town is subjected to heavy bombardment by aircraft or artillery, or is sprayed with napalm, or other lethal gases. The main enemy body may by-pass the town, leaving its capture to special troops detailed for the purpose. The latter will probably attack the town as soon as the bombardment,

or shock forces cease, from a direction they deem to be favorable. Therefore, all existing entry routes should be scrutinized for invasion and plans should be developed to frustrate the imperialist aggression.

(2) As a result of reconnaissance and careful study of the town plan, certain few buildings or localities well inside the town may be selected as first objectives. At first small and then large parties of troops will force their way to these objectives to form a strong point or points from which the core of the town may be "eaten" out and any perimeter defenses attacked from the rear. The objectives will be selected so as to be co-operative, i.e., success in training objective "A" will aid those troops who are trying to gain objective "B".

(2) METHODS OF ATTACK:

The scheme of attack tabulated below has been laid down not in order to dictate hard-and-fast rules to an attacking force but in order that a clear idea may be obtained of the problems facing an attacker and of a reasonable solution to them. It will almost always be impossible to the attacker to keep completely to the ideal. The chaos attending street fighting, and the haste imposed upon all guerillas will, in time of a racist attack from either the police or civilians, demand a compromise: If this compromise is to be successful, initiative and a high degree of training are required of all guerillas. Failure to realize the inevitability of disorganization and chaos would be dangerous. It must be accepted that guerillas will, at times lose contact with their "units," that members of the same "unit" will lose contact with each other at times.

UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES:

- (1) A simple plan is essential. Each unit must be given a clear limited objective, and complicated manoeuvres such as a change of direction should generally be avoided. Isolated thrusts apart from the main attack are not usually successful and will not divert as many defenders from the main attack as might be achieved in field warfare, since the bulk of the defense will probably be on fixed system(s) giving all-around defense.
- (2) Success or failure will largely depend upon the initiative of subordinate commanders. Lacking clear orders as to their next actions, section and platoon commanders must on no account merely send back each time to be told what to do, but must act swiftly and with enterprise in the spirit of their previous orders. Speed in attack must not be allowed to flag for an instant. The need for a clear limit of exploitation, however, referred to in sub-paragraph will now be even more clearly seen.
- (3) Accurate, early information is vital. A plan with insufficient information will fail; a plan made with incorrect information will fail. A sub-unit commander has not done his duty of his superior commander does not know everything about the enemy that he knows, and all that is required about his position, intention, casualties and state of exhaustion.

(4) Tremendous thrust is required. In this difficult terrain, the attackers are forced to move in the open against defenders (guerrillas) who, given time to choose and perfect their fire positions, can make them (the attackers) feel like rabbits in a hunting field, continually surprised and shot at from unexpected directions. The attackers can upset the scales only by giving their opponents no time to prepare (if we choose to defend a position which at first will not be the primary task of any guerrilla), no rest in retreat, no chance to re-organize or reassure themselves. Speed is of the essence, and speed can be produced only by intelligent anticipation, efficient orders, dashing execution, and energy, more energy, and even more energy.

Attacks must be laid out very carefully—the only way the enemy can rout us from our position (temporary holding positions) is that the attack us before operations are put into effect (ambush).

THE ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY:

It is impossible absolutely to safeguard the main body against attack from guerrillas. An active advance guard will, however, use some of the many good points of observations that abound in cities, cover with fire the more important junctions, and question inhabitants. Note: **ATTACKS SHOULD BE MADE ON TWO POINTS PRINCIPALLY, FIRST, THE VANGUARD (FRONTAL ASSAULT TROOPS), AND THE SECOND, THE MAIN BODY OR CENTERGUARD, WHICH IS USUALLY THE POSITION THE COMMANDERS AND PETTY OFFICERS WILL OCCUPY.**

IN CASES OF AMBUSH:

The main body should be well deployed. It may often be best to keep all sections on one side of the road, for two reasons:

- (1) they can keep to the shadows
- (2) in the event of a sudden attack, they will all take cover on the same side of the street, and will not therefore, be divided from each other by coverless, bullet-swept areas.

PROTECTION (the enemy):

From the start to the end of operations there must be no moment during which the main body can be surprised undeployed. On arrival at the assembly positions, whether on foot or in armoured personnel carriers, and sentries will be posted covering every approach. Two A.A. sentries per company should be posted in opposite arcs of 180°. The main body should take immediate cover and be slightly dispersed. Note: **THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE MUST BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED AND EXPLOITED TO THE FULLEST TO STUN OR RETARD, OR FRUSTRATE THE ENEMY ADVANCE.**

RECONNAISSANCE:

Buildings of brick and mortar make reconnaissance difficult. The ideal of an airplane view being usually denied, second best is a view from a high building. Other useful aides to the attacking enemy are street maps, airplane photographs, and the accounts of troops on the spot, and local inhabitants.

Enemy officers commanding troops likely to be used in built-up areas may find it useful to obtain airplane photographs of their area for use instead of maps.

THE PLAN:

In forming his plan, the commander (in this case, the enemy) must bear in mind the following points:

A. A complicated plan depending for its success upon co-ordination between troops attacking up widely separated streets, or upon changes of direction, is liable to fail.

B. Streets provide easier and quicker lines of approach and attack. Back gardens may sometimes offer more cover; but it should be remembered that it will often be necessary climb over obstacles, and at these moments exposure is un-avoidable.

C. A single attack should be maintained. This does not mean that only one street or one house is to be attacked at a time. It does mean that if two or three or six streets are attacked at a time the effort should be co-operative, i.e., success in street 5 helps the troops attacking street 1.

HEADQUARTERS:

Headquarters should be chosen for the following features:

1. Well up: much closer to the forward troops than infield warfare.
2. Easy to find.
3. A strongly built house or shelter.
4. Entrance and exit defiled from enemy view and fire.

No concentration of troops or vehicles must be allowed near it, by day or night. During an attack it may frequently be necessary for the headquarters to be moved. Chalk and other marks may be drawn as a guide to the new headquarters. For safety, it can be arranged beforehand that, e.g., arrows face the opposite to the true direction.

CORDONS:

The object of cordoning is to prevent enemy lateral movements, whether of reinforcement, counter-attack or escape. When the object of attack is clear an area of enemy, the procedure should be to cordon a sub-area, clear it, and keep it cordoned from the uncleared area.

When the object of an attack is to penetrate to an area, it may frequently

be advisable to continue the line of advance.

Cordoning should be carried out by fire, not by men. The firing position should be selected so as to give the best field of fire, and will therefore normally be as low as possible.

COVERING FIRE:

It should be an absolute rule that no troops move across the open until three measures have been taken:

1. A rifle or machine gun must be sited-in to cover the street in which they are moving. In choosing the firing position, bear in mind:

(a) that if the enemy sees you getting into position or if your position is the obvious one to choose, you will never fire from it;

(b) that M-16 fire penetrates up to 13 inches and .55-inch anti-tank rifle fire up to 27 or more inches of brickwork, and that prolonged bursts will achieve greater penetration.

(c) that the lower you are the longer will be the beaten zone of your weapon.

(d) that if you are going to cover the advance of your own troops from the rear you must get high enough up to fire over their heads until the last possible moment (preferably rooftops).

(e) that there are many good firing positions other than houses (in and outsides of houses).

(f) that fire from a position rather above a room occupied by the enemy will search the position best and is the most telling.

2. One machine gun per company should be sited-in on one of the highest buildings in the area to cover as far as possible all rooftops. It is very hard for troops in streets to deal with attackers above them. No street should be attacked without domination of the rooftops (all rooftops must be secured before any operations).

3. There is usually a house whose windows dominate a whole street. It may be placed at the end of the street, or on rising ground farther away. If there is such a house, make preparations before attacking the street to destroy or blind it if the enemy should open fire from it.

THE POINT SECTION:

The first troops to break cover are the point section. This consists of:

1. SCOUTS—The duty of the scouts is to find out where the enemy is. They move, one or two on each side of the street, by short bounds, stopping under the cover of doorways, buttresses, gateposts, alleyways, etc., to observe the opposite side of the street. When moving, they should keep as close to the side wall as possible, and must go at the highest possible speed. During their pauses for observations they must on no account keep their heads poking round a corner; if possible they should be equipped with periscopes. If fired on, the scouts should take cover and try to work into position to give covering fire to assault troops.

be spared, for there may be many streets, and men and weapons will be a premium.

ASSUALT:

1. FORMS OF ATTACK—When the enemy is encountered he must be dealt with. There are many forms of attack. He may be attacked with bombs from the air; though this form is not practical is close fighting, and is more useful against an area than against an individual target. He may be attacked with shells from a gun man-handled into position; with weapons capable of riddeling his protective cover; with incendiary devices or weapons fired or thrown; with gas; with any effective weapon from a gun to a hosepipe. Often, however, it will not be possible to oust or destroy the enemy without an infantry assault, and it is the infantry assault, whether combined with other forms of attack or not, with which we are concerned.

2. LINES OF ASSAULT—In the same way, there are many lines of assault. An assault may be made up main streets; up side streets, through back gardens; over rooftops; through neighboring houses; through a house opposite and across a road; possibly even through sewers or contaigous cellars. Gliders were used by the Germans to land (in Belgium) on a wide, flat roof at fort Eban Emaal. We may leave out of account these more exotic forms of attack while remembering that if they are possible to do, they will be a surprise, a new idea, and therefore successful. In deciding upon a line or lines of assault, the following points should be borne in mind:

(a) An enemy position is a strong point. Before it is attacked, it should be as nearly encircled as possible. Occupy the houses on either side or behind it.

(b) Gain the houses on one side of a street before you enter the street, example: A and F are occupied by our own troops. Enemy in B will find it hard to cover the B side of the street and will have to lean right, out of the windows, doors, etc., to do so, where they themselves will be exposed from A2, 3, and 4. Thus, the street can only be effectively covered by the enemy from C, and this narrows the opposition almost to a single house, which can be neutralized.

(c) Attack the enemy most threatened by your own position. Example (see diagram opposite): A and F are held by our troops. Which street should be made good first, X or Y?

ANALYSIS: One side of each street is held. One end and one side of each street is held by the enemy. Of the enemy houses holding X, D2 and D3 are covered by fire on four sides, and D1 is covered on two sides. Of the enemy houses holding Y, four sides of all the houses D3 and B1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered by fire. Moreover, the street joining X from the enemy side is not properly covered, whereas the entrances to Y are well covered. Conclusion: Street "X" should be attacked first. You figure it out, as your life may depend on it in the near future. (see page #25 for drawings and analysis of this equation).

Note: The enemy will try to locate, attack, and destroy the strong point(s) of the Guerillas first. Caution should be exercised when encountering the enemy so as not to give away strong points by over eagerness, or aggressiveness in attack whenever the Guerillas do not wish to make their strong points or strategy known.

(d) More than one line of attack will be found difficult to co-ordinate but will have an excellent psychological effect upon the enemy.

(e) If you can attack along a line which does not hinder your covering fire the latter will be more effective.

(f) Back gardens may offer good cover: advancing troops will, however, find it difficult to avoid exposing themselves when surmounting obstacles.

(g) It is hard to deal with attackers from above; rooftops are safe from below and being built as a rule in the shape of an inverted V, they usually have a side defiled from fire.

(h) In the case of an attack through houses, back doors a little distance from the enemy house are usually covered from view by high wooden fencing, sheds, etc., moreover, in ghetto houses it does not take more than a minute or two to knock a hole in the wall.

(i) The most suicidal occupation in war is to delay in the open. When fired on, in all circumstances; FALL TO THE GROUND (or the nearest cover, as low as possible).

(j) The enemy are unlikely to occupy a single house unsupported by any other position. Normally they may occupy houses on each side of the road and site their automatic weapon in a house whose windows dominate the whole street.

THE ASSAULT—Experience in Madrid, Spain showed that a very high proportion of the total casualties was incurred in assault, and of these, 75% were caused by delay in the open, or more specifically: by delay outside the barricaded house of the enemy. The whole assault must be carried through at the highest possible speed by the shortest exposed route, with the heaviest possible covering fire until the last possible moment.

The following points should be considered:

(a) The enemy will prefer firing to his left. Firing off the right shoulder, he has to expose his body less when firing to the left than when firing to the right. Incidentally, the greater the angle to his position, both lateral and vertical, at which he has to fire, the more he must expose his body.

(b) The enemy will undoubtedly have barricaded or mined all entrances to his house. Preparations must be made to force an entrance to the house with

the shortest possible delay outside. The best form or method is for a single man to run forward under covering fire, place an explosive against the house, and dodge under cover. He should avoid doors and windows in placing his explosive; possibly a point in the side wall is best. If explosives are not obtainable, second-best are a heavy axe and a crowbar. Their employment means delay in the open and should be avoided whenever possible. Then men who are using them should always be accompanied by a man watching for bombs and grenades thrown from windows or a roof, ready to seize and throw them over a wall or down the street, or if the opportunity affords itself, throwing them back into the enemy position.

If explosives are used to force an entrance, the remainder of the assault party must be under cover well up, ready to dash in before the enemy has recovered from the shock of the explosion. Whatever the method employed of forcing an entrance, the assault party must attempt all methods of getting in. They need not necessarily confine themselves to going in through the gap they have made; the enemy will be concentrating their attention on it, and a man going in over the roof of a lean-to shed, up a drainpipe or down the skylight may escape notice.

(c) CLEARING HOUSE—Having made an entrance, the assault party still has half its task before it. Before leaving cover to assault the house, officer in charge must allot tasks to each member of his party to ensure that there is no hanging about inside the house and that no room cellar or attic is unsearched.

THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND:

- (1) The house should be searched systematically, floor by floor, remembering the cellars and roof. It is better if possible to search a house from the top downwards, as this makes an ally of gravity for grenades, etc. It does, however, involve entrance from the roof.
- (2) The front hall and the staircase are the two most dangerous points. Try any method of getting up and down from floor to floor but the main stair case. If it is not barricaded, it will certainly be mined. The fire escape may help. If the staircase must be used, feel in front of you with a long pole or throw a grenade at it, to set off any booby traps.
- (3) The officer must stay in the hall or passage to direct operations, but he must make use of any cover there may be, e.g. a thick sofa.
- (4) If the enemy are known to be upstairs, a few bursts of automatic weapons fire (ex: B.A.R.) through the floor from underneath will be a prudent action.
- (5) Smoke grenades inside a house are quite overwhelming. Incendiary bottles or bombs are very intimidating.

(6) Prisoners can be used to clear the house by setting off or revealing booby traps.

(7) Enter a room crouching as low as possible. The enemy will be prepared to fire about three or four feet above the floor.

It is essential that all attackers are familiar with methods of defense outlined in the chapters on defense and booby traps.

THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES:

1. General:

The use of high explosives can save many of the problems that arise during street fighting with an ease that astounds those who have never seen this weapon in action. It is essential, however, that only those who are trained in the preparation and application of high explosives are permitted to handle it.

The training itself is a simple matter and requires only marginal intelligence and determination on the part of the student. Methodical habits combined with reasonable enthusiasm are preferable to headstrong and suicidal dash, as, both in preparation and handling, explosives call for care and a steady head lest they become a source of danger to the user and his comrades. Arrangements are made for every man, woman, and child to learn the proper use of high explosives.

2. Defense:

As explained earlier, it is unlikely that enemy tank formations will venture into built-up areas: it is more probable that infantry will be called upon to capture a town.

All houses which are adapted for defense should be fitted with a booby trap system, operated electrically. The whole system can be controlled by a master switch which is situated so that the last defender can make the system live as he leaves. Booby traps will not be suspected in a house which has been used for defense, and the ensuing casualties will cause the attackers to reduce their speed of advance—even if it does not force them out into the open. Alternatively, each house can be mined either by buried charges or by explosives concealed in the basement or ground floor. These charges can be fired from the neighboring houses, and a single house blown up in this way will deter attackers from entering any other house near by with any feeling of confidence.

EXPLOSIVES IN ATTACK:

When clearing the enemy from occupied houses the advantages of explosives are very evident. The approach to an occupied house can be made on a blind side, i.e., the side where there are no downstairs windows. The house can be entered by a hole blown in this blind side, the charge required in most cases being surprisingly small.

If an entrance is made immediately after the explosion it will be found that the defenders in the immediate vicinity of the breach will be either casualties or in no condition to put up any resistance. Once inside the house, similar methods can be adopted to break into any room that offers resistance. Further, if a charge of 1 lb. of High Explosive on a 5-second or 7-second fuse be thrown into a room occupied by the enemy, the mopping-up operation becomes extremely simple and safe.

German troops were trained in the use of pole charges, i.e. charges of 10lbs. or more of high explosive on the end of a long pole, fired by an ordinary time fuse. These pole charges were intended to be placed in the loopholes of pill-boxes and were carried forward under cover of smoke or darkness. An adaptation of these charges can be made with advantage, and men should be trained to apply such charges to street fighting when clearing points strongly held by the enemy. With an elementary knowledge of explosives it is a comparatively simple matter to clear buildings which can block a field of fire.

ANTI-TANK MEASURES

Though the unsuitability of tanks in built-up areas has been stressed, it must on no account be taken that tanks will not be used by the enemy. Tanks are only unsuitable as long as every precaution has been taken against them. Every preparation should be made for their reception, and in this, explosives play a very large part.

Charges should be buried across all approach roads at a depth of 9 inches or a foot.

The quantity of this should 4 lbs. per foot of length. The charge must be fired electrically and provision can be made to fire this from the cover of a neighboring house. This charge will wreck lorries, but will only smash the track of a tank and bring it to a standstill. Though badly shaken, the crew will still be in a condition to fight and their guns will still be in action. To finish off the tank it is necessary to get a charge of explosive on the hull of the tank itself. (If operating from above, this can best be carried out by attaching a charge to a string and then to a pole and lowering it onto the tank from above).

This can be done under cover of smoke or the charge can be lowered from upper floors of houses near by also. Arrangements can be made (if you suspect an invasion) to have charges suspended above the road at suitable points or they may be lowered with the aid of long poles. THE CHARGES SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE, BE PLACED ON THE REAR DECK OF THE TANK BEHIND THE TURRET: THOUGH THE THICKNESS OF THE ARMOUR PLATING IN THIS POSITION VARIES, A CHARGE OF 10 lbs SHOULD SMASH A HOLE IN THE HULL AND DISABLE OR KILL THE CREW. It is desirable to have some knowledge of the weakest parts of a tank (see "demolition manual of the guerillas" for instructions into the weakest points of a tank) plating, and this knowledge will enable us to place the charges in the most advantageous positions. As an alternative to the continuous road charge, separate charges of 4 lbs. can be laid in the same manner as anti-tank mines at close spacing, though they must be buried sufficiently deep to prevent their being damaged by traffic. The separate charges should be connected up by instantaneous fuse so that they can be fired simultaneously by a low-powered battery exploder.

In addition to these road-block charges, a number of 10-foot planks should be prepared with the appropriate quantity of explosive strapped to them. These portable road charges can be rushed to any threatened point and laid by the roadside suitably concealed. On the approach of tanks or armoured fighting vehicles these planks can be dragged across the road, and exploded under the vehicle as required.

DEMOLITION:

Small bridges can be destroyed with ease and certainty, and craters blown in the road to form tank barriers. These and many other simple demolitions can be carried out after a short but careful course of training. It must be repeated, however, that High Explosive must be handled only by trained men and that men should be trained without further delay in this important field. The possibilities of this weapon in trained hands are limited, but in the hands of untrained personnel its use is usually disastrous.

To sum up generally: a knowledge of the use of explosives placed in the hands of single individual the most powerful weapon in existence, a weapon which, handled with reasonable care and skill, is practically safe and adaptable to very high degree. In using explosives it is not necessary to hold large stocks and kinds and sizes of grenades, each grenade being suitable for only one job. A single store of high explosives can be held and by varying the quantity used, this item of store can be adapted to a variety of purposes. The final, and in fact ruling, point of handling of high explosives is that personnel be trained carefully and **MUST AT ALL TIMES CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE PRECAUTIONS TAUGHT IN THIS TRAINING.** Accidents will only create a loss of confidence in the weapon, whereas the loss of confidence should be in the operator. Provided this is borne in mind, the unit commander will find a solution to the majority of street-fighting problems in the use of high explosives.

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT:

GENERAL:

The choice of arms and equipment should be governed by 1) certain features of warfare, 2) and the type the enemy use:

1. Street fighting imposes great physical strain upon all ranks.
2. Many obstacles are encountered in built-up areas.
3. Nearly all surfaces are hard and smooth: water drains off quickly.
4. Fighting usually takes place at close quarters.
5. There are usually many firing positions giving good cover from fire: most of these have overhead cover which can quickly be strengthened.

THE ABOVE POINTS SUGGEST DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS:

1. Arms equipment should be kept as light as possible.
2. Weapons should correspond to one of the following types:

I. GIVING A GREAT VOLUME OF FIRE IN PROPORTION TO WEIGHT AND SIZE
.e.g. A SUB-MACHINE GUN.

II. BEING ABLE EITHER TO GET ROUND OR TO PENETRATE COVER FROM AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE, .e.g. A GRENADE OR RIFLE...

note: In all cases, weapons used should be that of the same caliber as that of the enemy, as that becomes our source of ammunition and weapons.

ARMS:

I. Rifle and Bayonet -- The 360' field around ant defensive position is likely to be split, in built-up areas, into several separate, narrow fields of fire. The bayonet is the principal close-quarter weapon for the ordinary rifle, and can be used with great effect in clearing houses, or in street battles.

II. Discharger --- The present issue of one discharger per platoon is intended for the the use of the use of the grenade.

III. M16, B.A.R., & M1 --- These two weapons will be dealt with together, as in street fighting the greater range and endurance of B.A.R. will rarely be utilized.

Both types are excellent in defence and can make a street impassable. The Automatic weapon is very suitable in attack to give covering fire, but both are too heavy and cumbersome for such close-range fighting, such as would be the case in gardens and houses. At a pinch an Automatic weapon can be fired from the hip, and may be useful where sub-machine guns are not obtainable.

THE SUB-MACHINE GUN--This is the ideal assault and close-range fighting weapon. It enables targets appearing from different directions and at short ranges to be engaged quickly, and has a high rate of fire combined with great stopping power. The sub-machine gun can be fired from the hip or shoulder with accuracy up to 50 yards. It has been found that the best method of firing from the shoulder is to align the foresight in the V formed by the cocking-handle rather than the backsight.

ANTI-TANK RIFLE--This has good penetrative qualities, and, although primarily for use against medium sized tanks, can usefully be used against enemy behind cover proof against automatic weapons fire. The hole blown by the bullet will not be large enough to provide entry to a house. The rifle is rather heavy and awkward to carry great distances.

TWO-INCH MORTAR --This weapon is difficult to use and rather ineffective in built-up areas for the following reasons:

A. Mortar bombs have little penetration.

B. The enemy will, in defence, be roofed over; and, in attack, will either be roofed over or better engaged by small-arms fire or automatic weapons fire.

There are, however, occasions when it is useful to attack an enemy in gardens, ruined houses, etc., while it may sometimes be possible to use smoke, in cases where a smoke bomb can be found.

PISTOL--In the hands of an untrained shot, the pistol will not prove an effective weapon. With constant practice, it will be found that the short barrel and the speed with which single rounds can be fired enable the firer to engage targets rapidly in different directions and render it a very useful weapon for close-quarter fighting.

GRENADES--When thrown is a most valuable weapon. It will normally be used in clearing a house and in surprise encounters with enemy at close quarter. It has a 4-second fuse and a 7-second fuse--can be thrown up to 35 yards. The thrower must take cover before the explosion. (see handbook on improvised demolition)

Grenades are not suitable as explosives to blow a gap in barricades, doorways, walls, etc.

Smoke will almost certainly play a most important part. In defence it may be used to blind the enemy covering fire and mystify the attacking troops, incidentally making them good silhouette targets. In attack it may similarly be used to blind enemy fire, but better surprise is often achieved if a side is attacked different from that which has been blinded. In the assault,

smoke inside a house can be overwhelming.

EQUIPMENT:

SHOES--When obtainable, rubber-soled shoes are in every way preferable to Army boots, combining the advantages of silence and a good grip.

RESPIRATORS AND GAS-CAPES--Respirators may be needed against smoke and tear_gas grenades, dust, etc., and should always be carried. If orders permit, gas-capes may be discarded in built-up areas, where there is so much cover from spray attack.

KNAPSACKS--There are, in street fighting, features which make the wearing of the knapsack by advancing or attacking troops not only unnecessary but undesirable. The contents of the pack are:


- (a) Knife, fork, spoon, and mess-tin.
- (b) Spare pair of socks.
- (c) Groundsheet.
- (d) Food.

Periscopes--periscopes are invaluable for commandante' and Lt's and for the point section of each attacking platoon. The present issue should be supplemented by home-made productions.

GENERAL:

Training should follow the sequence:

- (1) lecture.
- (2) Demonstration.
- (3) Sand Table.
- (4) Practice.



WALLS ARE MARKED THUS-- 

FENCES- - - - - 

HOUSES- - - - - A1, B4, E3, etc.

STREETS - - - - - X, Y.

ANALYSIS: One side of each street is held. One end and one side of each street is held by the enemy. Of the enemy houses holding X, D2 and D3 are covered by fire on four sides, and D1 is covered on two sides. Of the enemy houses holding Y, four sides of all the houses D3 and B1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered by fire. Moreover, the street joining X from the enemy side is not properly covered, whereas the entrances to Y are well covered.

CONCLUSION: Street ? should be attacked first. You figure it out, as your life may depend on it in the near future.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 New York, New York

January 21, 1970

In Reply, Please Refer to

File No. Bureau 100-439100
 New York 100-147963

Title	Student National Coordinating Committee
Character	Racial Matters
Reference	is made to the report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated and captioned as above at New York.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

100-439190-34-199

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office NEW YORK	Office of Origin NEW YORK	Date MAY 25 1970	Investigative Period 1/16/70 - 5/20/70
Title of Case CONFIDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE		Report made by [REDACTED]	Typed By: kbn
		Character of Case RM	

Report of SA **[REDACTED]** at New York, 1/21/70. **B7C**

-P-

This report is classified "Confidential" since it contains information from **[REDACTED]** disclosure of whose identity might have an adverse effect upon the national security interest of the US.

The following individuals comprise the basic SNCC officers in the NYC area:

W. RAY BAKER
 IRVING DAVIS
 WILLIAM BOLT
 H. BRAL

MONROE HEAD
 BRUCE ALMSON
 RON JACKSON
 EMERY AUBREY (recently transferred to Atlanta)

Approved: <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below	
1 - Bureau (100-439190) (RM) 1 - 100th St. Branch, NYC (RM) 1 - OSI, NYC (SI) 1 - DESO, NYC (RM) 2 - Secret Service, NYC (RM) 1 - New York (100-6488) (INFO) (RM) 1 - Cincinnati (100-24158) (INFO) (RM) 3 - New York (100-147965)		100-439190-34 100-439190-2184 MAY 27 1970	REC 25 ST-117

Notes: AGENCY: PAC ATT: ISD, RAO ATT: IDIU
 ASSI, SEC SER OSI, IRS. Mr. Whyatt
 DATE FORN: 6/10/70
 HOW FORN: R/S
 BY: PEN/WSB

RACIAL INT. SECT.

JUL 27 1970

70 JUN 30 1970

EXP. PROC.

NY 100-147963

ADMINISTRATIVE CONT'D

Information copies have been designated for Atlanta and Cincinnati since they are the only other divisions with any apparent SNCC activities.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source

File Number Where Located

[REDACTED]

100-147963-4091, 4086, 4113,
4091, 4140, 4113

[REDACTED]

Instant Report
100-147963-3920, 4110, 4086,
4047, 4040, 4086,
4124

[REDACTED]

Instant Report
100-147963-4124, 4086, 4113,
4040, 3957
Instant Report, 4110

[REDACTED]

100-147963-4047, 4047,
4047

[REDACTED]

100-147963-4049

[REDACTED]

100-147963-3992

[REDACTED]

100-147963-4047

[REDACTED]

100-147963-4157

NY 100-147963

LEAD

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will follow and report SNCC activity in 90 days.

-C*-
COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy to: 4 - 108th MI Group, NYC (RM)
1 - OSI, NYC (RM)
1 - NISO, NYC (RM)
1 - Secret Service, NYC (RM)

Report of: [REDACTED] Office: New York, New York
Date: MAY 25 1970
Field Office File #: 100-147963 Bureau File #: 100-439190
Title: STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Synopsis: SNCC occupies space in the Rectory of St. Peter's Episcopal Church, 356 West 20th Street, NYC, which serves as national headquarters for SNCC. There are SNCC chapters currently functioning in Cincinnati, Ohio, Atlanta, Georgia, and NYC. Chairman H. RAP BROWN is currently a fugitive from justice and is being sought on a federal warrant charging Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution. SNCC has announced various projects including a Liberation School in Atlanta, the National Black Referendum Against the War in Vietnam, the Augusta Coffeehouse, the Newsletter and the Agrarian Reform Program, but none have come to fruition as a result of a lack of funds.

[REDACTED]

Various SNCC releases concerning structure, aims and purpose of organization set out within.

-P-

DETAILS:

A characterization of the Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) may be found in the Appendix section of this report.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~GROUP 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

NY 100-147963

I. LOCATION OF NATIONAL OFFICE

The SNCC headquarters will be returned to Atlanta, Georgia, effective on or about April 17, 1970. New York SNCC leader TERRY AUDREY is scheduled to move to that city to serve in the leadership of the organization with STANLEY WISE and WILLIE RICKS, both presently operating in the Atlanta, Georgia area.

[REDACTED]
April 18, 1970

The transfer of SNCC functionary TERRY AUDREY to Atlanta, Georgia, is being held in abeyance as the organization is without funds to pay the cost of his transportation and the fact that they no longer have office space since the takeover of the SNCC Office by the National Black Economic Development Conference. NBEDC is an organization in which JAMES FORMAN formerly served as spokesman.

[REDACTED]
April 16, 1970

The SNCC National Headquarters remain at 336 West 200th Street, New York City, as of May 21, 1970, although there has been some discussion in the past concerning the removal of National SNCC Headquarters to Atlanta, Georgia.

[REDACTED]
May 21, 1970

II. MEMBERSHIP AND OFFICERS

SNCC has three chapters currently active throughout the United States. They are in New York City, Atlanta, Georgia, and Cincinnati, Ohio.

[REDACTED]
May 21, 1970

NY 100-147963

PHILIP LEROY HUTCHINGS, former National Program Secretary of SNCC, has ceased his activities with such organization and is now actively involved in recruiting for the Venceremos Brigade. Source described the Venceremos Brigade as a volunteer organization whose purpose is to travel to Cuba to aid in the harvest of sugar cane.

[REDACTED]
January 30, 1970

H. RAP BROWN is the National Chairman of SNCC. IRVING B. DAVIS remains as Director of the International Affairs Section and WILLIAM HUNT is the Chairman of the Revolutionary Political Council of SNCC.

[REDACTED]
May 21, 1970

A federal warrant was issued May 4, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland, charging H. RAP BROWN, National Chairman of SNCC, with Unlawful Interstate Flight to Avoid Prosecution, for Arson, Inciting to Riot and Failure to Appear (Title 18 United States Code, Section 1073).

The Cincinnati SNCC chapter is composed currently of eleven members. The office of SNCC in Cincinnati is located at the Rockdale Temple, Rockdale and Harvey Streets, Cincinnati, Ohio.

[REDACTED]
May 21, 1970

The SNCC office in Atlanta, Georgia, is located at 360 Nelson Street South West. There are three individuals who are currently active in SNCC in Atlanta. There has been some attempt by JAMES FORMAN, a former SNCC officer, to gain control of the Atlanta SNCC office.

[REDACTED]

NY 100-147953

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

May 4, 1970

V. FOREIGN CONTACTS

SNCC sponsored a party February 18, 1970, honoring the Tanzanian Ambassador to the United Nations. The party was held at 7 East 14th Street and was arranged by IRVING DAVIS.

[REDACTED]

February 18, 1970

NY 100-147963

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

March 24, 1970

Three representatives of SNCC attended a social affair at the residence of the Tanzanian Ambassador to the United Nations in Mt. Vernon, New York, April 26, 1970.

[REDACTED]

April 29, 1970

[REDACTED]

VII. SNCC PROJECTS

1. National Black Referendum
Against the War in Vietnam

The so-called "Black Referendum on Vietnam" being organized by IRVING DAVIS is actually a front organization of SNCC. The purpose of the referendum is to conduct a polling of the Black Community to show the dissent existing therein towards the involvement of the United States in Vietnam. This polling was to be accomplished through mailing and the establishment of booths within the Black Communities and churches in Atlanta, Georgia; Augusta, Georgia; Cincinnati, Ohio, Cleveland, Ohio; Boston, Massachusetts; Detroit, Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; New York, New York, and Washington, D.C. It was originally scheduled to take place between March 22, and March 27, 1970; however, it was rescheduled to commence on April 30, 1970, as a result of the postal strike, which interrupted mail service.

[REDACTED]

March 11, 1970

NY 100-147963

This project has been given the endorsement and support of the National Committee of Black Churchmen, 110 East 125th Street, New York City, a ministerial organization of black clergymen, who have granted DAVIS the use of their office space. DAVIS has contacted ALE WEISBURD, official of the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, a New York City based anti-war group, and secured some financial assistance from him for the project. The amount DAVIS received is unknown and he is the only individual who has access to the records.

DAVIS has stated that he is using the office space of the National Committee of Black Churchmen for the Referendum because he feels that if the Black Community realized it was a SNCC undertaking, it would receive little or no support.

[REDACTED]
March 11, 1970

The SNCC program entitled "National Black Referendum on Vietnam" scheduled to commence on April 30, 1970, has been completely dormant and no one from SNCC previously active in promoting this program has been observed at its office space, 110 East 125th Street, New York City, in the previous weeks.

[REDACTED]
April 14, 1970

The National Black Referendum against the War in Vietnam, initiated by IRVING DAVIS, appears to have accomplished nothing and is regarded by many as a complete flop. The program was afforded very little publicity and it is believed, at this point, to have been abandoned by DAVIS.

[REDACTED]
May 21, 1970

NY 100-147963

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
April 27, 1970

3. Coffee House

Various SNCC officials have been in the Augusta, Georgia area seeking to secure rental space, which SNCC intends to convert into a "coffee house" in Augusta, Georgia. Atlanta attorney, HOWARD MOORE, Jr., is acting as lawyer in behalf of SNCC in these negotiations.

[REDACTED]
March 2, 3, and 4, 1970

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]
March 25, 1970

The "coffee house" being established by SNCC in Augusta, Georgia, has run into serious financial problems and its future is very questionable because of the lack of money needed to open and operate it. It was anticipated the coffee house would open May 29, 1970; however, it is unknown whether the opening can be effected on this date.

[REDACTED]
May 11, 1970


NY 100-147963

TERRY AUDREY, SNCC functionary is believed to have authorized a report outlining the present situation and conditions of the SNCC operated Liberation School in Atlanta, Georgia. The report on the Liberation School is directed to the RPC, which is the Revolutionary Political Council of SNCC, a semi-secret policy making body within the organization composed of MOHAMMED HUNT, IRVING DAVIS, H. RAP BROWN and possibly RON JACKSON, all New York City based officials.


May 11, 1970

VII. MISCELLANEOUS

Subsequent to funeral services for RALPH FEATHERSTONE in Washington, D.C., who was killed along with another SNCC functionary when the car in which they were driving exploded outside Bel Air, Maryland, on March 9, 1970, as a result of a bomb explosion, JAMES FORMAN called a meeting of all former SNCC officials who were present at the funeral.






[REDACTED]
March 17, 1970

SNCC issued a press release concerning the whereabouts of H. RAP BROWN, National Director of the organization, on March 16, 1970.

[REDACTED]
March 25, 1970

A copy of this release, as provided by [REDACTED] on March 25, 1970, may be found in the appendix section of this report page 29.

The following statement was issued by SNCC concerning the disappearance of H. RAP BROWN following the explosion in Bel Air, Maryland, on March 9, 1970, which killed two of BROWN's associates:

"March 15, 1970

"STATEMENT TO THE BLACK COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

"AMERICA IF IT TAKES MY DEATH TO ORGANIZE MY PEOPLE TO REVOLT AGAINST YOU AND TO ORGANIZE YOUR TROOPS TO REVOLT AGAINST YOU AND TO ORGANIZE YOUR CHILDREN, YOUR GOD, YOUR POOR, YOUR COUNTRY, AND TO ORGANIZE MANKIND TO

NY 100-147963

REJOICE IN YOUR DESTRUCTION AND RUIN,
THEN HERE IS MY LIFE. BUT MY SOUL BELONGS
TO MY PEOPLE. WE SHALL CONQUER WITHOUT
A DOUBT'

"'Note to America'

H. Rap Brown, Parrish Prison, La.

February 21, 1968

"The Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) calls for massive retribution and revenge for the vicious murders of Ralph Featherstone and Brother Che.

"In executing revenge and retribution we urge all Black people to keep in mind the very real possibility that the body of H. Rap Brown was removed from the scene of the murder by the racist white power structure in order to avoid massive reprisals in the United States. Black people must not forget that the body of Patrice Lumumba was not found until some time after his assassination so that the Congolese population wouldn't rise up in vengeance at the death of their leader.

"Ralph Featherstone and Brother Che have rendered heroic service to the Black liberation struggle and their murderers and assassins must be punished. Aggressive warfare against the U.S. must be further intensified. We know that the killing of these brothers is only a small part of the systematic extermination of Black people that is the basis of the call for law and order. By planting a bomb in the brother's car the racist white in the U.S. have escalated their tactics of violence against Black people. We must, therefore, begin to escalate our efforts and tactics in trying to destroy the racist, capitalist and imperialist government of the United States.

NY 100-147963

"We are firmly convinced that the murder of our brothers must be charged to the dirty, bloody hands of Richard M. Nixon and especially Spiro Agnew. All Black people must also understand that Ralph Featherstone was viciously hated by zionists and he became the symbol of SNCC's opposition to Israeli aggression in the Middle East.

"It must be made crystal clear that H. Rap Brown IS NOT at home -- and that his wisdom and ideas must be spread throughout the Black community: 'No slave should die a natural death; there is a point where caution ends and cowardice begins. Brothers and sisters, and all oppressed people, we must prepare ourselves both mentally and physically for the major confrontation is yet to come.'

"WE MUST NOT BETRAY THE CONFIDENCE OF H. RAP BROWN,
RALPH FEATHERSTONE AND BROTHER CHE!"

[REDACTED]
March 16, 1970

FRANCIS BEAL, National Staff member of SNCC, is presently distributing a pamphlet attacking the Federal Government and several of its agencies, attributing to the Federal Government much of the violence that has transpired in the country.

[REDACTED]
March 25, 1970

The above statement, as furnished by [REDACTED] on March 20, 1970, may be found in the appendix section of this report pages 30, 31, and 32.

WILLIAM HUNT has authored various outlines describing the current SNCC organization, its aims, structure and programs.

[REDACTED]
May 11, 1970

NY 100-147963

Copies of such report, as provided by [REDACTED] on May 11, 1970, may be found in the appendix section of this report pages 33, 34, 35, and 36.

SHCC has mailed various functionaries within the organization a document captioned "Guidelines and Amendments".

[REDACTED]
May 11, 1970

A copy of the above document, as provided by [REDACTED] on May 11, 1970, may be found in the appendix section of this report pages 37, 38, 39, and 40.

APPENDIX

NY 100-147963

1.

STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A source advised the Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC), formerly known as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, is a nonmembership organization founded in 1960, during the civil rights movement in the South.

Under the leadership of STOKELY CARMICHAEL, who served as National Chairman during the period 1966-67, SNCC evolved from a civil rights oriented group into a full-blown black revolutionary organization.

A publication entitled "1967 High Tide of Black Resistance" indicates the year 1967 was considered by SNCC as a historic milestone for the liberation of black people in the United States and the year that revolutionaries throughout the world began to understand more fully the impact of the black movement. The publication declared that "liberation will come only when there is final destruction of this mad octopus-the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The realities of black life, together with the recognition instilled in SNCC workers, forced its members to further popularize the legitimacy of self-defense and rebellions when oppression became too great."

A second source advised that H. RAP BROWN succeeded CARMICHAEL as National Chairman of SNCC in May, 1968, and served in that capacity until June, 1968, at which time SNCC reorganized, creating ten deputy chairmen in an effort to relieve pressure by law enforcement.

In April, 1969, SNCC moved its national headquarters from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City, where it is presently located.

H. RAP BROWN announced at a press conference in New York City on July 22, 1969, that he had been elected Chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. He announced the organization was dropping the word "nonviolent" from its title and will be known as the Student National Coordinating Committee, with a Revolutionary Political Council functioning as its governing body. BROWN, at that time, stated the use of force is necessary in obtaining revolutionary goals.

REPORT TO R.P.C.

Terry

Have been here two weeks - in which time bulk of energy spent in cleaning office.

Met with John O'neal of GCSP last week. Three instructions:

- 1- change name of group
- 2- cut original proposal and submit for emergency funding for school.
- 3- start school for another field appraisal.

The name of the group was catching flack here from someone. Original proposal also seemed as a smoke screen for something else. He (and Herb Callender) felt the school would fall if it was submitted with the other components of the program.

In order for emergency funding, the field appraiser must see something tangible. This is in progress now, anticipating his visit.

rewrote proposal - enclosed is copy of original and rewrite. Please send back copies of both for our files.

As for the school - Naomi and I have been greatly hampered by lack of transportation until last week. We have been doing leg work attempting to raise money for bills. Checked with Summit Conference here- they instructed I should see Abbott Heacock Danny Brown's Monastery. Also I am attempting to find a Father Austin Ford - a radical churchman in the Episcopalian church who has fought the Bishop and has enough influence to try to get the programs through.

Received a history of why SNCC is catching hell from the bishop. He was one of the liberals in Atlanta who Carmichael turned off in '66 and has resented it ever since.

Office in need of the following sum:

light \$122
water \$ 15
gas \$118

am trying to raise it through those above mentioned folks and others.

Things are slow - but we'll get it together.

Due to internal difficulties of administration and the group dynamics of the working staff of the organization formerly known as the AfroAmerican Society of Greater Atlanta, we find *emerging* a group of individuals, comprising a working team, who intend to live up to the commitments to the Black people of Atlanta in the form of programs previously adopted by the presently defunct organization.

However ^{two} after many months of inactivity, we find that it is impossible to fulfill all of the obligations we have incurred, and have set policy to the effect that the programs (three of them) will be implemented when feasible to do so. Our most important and most successful program shall be our primary concern. Until we are thoroughly convinced we shall be able to invest time and energy in other endeavors, our liberation school shall be our major program in and for the Black communities of the city of Atlanta.

This school, with the exception of the past two months, has been successfully operating for almost a year.

*In the beginning of our liberation school program we set forth a purpose answerable to some of the problems facing the present public educational system, therefore outlining our alternative. We realized that the present educational system was grossly inadequate because Black children are fed specifically indoctrinatory and often irrelevant data, while being denied those exercises necessary to stimulate the thought process. The methods used to teach basic subjects vital to any form of education have not been successful, and where they have been, only in minimal forms, not reaching the broad ^{masses} base of Black children. This means a disabling of Black children's ability to read, write, reason, create (especially create), challenge and dispute. This system's effects are apparent in the average Black youth after completing the so-called "educational cycle". He has no knowledge of self; he has an acquired desire to break ties with the Black community, and can function in no capacity for he cannot relate to his own,

While the system which created his dilemma will not accept him on equal terms, even though he has been programmed to accept and partake in the values, rituals mores and trends of that society, right or wrong.

Realizing these inadequacies we designed our liberation school to react the Black child at an early age (3-6) in order to offset the present situation, as well as to prepare him to enter wider environmental situations, ie making the transition from home and family to the broader society. Using our philosophy "Black pre-school education is one that essentially prepares the child to withstand and cope with obstacles he will be faced with the first years of formal public school, for we realize it is during the first years of schooling is the Black child molded and shaped for whatever future education they receives, as well as the foundation laid for "success or failure" in this system.

We see our liberation school program as:

a- improving the child's capacity and ability to think and rationalize, preparing him for the type of thinking processes he will encounter in a very short time under the system of education known to us today.

b- instill an understanding of the meaning of relationship and responsibility to himself, his parents, people around him and his own Black community.

c- show him the importance of questioning and seeking knowledge, which can be used and applied to his own situation, so that he may create uses for the knowledge that he acquires, whether in the sterile laboratories of a classroom, or in intercourse with society at large.

We feel that this can and will be accomplished by our curriculum, which is outlined below:

READING

In the first year children learned alphabet and letter writing. This is the prerequisite to reading. This year we have moved into phonetics, spelling and reading skills.

MATHEMATICS

The first year we learned numbers (recognition, writing and numerical concepts), shapes and simple operations. This year we are trying to use a relatively new approach in purpose, if not in technique. With our emphasis placed upon building a new value system and a humanity, we are trying to instill new values, new concepts and new alternatives to existing systems, we find the student too young to comprehend any detail in mathematical principles, but are being taught the basic concepts of the numerical system, groups, and sets, through their (the numbers) relationship with each other and the relationship of numbers to things directly associated with the children.

SCIENCE

This shall entail a study of the human body (external and internal) on the level of hygiene for youngsters and other body functions. We are dealing primarily with less complicated systems and organs. We also study other aspects of nature, i.e. plant life and some forms of animal life, this course provides for puzzling exercises and experiments which allows the children to learn the analytical process, satisfy their basic inquisitive nature, and also allow them an understanding of themselves. (This is so because children are so much like animals.)

GEOGRAPHY

Geography is taught in conjunction with Black history. Geographic work shall be both theoretical (map study etc., of foreign lands, as well as practical, in the form of exploration of his own community, and the city of Atlanta itself. Here children will be prepared to venture out from their immediate environment of the backyard (if fortunate to have some facimile) or their street, into the areas which affect them. This will help break the ice so to speak when the child is prepared to venture into the educational system of Atlanta. In addition, since we find that the intelligence quotient is based on a test which deals with the middle class environment and experience, we intend to prepare the child for such

BLACK HISTORY

This is a presentation of the African and Afro/American experience to young Black minds. It shall be told in story form, using animation and personification to maintain the interests of the students. This course shall concern itself with the visible and significant achievement and struggles of Black people, things that a young Black child can relate to his own experience.

SPEECH

This course is designed to give the children exercises in self-expression and vocabulary building. It will give the child the opportunity to develop speech habits and confidence in speech, two primary factors in communication. It will not be a grammar course, we will not discuss nouns and adjectives, and all of the other things that are done in the system's schools, but allow the student to relate, verbally, his own ideas and concepts of the other things taught. We find that in primary grades in public school systems, young Black children become afraid and lack confidence when speaking and learning to speak because they are afraid of being put down by the teacher. Given a little freedom and a little correction now and then, as well as encouragement without fear of a bad grade, etc., the child can (and invariably has) learn to speak and express his thoughts.

To augment all of this the children will have exercises in Observation and Concentration. They are exposed to music, creativity, arts and crafts and the other aspects of their environment which are conducive to a good educational experience. Learning situations of this type (we feel) enables a child to develop physically, socially, emotionally, politically as well as academically.

In the past the school has been able to provide free medical checkups for the students with the aid of a few Black physicians. This has been broadened so that free dental examinations shall also be given.

The child's education shall not stop once he leaves the confines of our physical plant. We are and have been in the process of ~~making~~ designing and manufacturing our own textbooks and materials, as well as using whatever we deem appropriate. Many of these articles find their way into the parents hands who are counselled as to use and application so that home is also a part of the child's educational process.

After the child has left us, and is entered into a public elementary school we feel that either of two things will happen. Either he will be looked upon as an intelligent, well reared child, or as an "uppitty nigger brat"- which indicate that we have done our job well, according to the type of teacher the student receives. But in the long run we know that the child has and will have gained a lot from his experience.

The need has made itself apparent to expand our school. Since our program is a community based project working directly with local persons. We have been asked to expand our school to thirty children. That we intend to do.

Our school is housed in space rented (a whole building) at 360 Nelson St. SW former home office of our landlords, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, a civil rights organization of many years ago. We have acquired this building for \$200 a month. Presently we have paid two months rent in advance, which was raised among those individuals working with the school (which presently is unnamed). Meals are provided for the students, free of charge. Food coming from various sources, but basically again coming out of the pockets of individuals.

Our intention is to continue the program as long as there is a need. But for

5-

these funds are desperately needed. We intend for this school to become community operated in the future, self sufficient as well as completely controlled by the community. This, however we foresee in the next 18-24 months.

Until this time it is necessary for us to seek funding from various places. This is quite apparent when we find that we were able to raise for operations in the past two weeks only a little over \$450, with \$200 coming from one individual with the program.

We are asking for a refunding from your organization. Presently we see our budget for the school as pretty much the same. for the next 12 months

Director & head teacher	\$400/mon	4,800
2 teachers	400/mon	4,800
rent	200/mon	2,400
utilities incl tele	110/mon	1,320
paper & supplies		10,000
		23,320.00

Presently, due to lack of funds, and in order to reestablish complete operation of the school, as well as expansion as planned, we seek an emergency grant, as advised by your field appraiser, Mr. O'Neill for a period of 3 months. This comes to a total of

director & head teacher	\$400/mon	1,200
2 teachers	\$400/mon	1,200
rent (two months)	\$200/mon	4,000
utilities	\$110/mon	330
supplies		2,500
		\$5,630

Not all of the Afro American Society has been scrapped, for we have kept the board of directors in tact because they are representative of all segments of the community in the city of Atlanta. these people and their respective functions are:


William Coleman	Chairman	1214 Eastridge Rd	SW
Connie Beadles	vice Chairman	917 parson st.	SW
Essie Thompson	recording secy	217 Buena Vista Ave	
Mozelle Daniels	corr secy	217 Buena Vista Ave	
Betty Foster	Committee XXXXXXXX coordinator	718 Parson st	
Carrie Mathis	treasurer	980 Peoples St	
sen Julian Pond	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	132 Eurlie St	
Rev Robert Hunter	Advisor	po box 3111	
Howard Moore esq.	atty & legal advisor	859 1/2 Hunter St	

Robert Smith has been replaced as director by Terry Ardrey. His function is to carry out all of the responsibilities delegated him by the board, and to make sure the school is running at all cost. As director of the school, he is an ex-officio member of the board of directors. The only salaried person on this ~~board~~ body.

NOTES

* - most of the text of this proposal has been plagerized from the original. This is not due to lack of originality, but because we feel that this program is a worthwhile endeavor.

** The school shall be known as



RALPH FEATHERSTONE

For Immediate Release

Official Statement by the Student National Coordinating Committee
March 16th 1970

We, the Student National Coordinating Committee, hereby denounce all reports that Chairman H. Rap Brown is at home. These stories are total speculation and rumor.

We further denounce the stories of the Amsterdam News claiming "H. Rap Brown is alive and well at home" as a deliberate attempt of the establishment to sow confusion in the Black community and movement.

These totally unfounded stories are dangerous to the morale of Brother Rap's family and friends.

Chairman H. Rap Brown's whereabouts are not known. It is a grave possibility that Rap's body was pulled from the wreckage, or that he was kidnapped.

With the given racial tension in Bel Air Maryland, known as a habitat for the Minutemen and KKK, there is no doubt in our minds that the bomb that claimed the lives of Ralph Featherstone and William (Che) Payne was meant for Chairman Rap.

We call for a dismissal of the trial because the charges are unfounded and that no Black man can get a fair trial under this judicial system.

We request the cooperation of all above and underground media in not reiterating these fictitious reports of H. Rap Brown's whereabouts. Any statement made by any individual who is not a spokesman of, or affiliated with, SNCC should not be regarded as fact. Unless authorized by the said organization.

Other press conferences and statements will occur in the near future
Political Council,
Student National Coordinating Committee.

We charge the federal government with the crime of wantonly murdering our two brothers, Ralph Featherstone and apparently William Che Paine. We suspect, although we may never be able to prove it, that agents of the federal government were directly involved, probably because they thought that Brother Rap Brown was in the car.

This is the way that the CIA has operated all over the Third World from the Congo to Laos, from Ghana to Vietnam. If they are in the way, people of color and their leaders are mysteriously blown to bits, with even less thought than if they were boulders blocking a road or trees blocking a view. But directly involved or not, the Federal Government is responsible for initiating the chain of events that has now resulted in this heinous crime against black people.

Just as the Mayor of Memphis, Tennessee created the political climate of violence and hysteria which led to the wanton murder of Dr. King in 1968, the Federal Government today with its repressive legislation against movement activists such as the Stokely Carmichael Anti-Riot act, and the Anti-Conspiracy Act and its bringing to trial of movement activists on the basis of this repressive legislation has now created the political climate of violence and hysteria which has led to the wanton murder of these two dedicated hard-working, unsung fighters of human freedom.

For many years it is the Federal Government itself which has been responsible for the growing chaos and disorder in and around the courts. By its deliberate effort to muddy up the fundamental distinction between political activity and crime, it has fostered disrespect for the judicial process, and cited to riot and murder, and unleashed the most reactionary forces in the nation.

By sending in agents-provocateurs to movement organizations, as in the notorious alleged plot by RAM to blow up the Statue of Liberty, it has deliberately instigated and sought to provoke freedom fighters to acts of terrorism which can only end in their imprisonment or death.

THE TIME HAS COME TO TAKE SOME SIGNIFICANT STEPS TO BRING A HALT TO THIS VIOLENCE AND UNENDING INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE BY THE GOVERNMENT. To this end, we demand:

- (1) that the Federal government itself take the initiative immediately to move for the dismissal of all charges against H. Rap Brown, as well as against all other political defendants, black and white, who have been charged under the Anti-Riot, Anti-Conspiracy Act and similar repressive legislation;
- (2) That steps be taken immediately to repeal the Anti-Riot and Anti-Conspiracy Act;
- (3) That the FBI, the CIA, and Police Departments across the country immediately destroy their dossiers on movement activists and that the permanent Subcommittee on Investigation of the Committee on Government Operation of the U.S. Senate (whose extensive extensive and public hearings have revealed only a small part of what is contained in these dossiers) be immediately disbanded;
- (4) That wherever agents-provocateurs have been, or are disclosed to be involved in, acts of terrorism against movement activists; that the charges against the movement people be dismissed and charges be brought instead against these agents and the official agencies employing them for conspiring to violate the civil rights of citizens.

WE CALL UPON THE BLACK COMMUNITY AND ALL DECENT CITIZENS ACROSS THE NATION TO SUPPORT THESE DEMANDS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO CLEAR UP THE CALCULATED CONFUSION BETWEEN POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND CRIME WITH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS SEEKING TO DESTROY THE MOVEMENT.

At the same time we call upon black organizations to appoint their own investigative committee to determine the guilty parties to these murders and we demand that the Justice Department and all officials on every level cooperate with this committee giving it the right to subpoena persons and documents and granting it access to all files and information related to this and similar crimes. In particular, we urge movement people to reflect upon the need for new forms of organization which will minimize future opportunities for the enemy to waste our Brothers and Sisters.

ENDORSERS CAN SEND THEIR NAMES, ORGANIZATIONS, ETC. TO THE FOLLOWING:

P.O. BOX 3346
Jefferson Station
Detroit, Michigan 48214

SIGNED BY:

Dan Aldrich

James Boggs

Bob Lucas

William Strickland

Frances Beal

I. DEVELOPMENT OF POSITION PAPERS ON:

- A. The Role of Black Women
- B. Revolutionary Morality and Leadership
- C. Revolutionary Nationalism: A New Direction

II. AMENDMENTS TO ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES: (see attached)**III. CONCEPT OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY ORGANIZING: "Working within the framework of community programs and structures"**

- A. Participation - understand true nature of community in which we intend to organize. We must therefore participate in already established organizations and perform one or more of the following tasks:
 - 1. Gathering data on personnel, finances, income, supporters' effectiveness of program, usefulness.
- B. Influencing programs with SNCC ideology
- C. Neutralizing programs that are dangerous or detrimental to the liberation of black people.
- D. The following issues concern the black community and organizing should be carried out wherever possible around them:
 - 1. Education - community control, busing of pupils, etc.
 - 2. Nationalism
 - 3. The Welfare issue
 - 4. Indonesian Wars (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand!!!)

IV. BASIC STRUCTURE AND BASIC PROGRAMS: (see attached sheet)**V. ORGANIZATION PROJECTS:**

- A. Augusta Project - Coffee House - Hughes, Lytle
- B. Skills Project - Davis, Douglas
- C. Atlanta Project (organizers training school, pre-school, audio visual center. - Terry Audrey
 - 1. Library
 - 2. Student Organizing
 - 3. Draft Counseling
 - 4. Printing Operation
- D. National Newspaper - R. Jackson
- E. Agrarian Reform Project - Hunt
- F. Genocide, Human Rights - Crook, Sandy
- G. Pittsburgh-Midwest Project (factory workers base) Scrooge, Danny Brown
- H. New Jersey auto workers - M. Head, Bruce A.
- I. Black women's Alliance - F.Beal

VI. REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM: (An in depth position paper is presently being prepared)

Our political ideology must be that of revolutionary nationalism which means that all our efforts must be channeled towards liberating our people here, in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Our objective is the building of a strong political force which will eventually lead to a strong Revolutionary Nationalist scientific socialist state.

We must begin to instill in ourselves and in our people that we comprise a nation of African people and that therefore, we must strive to build a strong, viable, nation based on the needs and aspirations of African people in the U.S. and around the world. for self determination and self reliance.

VII. TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL:

A program is presently being developed for recruitment, training and assigning new SNCC personnel. Lesson plans will be forwarded to SNCC chapters and contacts.

VIII. FORMATION OF SNCC SECRETARIAT: Chairman - Frances Beal

Functions:

- A. Is responsible for coordinating all programmatic aspects of SNCC.
- B. Is responsible for keeping members informed of progress of projects, programs as well as a liaison with the RPC on matters concerning programs.
- C. Is responsible for distributing funds to those programs under its administration and is responsible to the RPC for accounting of financial status of each project.
- D. Is responsible for the recruitment and training of new members and appointing them to work on various committees and projects.
- E. Is responsible for creating and developing internal political education curriculum for approval by the RPC.

NOTE: All programmatic aspects of the organization are to be coordinated with the Chairman of the Secretariat. All heads of chapters, projects, programs, etc. MUST submit a bi-monthly report to the Chairman at 346 West 20th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011. A form will be prepared and distributed to facilitate this responsibility.

IX. DISCIPLINARY ACTION BY WORKERS AND RPC:

- A. Discussion of disciplinary action to be taken against Irving Davis, present Director of International Affairs project for violation of code of behavior, gross political indiscretion.
- B. See letter forwarded to Comrade Davis attached herewith. The final decision after extensive debate is to (1) Take disciplinary action based on violation of Guidelines adopted Nov. 10, 1969 (See #s 1, 2, 6, 10, 415. Also #162 under revolutionary morality.) (2) Write a letter to Davis detailing reasons for disciplinary action and (3) Mandate RPC to decide form of action to be taken. All communication to Com. Davis should discontinue except on the skills project and the black referendum on Vietnam.

SNCC STRUCTURE AND BASIC PROGRAMS

I. SNCC STRUCTURE:

- A. National Chairman
- B. Revolutionary Political Council
- C. Secretariat
 - 1. Newspaper
 - 2. Communications
 - 3. Training & Recruitment
 - 4. International Affairs
 - 5. Internal Political Education

II. BASIC PROGRAMS:

- A. Ideological propagation - revolutionary nationalism
- B. Organizing workers

To begin to go into factories where our people are and organize them (both male and female) around their oppression, the power they hold as workers and producers, and the development of Political Consciousness and the necessity for struggle and sacrifice, etc. This area is crucial.
- C. Southern Organizing

Organizing our people in the South; farmers, sharecroppers, tenant farmers, students, industrial workers around self defense, survival, the oppression that is felt day to day, hunger, starvation, radical unions, developing skills in agriculture, the agricultural sciences, the SNCC concept of Agrarian Reform, marketing of goods that are produced in a communal effort.
- D. Welfare Organizations - working in or assisting welfare groups to achieve a high level of sophistication in organizing and political consciousness.
- E. Student Organizing - most student orgs. across the country at this point in our struggle have no concept of "where to go from here, or what to do". Due to the mistakes we have made in the past, some student orgs. are very mistrustful of SNCC. Whereas they are susceptible to our ideology they have conflicting interests when it comes to actual work or physical contact with us. We must proceed to dispel these mistaken ideas. We are all aware of the importance of students and must create a viable apparatus that allows the student an opportunity to interact with the community. One such method or project would be to have them organize a free school to train our people in the field of agriculture. (In south)

OBJECTIVES OF THE ORGANIZATION

1. The destruction of (a) capitalism, (b) feudalism, (c) imperialism, (d) racism, (e) the present "western society and its vestiges".
2. The establishment of a democratically centralized, scientific socialist state based on the needs of an oppressed African people.

METHODS TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES INCLUDE:

1. Armed struggle
2. organizing black workers
3. organizing black students
4. organizing welfare mothers
5. organizing tenant farmers and sharecroppers
6. Propagation of our ideology - revolutionary nationalism.

GUIDELINES & AMENDMENTS

I. Political

1. All persons, volunteers, and organizers engaging in SNCC activities and functions shall be subject to the rules and regulations established by the decision making body of the organization (Revolutionary Political Council)
2. All persons willfully engaged in activities politically detrimental to the organization shall be expelled from the organization after review by staff members and the Revolutionary Political Council. Such activities shall be determined by the staff of SNCC and the RPC.
3. Those persons who are late for organizational appointments 4 times within a month shall be brought before the local staff for discipline.
4. Members who willfully disobey orders from people delegated responsibility by the RPC will be brought before the RPC for disciplinary action and dismissal from the organization.
5. All internal dissension and discussion shall be carried out by those parties involved and at no time shall arguments be tolerated in the presence of the public.
6. Members who participate in or contribute to misinformation and untruth concerning the organization in public or elsewhere shall be reprimanded on the first account and given political education on the position of the organization. Upon the second offense, they will be expelled.
7. No member involved in the organization shall sanction the use of his/her name by any indigenous groups, organization, etc. without the permission of the RPC.
8. No SNCC person, chapter, etc. shall make alliances with local, national or international groups or individuals without informing and/or the approval of the RPC.
9. All SNCC personnel including office workers and full time staff shall spend at least 15 days per month in the community on one or more political projects.
10. Any member convicted of victimizing any other member of the organization or member of the community shall be expelled after the first warning.
11. Those persons assigned special tasks by office staff and who do not function properly shall be replaced if the RPC finds them working below his/her fullest capacity.
12. All officers heading any of the 7 or more networks shall be subordinate to the RPC. Each member or head shall, after review, be placed on a Council or committee according to his/her work record, dedication, political ability, etc.

13. All officers of the aforementioned networks shall present an outline of past activities and one for his proposed future activities to be reviewed by the RPC upon the request of the RPC.
14. National and international verbal and written contracts, documents, and contacts shall be approved by the decision of the RPC.
15. Any member of the organization found guilty one or more times of being discourteous, arrogant, or egotistical toward people in the community shall:
 - (1) Be given political education on the correct nature of dealing with people;
 - (2) Be reprimanded and/or transferred or expelled from the project and/or organization.
16. The Chairman of the RPC shall be elected by the said Council and the National Chairman. (In cases of emergency where the Council cannot all meet, the National Chairman and those members of the Council present shall elect a Chairman of the RPC.
17. All SNCC Chapters are required to have (1) Work Study Classes; and (2) Cadre meetings at least once a month. (Last Sun. of each Month)

POLITICAL AMENDMENTS (As of April 11, 1970)

17. No one other than the Chairman of the RPC or/and the Chairman of the Secretariat will authorize statements to the public.
18. All mass based programs requiring use of SNCC personnel and resources will require the authorization of the Chairman of the RPC.
19. Anyone making accusations against anyone or anything either within the organization or in public based on emotional outbursts, rumor and hearsay will be warned on the first account and dismissed from the organization on the second offense.
20. All negative attitudes toward women both within and without the organization must be done away with. Those individuals who continually exhibit degrading behavior toward women will be asked to:
 - (1) Change their attitude through furthering their political education by reading up to date materials on the woman question;
 - (2) After reading the required data and their basic attitude and behavior has not changed, will be asked to resign from the organization upon review by the workers and political Council.
21. No one in SNCC assigned a project or program will dictate or make policy for or try to influence any other project. All projects will come up for review by the Secretariat and the RPC and suggestions and/or criticisms shall be directed to these bodies, for consideration.

22. Anyone who does or attempts to factionalize the organization in any manner will be dealt with in the most complete and effective manner.
23. All ideas, propositions, position papers, etc, must be presented before the general body and must be put up for criticism and discussion by the body.

II. ECONOMIC

1. Those persons actively engaged in full time work for the organization shall receive a subsistence allowance according to (a) need and (b) circumstance.
2. Except in cases of extreme emergency, all monies will be distributed equally to SNCC personnel. (When there is sufficient amount.) Need will be the determining factor in cases of conflict.
3. Those persons who participate willfully in embezzlement, hide or conceal information concerning financial matters of the organization will be upon conviction punished by:
 - (a) Mandated to solicit a job within the system 2 weeks following conviction and mandated to contribute 2/3 of their net salary to the organization for a period of 3 months.
 - (b) Mandated to organize a political function twice a month for a 4 month period with gross proceeds going the the organization.
 - (c) Other punishment to be determined by the RPC including expulsion.
4. All cadres will be required to sell the National SNCC newspaper.
5. All economic matters, implementation of organization programs, etc. shall take precedent over all other matters. Monies shall be used to implement programs of the organization first, subsistence pay will have to take second place.

IIA. ECONOMIC AMENDMENTS (As of April 11, 1970)

6. No one should use the name of SNCC to acquire contacts for funds, personal assistance, etc. and keep these contacts the personal hegemony or use of the individual. All funds received shall be turned over to the RPC who will decide their distribution.

III. REVOLUTIONARY MORALITY

1. A high degree of respect between members of the organization & others must be maintained at all times.
2. Anyone who knowingly exploits either economic, military or political situations for personal gain will be brought before the RPC and following conviction shall be immediately expelled or otherwise punished. Opportunism in any form shall be immediately dealt with by appropriate action of the RPC and/or staff/or committee head.

GUIDELINES

3. Meetings should be conducted with the utmost feelings of comradeship, deep feelings of love for each other, sophistication, calmness and especially honesty.
4. Morality and leadership qualities in all members must take the form of being that which allows all personnel to avoid all excesses in personal habits. This is the sacrifice that leadership entails. It is not a part time responsibility; leadership requires the person who would exercise it to be available to serve at anytime, twenty-four hours a day. Leadership requires readiness to give up personal freedom, life family and friends to promote the cause of the black liberation struggle. (Position Paper to be Developed)

CONFIDENTIAL



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

MAY 25 1970

In Reply, Please Refer to

File No. Bufile 100-439190
NYfile 100-147963

Title Student National Coordinating
Committee

Character Racial Matters

Reference is made to report of Special Agent
[REDACTED], dated and
captioned as above, at New York,
New York.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE NEW YORK	OFFICE OF ORIGIN NEW YORK	DATE 5/10/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 4/29/70-4/16/71
TITLE OF CASE STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE		CHARACTER OF CASE RM	TYPED

REFERENCE

NY report of SA [redacted] 5/25/70

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a report relating to the activities of the captioned group.

The SNCC organization continues to share space with other groups at 346 West 20th Street.

The organization held its last national staff meeting in June of 1970, and has not since such time held a subsequent national staff meeting, although it had tentatively scheduled such a meeting for December, 1970.

Case has been: Pending over one year No; Pending prosecution over six months Yes

APPROVED: [Signature] SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

- 11 - Bureau (100-439190) (RM)
- 1 - Secret Service, NYC (RM)
- 1 - Atlanta (100-6488) (INFO) (RM)
- 1 - Cincinnati (100-14158) (INFO) (RM)
- 3 - New York (100-147963)

100-439190-2237

EX-100

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF DATE 12 MAY 12 1971

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	AGENCY: [redacted]
Request Recd.	DEPT: [redacted]
Date Fwd.	DATE FORW: [redacted]
How Fwd.	BY: [redacted]

55 JUL 1 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 3832
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

45 under

[Large redacted area with handwritten notes and signatures]

NY 100-147963

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ADMINISTRATIVE (Cont'd)

As disclosed within, the SNCC organization is engaged in various projects at the present time; however, for the most part, these projects are in the planning stage and/or have actually ceased operation at the present time. The Third World Womens Alliance, which is the successor organization to the Black Womens Alliance, which was initially instituted as a SNCC project, now operates autonomously under the direction of FRAN BEAL, a NY area SNCC functionary. Since the referenced report, the organization has expelled a number of ranking SNCC functionaries as a result of internal conflict including TERRY ARDRY, JAMES LYTLE, and IRVING DAVIS.

As a practical matter, Atlanta and NY are the only cities where there is even a facade of SNCC activity.

During the period covered by this report, SNCC has not staged or participated in any demonstration or disruptive activity, and it is believed incapable of accomplishing same in view of the limited membership, lack of funds, and internal dissension.

SNCC has recently indicated that the national headquarters of the organization will be transferred to Atlanta, Georgia, within the next month or two. The organization previously maintained its national headquarters there and has indicated on various occasions during the past year that headquarters would be returned to Atlanta, Georgia.

Although the SNCC organization has indicated that it continues to publish a monthly known as the "National SNCC", copies are not known to have been distributed in the NY area since the summer of 1970. Information recently developed indicates that the newspaper may be published in the NYC area by a Chinese

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ADMINISTRATIVE (Cont'd)

printer. It is believed that such printer may be FRANK CHAN, owner of the Sun Publishing Company, who has in the past done extensive business with political groups in the NYC area. NY will contact Sun Publishing Company to determine the possibility of the SNCC newspaper being published there.

The informants referred to within as having been contacted during February and March, 1971, concerning SNCC proposed guerrilla training program are identified as follows:



The pretext referred to within, conducted by SA [redacted] under the Womens Liberation subcaption was a telephone call to St. Peters Episcopal Church [redacted]

The interview of [redacted] as set out within under the Third I. Lounge subcaption, was conducted by SAS [redacted], and [redacted] on the date noted.

The interview of [redacted] as set out within under the Third I. Lounge subcaption was conducted by SAS [redacted] and [redacted] on the date noted.

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ADMINISTRATIVE (Cont'd)

SA [REDACTED] conducted the review of [REDACTED], as set out within on the dates noted.

The various confidential sources contacted as set out under the SNCC Chapters caption within are identified as follows:

[REDACTED]

The address set out within of 300 9th Ave., NY, NY, as being maintained on the mailing list of the "Daily World" is a former national headquarters office of SNCC.

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NY 100-147963

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INFORMANTS

Identity of Source

File Number Where Located

✓ [REDACTED]	100-147963-4495, 4204, 4273, 4176, 4496, 4464, 4278
✓ [REDACTED]	100-147963-4198
[REDACTED]	100-147963-4203, 4253, 4254
[REDACTED]	100-147963-4188, 4305, 4179, 4390, 4448, 4256, 4339, 4275, 4262, 4417, 4390
✓ [REDACTED]	100-147963-4188, 4467, 4467
✓ [REDACTED]	100-147963-4373, 4185, 4277, 4326, 4427, 4289, 4310, 4443, 4464, 4371, 4142, 4277, 4289, 4310, 4388, 4430, 4492, 4439, 4430, 4470, 4443, 4371, 4181, 4181, 4337, 4344, 4165, 4389, 4466, 4305
[REDACTED]	100-147963-4489, 4472

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NY 100-147963

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INFORMANTS (Cont'd)

Identity of Source

File Number Where Located

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION

The enclosed report is classified "Confidential" since it contains information from NY T-1 through T-20 disclosure of whose identity might have an adverse effect upon the national security interests of the U.S.

LEAD

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will follow and report on the activities of the SNCC organization in 90 days.

- G* -

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, NYC (RM)

Report of: [REDACTED]

Office: New York, New York

Date: MAY 10 1971

Field Office File #: 100-147963

Bureau File #: 100-439190

Title: STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Synopsis: SNCC currently occupies office space at St. Peters Episcopal Church, 346 West 20th St., NY, NY, which serves as the National Headquarters for SNCC. SNCC has announced various projects including the SNCC newspaper, guerrilla training, Womens Liberation, organizing black workers, and the Third Eye Lounge all of which are in various stages of development and/or discontinuation.

[REDACTED]

Continuing factionalism within the SNCC organization has inhibited the development of some SNCC projects and continues to date. The organization has been generally unsuccessful in securing funds from church groups and private interests, however, they did secure funds for the operation of the Third Eye Lounge from the U.S. Servicemen's Fund. SNCC currently maintains quasi-active chapters in NY and Atlanta, Georgia. Various SNCC documents concerning aspects of SNCC activity in the NYC area and on a national basis are set out within. The legal status of SNCC as an organization recognized by the State of NY has been cancelled and the matter has been referred to the office of the Attorney General for the State of NY for appropriate action.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF CLASSIFICATION DATE 7/10/78

- P -

Classified by 3832
Exempt from GDS, Category 33
Date of Declassification Indefinite
7/1/78 LSKM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~GROUP~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.~~

100-147963

I. THE LOCATION OF THE NATIONAL OFFICE
OF STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING
COMMITTEE (SNCC)

A characterization of
SNCC is attached to this
report:

The offices of National SNCC are located at
St. Peter's Episcopal Church, 346 West 20th Street, New
York City.



March 26, 1971

II. MEMBERSHIP AND OFFICERS

WILLIAM MUHAMMAD HUNT is the director of the New
York State operation of SNCC and chairman of the RPC.

JIMMY LAZARE is a field member of SNCC and a
member of the RPC.

FRANCES BEAL is the national secretary of SNCC
and a member of the RPC.

JAMES FORMAN is the political analyst of SNCC and
coordinates international affairs for the organization.

RONALD JACKSON is editor of the SNCC newspaper
"National SNCC" and is a member of the RPC.

March 26, 1971

all NY

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50/3

100-147963

III: SNCC NATIONAL STAFF MEETING

[REDACTED] N.Y.

[REDACTED]

The organization is currently experiencing financial difficulties in connection with the Augusta Coffee House known as the Third Eye Lounge. An additional \$13,000.00 is needed to pay for air-conditioning equipment which has been installed at the lounge.

[REDACTED] e

[REDACTED]
June 26, 1970

[REDACTED]

100-147963

SNCC presently has pending an application for a grant with the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizing (IFCO), 475 Riverside Drive, New York City.

The IFCO is an organization created in 1966, by 10 Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish agencies to obtain financial support and strategies for community development and indigenous economic development efforts across the nation.

HUNT indicated that the National Office of SNCC would be returned to Atlanta, Georgia in the near future.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
June 24, 1970

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

100-147963

The following projects are currently being developed by SNCC:

Atlanta Freedom School
TERRY ARDREY

Augusta Coffee House
(Third Eye Lounge)
WILLIAM COLEMAN

Women's Liberation
FRANCES BEAL

SNCC Newspaper
RONALD JACKSON

Organizing a Political Party
WILLIAM HUNT

Agrarian Reform
WILLIAM HUNT

IRVING DAVIS resigned from the SNCC organization and is no longer Director of International Affairs. [REDACTED] DAVIS is persona non grata with the organization. PHIL BUCHINGS is being considered as a replacement for DAVIS but is unable at the present time to assume such a position since he is occupied at present with organizing for the Third Venceremos Brigade.

NY
A characterization of the Venceremos Brigade is attached to this report.

AKA: MRS
BARBARA HUNT the wife of *WILLIAM HUNT* has been recruited for such brigade and will leave for Cuba August 1, 1970.

N.Y.

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Ga.