



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

**AMERICAN FRIENDS  
SERVICE COMMITTEE**

**PART 15 OF 25**

**FILE NUMBER : 100-11392**

SUBJECT; AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

FILE #: 100-11392

SECTION: 15

NAME CHECK

REC-134

EX-107

1 [REDACTED]  
1 [REDACTED]

January 7, 1966

**AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE**

the "Daily Telegraph" of London, England, on October 29, 1962, carried an article on page 11 captioned "Russians to Send Home Seaborne Pacifists." The article listed Mr. Bertil Svahnstrom as the leader of the group who sailed to Leningrad and carried banners with the slogan "No Nuclear Tests in East or West." After they were not allowed to ashore they were pulled out to sea by a Russian tug after which scuttled the ship. According to the article they were interned and would soon be sent home.

The young people in attendance at the camp came from the eastern part of the United States. Religious groups other than the Friends were represented at the camp.

[REDACTED] furnished a one-page release from the AFSC, 180 North 15th Street, concerning work camps for high school students. This release contained the following descriptive data concerning the AFSC:

The American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organization, attempts to relieve human suffering and to seek for nonviolent solutions to conflicts -- personal, national, and international. In addition to its work and study projects for young people, the Committee has world-wide programs of relief and rehabilitation, social and technical assistance, community relations, and seminars and institutes

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

"on peace and international affairs. Its work is carried on without regard to race, creed, or politics. It is supported entirely by voluntary contributions."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FBI

Date: 11/23/65

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRMAIL AIRTEL

AIRMAIL - REGISTERED

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, PORTLAND [REDACTED]

RE: MARCH ON WASHINGTON FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., NOVEMBER 27, 1965  
INFORMATION CONCERNING  
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

RC  
RC  
2

*Handwritten signature*

Re Bureau airtel to All Offices, 10/25/65.

[REDACTED]  
furnished information that the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 4312 S. E. Stark Street, Portland, Oregon, under calendar of coming events had included information that on Saturday, 11/27/65, at 11 a.m., there is to be a march on Washington, D. C. for Peace in Vietnam. A bus will leave Portland and a chartered plane from Seattle.

On 11/23/65, a Special Agent of the FBI, Portland Office (SA [REDACTED])

determined

PD [REDACTED]

from [REDACTED] Portland, Oregon, [REDACTED], that there will be no bus from Portland to Seattle to transport people to join with the Seattle group to attend the March on Washington, 11/27/65, as only one woman may possibly attend the March from Portland. [REDACTED] said that he understood now that there will be no chartered plane from Seattle to Washington and that those going from Seattle, number not known, will pay the regular fare but they may go on the same plane, date and time of departure unknown. [REDACTED] says that he is not aware of the number of people planning to attend from the Seattle area, but apparently the number is very small because plans for the chartered plane apparently fell through. [REDACTED] said that detailed information concerning the group from Seattle going to Washington could be obtained from the AFSC, 814 N. E. 40th, Seattle, Washington, telephone ME 2-0502. During his comments [REDACTED] said that the March on Washington is being sponsored by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (NCSNP), and SANFORD GOTTlieb from the Sane Office, 245 2nd Street NE, Washington, D. C., is co-ordinating the Washington, D. C. activity.

[REDACTED]

The above information was not furnished to the Bureau by teletype inasmuch as only possibly one individual from Portland plans to attend the March on Washington and Seattle will furnish the Bureau information developed concerning this matter in that area.

Information copies are being furnished New York and WFO pursuant to Bureau instructions set out in re airtel.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

December 22, 1965


Committee For Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Vertol Division,  
Boeing Corporation, Philadelphia,  
Pa., Area, December 29, 1965  
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On December 21, 1965, [REDACTED] Chester, Pa., advised that the Philadelphia Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA), 1520 Race Street, Philadelphia, Pa., issued a news release dated December 20, 1965, announcing that CNVA would sponsor a picket at Vertol Division, Boeing Corporation, plants in the Philadelphia area December 29, 1965, to protest shipment of helicopters to Vietnam. The news release stated that invitations have been sent to people throughout the country and that participants will most likely commit acts of civil disobedience such as attempting to enter plants and blocking vehicles. A mass meeting of CNVA is scheduled for 8 p.m., December 28, 1965, at the Metropolitan AME Church, 20th and Fitzwater Streets, Philadelphia, Pa., where participants will outline plans for pickets and acts of civil disobedience.

Committee For Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Vertel Division,  
Boeing Corporation, Philadelphia,  
Pa., Area, December 29, 1965  
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It was also announced that from 10 to 11 a.m., December 27, 1965, CNVA would have a news conference at the Academy Room of the Bellevue Stratford Hotel. All news media are invited.

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In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

January 10, 1965

Committee for Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Vertol Division,  
Boeing Corporation,  
Morton, Pennsylvania,  
December 29, 1965

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[REDACTED] furnished a leaflet an-  
nouncing the following:

"M A S S M E E T I N G

\*\* TUESDAY, DEC. 28 \*\*

--featuring discussion by outspoken  
peace workers on:

\*\* THE WAR IN VIETNAM

\*\* WHY WE DEMONSTRATE and WHY WE ARE  
WILLING TO GO TO JAIL

ORIENTATION FOR NEXT DAY'S DEMONSTRATION


Speakers will include:

WILLIAM DAVIDON  
CHARLES WALKER  
A. J. MUSTE  
TOM RODD

Metropolitan AME Church  
20th and Fitzwater Streets  
Tuesday, Dec. 28  
8:00 pm

D E M O N S T R A T I O N

\*\* WEDNESDAY, DEC. 29 \*\*

  
COMMITTEE FOR NON-VIOLENT ACTION,  
Demonstration at Vertol Division,  
Boeing Corporation,  
Morton, Pennsylvania,  
December 29, 1965  
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--consisting of  
VIGIL and CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE on the  
part of some demonstrators at the  
VERTOL HELICOPTER PLANT, MORTON  
Wednesday, Dec. 29  
2:00 - 5:00 pm

Demonstrators will gather at the Metro-  
politan AME Church, 20th and Fitzwater  
Streets at Noon, and proceed to Morton  
via the 1:25 Media Local train from  
Suburban Station.

Philadelphia Committee for Nonviolent Action  
1526 Race Street  
Phila., Pa. 19102  
Phone: LO 7-8770"

Committee For Non-Violent Action  
Demonstration at Vertol Division,  
Boeing Corporation,  
Morton, Pennsylvania,  
December 29, 1965

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An article in the "Sunday Bulletin," a Philadelphia daily newspaper, Sunday edition, dated December 15, 1963, captioned "Quakers Provide the Mainspring of the Peace Movement Here," contains a subsection captioned, "Peace Education Division, American Friends Service Committee." This portion of the article quotes CHARLES WALKER as stating the peace movement is now in a lull and is undergoing a transition phase. WALKER noted there is a new leadership coming in, the movement will change, and civil rights demonstrations have attracted the most immediate response from the public. He stated that the charge that Communists have influenced the major part of the movement is just not true. The article continued WALKER stated, "The Communist movement in the United States is dead, they have no influence."

WALKER is further quoted as stating, "I consider civil disobedience the highest respect for law. I don't agree with those who say it encourages lawlessness." The article noted that WALKER, considered by many in the peace movement to be the most knowledgeable about the Philadelphia area, is a Quaker and was sentenced

[REDACTED]

Committee For Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Vertel Division,  
Boeing Corporation,  
Morton, Pennsylvania,  
December 29, 1965

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during World War II to four years as a Conscientious Objector.

[REDACTED]

The "New York Evening Journal" issue of April 28, 1942, contains an article entitled "Ex-Red Won't Register." The article relates that the Reverend A. J. MUSTE, Presbyterian Minister and Executive Secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), had refused to register under the Selective Service Act. In the article MUSTE is described as a former leader of the Trotskyite faction of the Communist movement in this country. The article also relates that MUSTE was arrested in Illinois in 1934, charged with plotting to overthrow the government, but he was later released.

The April 14, 1957, issue of "The Worker," page 16, column 1, described A. J. MUSTE as the Dean of "Socialist Pacifists" and Secretary Emeritus of the FOR.

In August 1964, a source described A. J. MUSTE as National Chairman of the Committee on Non-Violent Action, 325 Lafayette Street, New York, N. Y.

Committee For Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Postal Division,  
Boeing Corporation,  
Morton, Pennsylvania,  
December 29, 1965

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also furnished on December 27, 1965, a two-page  
leaflet captioned "Helicopters Over Vietnam, A Call to Action."  
A copy of this two-page leaflet is attached.



Flashed by the success of heliops  
Vietnam, the Army hopes to buy more  
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 3, 1965

The world is now too dangerous for  
truing but the truth, too small for a  
but brotherhood.

Adlai Stevenson

# Helicopters over Vietnam

## A Call to ACTION

at

7ertol Division  
(helicopters)  
Boeing Corp.

Morton, Pa.

Wednesday  
December 29  
2 - 5 p.m.

We know that before his sudden and untimely death Adlai Stevenson was a troubled man. He had once said:

"The world is now too dangerous for anything but the truth, too small for anything but brotherhood."

He was aware that in Vietnam the United States was waging a cruel war, producing the suffering which the people of that nation had undergone for twenty years. This was a war which Congress had never declared. It was in violation of commitments which the United States had made to the United Nations. It was in violation of the Charter of dictators like the present incumbent, General Nguyen Cao Ky, who, in an interview last Fourth of July told a reporter from the London Daily Mirror,

"People ask me who my heroes are. I have only one—Hitler."

Adlai Stevenson himself had been forced as United States representative at the United Nations to repeat the misleading and sometimes false statements of his government about its conduct of our foreign relations. But when, ten days before he died, a group of distinguished writers privately urged him to resign and free himself from the course of our government in violation not only of the United Nations Charter and international law, but every principle of human decency, his answer was:

"I would never take advantage of my position to resign for political reasons. That isn't the way we play the game."

The Army, reports the Wall Street Journal, is pleased with the success of helicopters in Vietnam. It has 600 of them in service in Vietnam and plans for another 600 by the end of the year. More recently, Secretary of Defense McNamara, on a 'whirlwind tour' of the Vietnam battlefield, also was reported 'pleased.' His pleasure arose from the operations of the Army's First Cavalry Division, the mobile 'air cavalry' which has been riding into battle in these helicopters. In McNamara's pleasure was such that he announced that new air cavalry divisions would be formed as part of a further major escalation in an undeclared war. He pointed out that the helicopter-transport concept had been accepted as a very important tool of the war, as if there were to be no end to war!

Thus, the helicopter stands today as the foremost symbol of the U.S. effort to make distant people behave as we think they should and, often, to thwart their revolutionary aspirations. The machine has come to prominence in the tragic land of Vietnam, where the American military intervention has caused countless hardships and sufferings among both the Vietnamese and the Americans caught in the senseless conflict. In South Vietnam, the United States has been able to develop and perfect its techniques of counter-insurgency. With such tools as the helicopter and the air cavalry proving their usefulness, we may be sure that their application will not be limited to Vietnam or the Dominican Republic but will be widened to include every unfortunate territory that chances to come in conflict with the economic and political pursuits of the United States.

Having been provided with new symbols of U.S. military power and policy, we are also giving a new possibility for challenging them. One of the two major suppliers of helicopters to the Army is the Vertol Division of the Boeing Corp. Vertol's plants are located in Delaware County, Pa.—just outside Philadelphia. The company produces the CH47a "Chinook" helicopter, the machine being used by the Army's air cavalry. With a force of about 10,000 employees, Vertol ranks as one of the three largest firms in the Greater Philadelphia area. In the past several months, the company has had substantial increases in war contracts.

Also over the last several months, the Philadelphia branch of the Committee for Nonviolent Action has conducted a campaign of demonstrations and community education at Vertol and in the surrounding area to protest the plant's involvement in the Vietnam war and to urge that the U.S. withdraw its forces from the conflict. Reception of this has been mixed: some persons prominent in the community are open, almost sympathetic, to the proposals; at the same time, however, the county is a center of right-wing organizational efforts, and there has been considerable harassment.

National and Philadelphia CNVA agree that it is now time for a sizable confrontation of the military power and counter-insurgency policies implemented by the helicopters produced at Vertol. We believe it is time to point to the consequent destruction of human values and to call upon Vertol, its employees and the people in the surrounding community and the nation to stop supporting the war and the policies it reflects.

We believe there are many people in the area and even in the Vertol plants who must be troubled by what is going on in Vietnam and about their own part in it—as Adlai Stevenson was before he died. As the distinguished American novelist Kay Boyle has pointed out, Stevenson, in refusing to resign and lead a movement for a saner and nobler course, was declaring that his loyalty was not to


principle, not to fiction, not to truth, not to citizens out of "the team." We believe that people in the area and in the Vertol plants who not only recognize the right of people to dissent from the policies of "the team" but who feel that the time has come to act, to withdraw support from the Vietnam war policy, to turn the nation away to peace.

- c A demonstration encompassing these points is being held for an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam will be conducted from 2:30 p.m. to 5 p.m. on Tuesday, December 29th at Vertol's main Morton, Pa., Delaware County. The plant is on Route 420, one half mile south of the I-76 Pike (old Rt. 1) adjacent to the Morton Station Pennsylvania Railroad's Media Local.
- c It is possible that some may be moved to civil disobedience, most likely in the form of a sit-in to enter the plant and confront its management or an effort to block the movement of vehicles from the property. Participants in the demonstration need not, however, feel committed to any form of civil disobedience, but only to respect for the conscience of those who feel called to engage in it.
- c It is expected that persons from the East Coast and the Mid-West will take part. Accommodations in the Philadelphia area will be arranged for those of them. Supporting demonstrations will take place on the West Coast.

We urge you to come to Philadelphia for the demonstration and, if possible, to arrive on Tuesday so as to take part in a mass meeting to be held at 7:00 p.m. Please return the coupon or call either of the numbers below to obtain information on the time and place of the meeting and the assembly point for the demonstration.

**Committee for  
Nonviolent Action**  
5 Beekman St., Rm. 1033  
New York N.Y. 10038  
(212) 227-5535

**Philadelphia CNVA**  
1526 Race Street  
Philadelphia, Pa. 19102  
(215) LO 7-8770



Please return to PHILADELPHIA CNVA, 1526 Race St., Phila., Pa. 19102

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ Tel. \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

Zip \_\_\_\_\_

I will participate in the demonstration but do not plan civil disobedience.

I will participate in the demonstration and plan to commit or sponsor civil disobedience.

I will need a place to roll out a sleeping bag.

I wish to contribute \$ \_\_\_\_\_ toward expenses.

[REDACTED]

Committee For Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Vertol Division,  
Boeing Corporation,  
Morton, Pennsylvania,  
December 29, 1965  
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This paper is quoted in part as follows:

"THE COMMITTEE FOR NONVIOLENT ACTION is a pacifist organization founded in 1957 to protest the testing of nuclear weapons by all countries. We have sailed boats into the nuclear testing zones of the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union.

We are today particularly concerned about the United States' military policy in Vietnam. We see this U. S. effort as immoral and fruitless. We call for a withdrawal of United States troops now...

"The Philadelphia branch of the CNVA has this fall conducted three demonstrations at the Morton plant of the Vertol Division of the Boeing Corp. Vertol manufactures CH47A helicopters for military use in Vietnam. We find the plant an appropriate and important symbol of our government's war effort, and thus we must confront the government and the citizens of Delaware County with our views..."

This leaflet goes on to issue instructions to protesters and states:

"CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE is just what it says, 'civil disobedience.' It means the open, knowing violation of a civil law in obedience to a higher command. It is a principle endorsed by Pope John's Pacem in Terris and by the Nuremberg Trials. In our case, a small number (perhaps 25) of demonstrators have felt called to sit in the road leading into the main gate of the Vertol plant. They will



[REDACTED]

Committee For Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Vertol Division,  
Boeing Corporation,  
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and lie on the blades of a helicopter ready for shipment to Vietnam. This type action would be taken in the same spirit as the blocking of the supply trucks; and all pertinent data is the same for this particular act...

"Copies of this announcement are being mailed and given to all police forces that may have a concern in this action; and to the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania and the Governor of the State of Pennsylvania."

[REDACTED] furnished a leaflet of the CNVA / Philadelphia, 1520 Race Street, Philadelphia, Pa., from WILLIAM C. DAVIDON and CHARLES C. WALKER, Co-Chairmen. This leaflet also announces the public meeting in Philadelphia December 28th, to be followed by a Vigil at the Vertol Plant in Morton, Pa., on Wednesday afternoon, December 29, 1965. This leaflet states they were hoping for 500 people at Morton and that the project was open to civil disobedience. A team of people planning such action was then considering the precise form and procedure.

On December 29, 1965, [REDACTED] advised he attended the meeting of CNVA at Metropolitan AME Church, 20th and Fitzwater Streets, Philadelphia, Pa., the night of December 28, 1965, which was attended by approximately 125 people. Plans were made for a mass demonstration and civil disobedience at Vertol Division, Boeing Corporation, Morton, Pa., December 29, 1965, from 2:00 to 5:00 p.m.

CHARLES WALKER, Co-Chairman of Philadelphia CNVA, was chairman and moderator. Speakers were WILLIAM C. DAVIDON, Professor, Haverford College, and Co-Chairman, Philadelphia CNVA; ERIC WEINBERGER, National Secretary, CNVA, of New York; THOMAS MURRAY of New York, Organizer of the group, who will be civilly disobedient and in charge of CNVA MARSHALS; A. J. MUSTE, founder of CNVA; TOM RODD, on probation for violation of Selective Service and organizer of those who will be civilly

[REDACTED]

Committee For Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Vertel Division  
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Morton, Pennsylvania,  
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disobedient. He told what to do when arrested, how to make your body go limp, etc. He urged people to attend and bring the non-violent movement in focus. Other speakers were CAROL KORNFIELD, of Upland Institute, Upland, Pa., organizer of the Delaware County CNVA; MIKE WOOD, who has been active in civil rights and voter registration activities and jailed in Montgomery, Ala., for civil disobedience. He is a teacher in the Philadelphia School System. Also present were BEATRICE RAZNER, age 63, a nurse from Philadelphia; LOUIS MARKER, age 23, active in civil rights and voter registration movements; HENRY RADETSKY, West Chester, Pa., who made announcement of Veterans protest pilgrimage to Eternal Peace Light at Gettysburg National Park, Gettysburg, Pa., January 2, 1966.

Many of those present came with knapsacks and sleeping bags and slept in church and other places.

[REDACTED]

Committee For Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Vertol Division  
Boeing Corporation  
Morton, Pennsylvania,  
December 29, 1965  
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A characterization of the PEYSL is set forth  
in the Appendix.

Special Agents of the FBI observed on December 29,  
1965, a demonstration protesting United States intervention  
in Vietnam held at the Morton Plant, Vertol Division, Boeing  
Corporation, Morton, Pa., from 2 p.m. to 4:55 p.m., sponsored  
by CNVA.

Pennsylvania Railroad train from Philadelphia ar-  
rived at Morton, Pa., 1:50 p.m., with about 100 protesters  
and joined by others. Next train about 30 minutes later brought  
about 30 or 40 more protesters. Total demonstrators numbered  
about 175 protesting use of Vertol helicopters in the war in  
Vietnam.

TOM RODD was arrested at 2:35 p.m. by U. S. Probation  
Officer RICHARD EASTMAN for violation of probation. Eleven  
others were arrested at the same time by Springfield Township  
Police Department for blocking entrance to the Vertol plant  
and refusing to move. Six others were arrested for littering  
and two for disorderly conduct.

On the opposite side of the street, a counter-picket  
was held by members of the American Legion and Young Americans  
for Freedom (YAF). This group plus spectators totaled 400 to  
500 people.

[REDACTED]

Committee For Non-Violent Action,  
Demonstration at Vertel Division  
Boeing Corporation  
Morton, Pennsylvania,  
December 29, 1965

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Some spectators or counter pickets harassed and threw eggs at pickets. Nine were arrested for disorderly conduct by the Springfield Township Police Department.

The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Philadelphia, Pa., December 29, 1965, carried an article "Police Haul Off 12 Protesters at Vertel Plant." A copy of this article is attached.

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

# Police Head Off 12 Protesters At Vertol Plant

## 450 Jeer Pickets Protesting U.S. Policy In Viet Nam

By WILLIAM W. LAWRENCE  
Of The Bulletin Staff

About 160 pickets demonstrated today at the Boeing Co.'s Vertol division in Morton, Pa., in protest against Vertol's production of helicopters for the war in Viet Nam.

When 12 of the pickets sat down in the parking lot in front of the main gate leading to the plant, 20 policemen hauled them to their feet.

They were taken to a waiting Red Arrow bus, which police used for temporary detention.

Those who wouldn't walk were carried to the bus.

About 12 demonstrators, including three women, were placed in the bus.

Held on Detainer.

Minutes after the pickets arrived, a federal probation officer stepped into the group and arrested Thomas Rodd, 16, of Pittsburgh.

Rodd was placed in a car and brought to the Federal Courthouse here, where he was charged with violating probation imposed on him by a federal court in Pittsburgh for failure to register for the draft.

Later, he was taken to the Detention Center where he was held on a detainer lodged against him by Pittsburgh authorities.

Earlier, the Committee for Nonviolent Action had said that Rodd planned to climb on the rotor blade of a helicopter at the Vertol plant to protest the shipment of helicopters to Viet Nam.

The CNVA had announced that it would sponsor the demonstrations.

Also plucked from the picket line was William Davidson, Haverford College teacher, who has taken part in previous demonstrations. Springfield Police Chief Forrester said Davidson violated a township ordinance by distributing leaflets.

One other demonstrator was arrested on the same charge.

### Egg-Throwers Seized

The arrested demonstrators were taken in the bus to the Springfield Township municipal building.

Springfield Township Police Chief Lester Forrester said six counter-demonstrators also were arrested. He said most of them were young people who had thrown eggs. They, too, were taken to the municipal building.

Police detoured all traffic off Woodland av. between Baltimore pike and Morton av. during the demonstration—a distance of about three-quarters of a mile. Traffic began piling up in the Morton area in late afternoon.

About half of the pickets left the scene about 4.15 P. M. to catch the 4.23 P. M. train from Morton back to Philadelphia.

The pickets were jeered by approximately 450 persons lined up across from the plant on Woodland av.

The anti-demonstration crowd carried signs with legends such as "Have Matches and Gas for Peace Creeps."

The peace pickets wore round tags in their lapels which had the words "Practice nonviolence" printed on them.

### Came by Train

Some 200 Vertol security guards and police from Morton, Upper Darby and Springfield were on hand when the pickets arrived by train from Philadelphia at 1.55 P. M.

They were first met by a man carrying a sign: "Creeps, Our Boss Stopped the Bombing, How About Your Boss?"

In the block-long walk from the train station to the plant, they were accompanied by catcalls and cries of "misfits" from the crowd.

Eggs and tomatoes were hurled at the pickets. One egg hit the head of Swarthmore College student Barry Wohl, 18.

The demonstration was staged as part of a national project of the Committee for Nonviolent Action.

Rodd had previously announced that he planned to mount a helicopter.

He said earlier, "The government is conducting an antidemocratic and immoral war in Viet Nam and Vertol is helping them by selling helicopters."

The Philadelphia CNVA, organized this fall, has conducted three previous demonstrations at Vertol.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state)

p.3-"The Eve  
Bulletin"  
Philadelphia

Date: 12/29/65  
Edition: 4 star  
Author: Wm. W. Lawrence  
Editor: Wm. B. Dickerson  
Title:

Character:  
or  
Classification:  
Submitting Office:  
PT  
 Being Investigated



-14-

[REDACTED] advised that among material distributed by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee was a reprint from "The Washington Post" of Monday, October 2, 1961. This consisted of an advertisement submitted and paid for by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. It was headed, "Have We Lost

[REDACTED]

Committee for Non-Violent Action  
Demonstration at Vertol Division  
Boeing Corporation  
Morton, Pennsylvania  
December 29, 1965  
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Our Will To Protect Our Freedoms" and contains statements by Supreme Court Justice HUGO L. BLACK, HARRY S. TRUMAN, Supreme Court Justice WILLIAM DOUGLASS, and Dr. ALBERT EINSTEIN, concerning the First Amendment to the Constitution. One of the signers of the ad was ARIEL G. LOEWY.

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A characterization of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee is set forth in the Appendix.

On December 29, 1965, [REDACTED] Philadelphia, Pa., advised that a CNVA group consisting of 12 pickets picketed the Post Office at 9th and Market Streets, Philadelphia, Pa., from 8:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m., December 29, 1965, in protest of arrest of TOM RODD earlier in the day. Two persons were counter-picketing. [REDACTED] did not know the identities of the persons involved.

The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Philadelphia, Pa., December 30, 1965, carried an article "12 Pickets on Market Street Protest Arrest at Vertol." This article states in part as follows:

"A dozen pickets shivered in the wintry blasts of lower Market St. last night to protest the arrest earlier of a young draft evader during a peace demonstration in Delaware County.

"'Free TOM RODD,' read one sign. 'He Did It Out of Love,' read another.

"RODD, 19, of Pittsburgh, was arrested by a federal probation officer as some 160 pickets demonstrated

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Committee for Non-Violent Action  
Demonstration at Vertol Division  
Boeing Corporation  
Morton, Pennsylvania  
December 29, 1965

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at the Morton plant of the Boeing Co.'s Vertol Division. The plant makes helicopters used in the Vietnam war.

"RODD was charged with violating probation imposed on him by a federal court in Pittsburgh for failure to register for the draft. He was held in the Detention Center here on a detainer lodged against him by Pittsburgh authorities.

"The pickets last night had the area around the U. S. Court House, 8th and Market Sts., largely to themselves after heavy Wednesday night shopping crowds departed.

"The demonstration was jointly coordinated by PAUL EUSTACE, 21, a conscientious objector to the draft and an art student at Barnes Foundation, in Merion, and ANNE STEVENS, 17, a student of the Philadelphia Music Academy.

"EUSTACE had stains on his trouser leg where he had been hit by an egg thrown by counter-demonstrators at Vertol. He said the pickets were members of Students for Non-Violent Action.

"Also on hand was THOMAS MURRAY, of the National Committee for Non-Violent Action, and one of three coordinators of the Vertol demonstration. He had egg spattered over one shoulder of his topcoat...

"Standing opposite the pickets was a lone counter-demonstrator who declined to give his name. He said he is 23, was medically discharged from the Air Force and is now appealing his current 4-F classification so he can get back into military service.

"He held up a sign reading, 'I Support the Government Policies,' and hardly moved -- except to tremble from the cold -- during the entire two-hour vigil.

Committee for Non-Violent Action  
Demonstration at Vertol Division  
Boeing Corporation  
Morton, Pennsylvania  
December 29, 1965

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"MURRAY, who said he was there because some of the parents of the youthful demonstrators wanted an adult on hand, said he felt the Vertol demonstration was a success.

"'We did make an impact on the public,' he said. 'We did create concern. I also think there was a significant contrast between the deportment of the pickets and that of the counter-demonstrators.'"

APPENDIX

Characterizations of Organizations

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH THE HOUSE  
UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" issued December 1, 1961, by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 11, contains the following citation regarding the National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee (NCAUAC).

"Cited as a 'new organization' set up in the Summer of 1960 to lead and direct the Communist Party's 'Operation Abolition' campaign. Several of the national leaders of this group have been identified as Communists."

A source has advised that the NCAUAC changed its name on March 3, 1962, to include the word "House" in its name, thereby becoming known as the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee (NCAHUAC).

A second source advised on June 22, 1965, that as of that date the NCAHUAC continued to function with headquarters at 555 North Western Avenue, Los Angeles, California.

INDEPENDENT CITIZENS COMMITTEE (ICC)

A source advised the Independent Citizens Committee (ICC) was initiated and formed by the Communist Party, Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware (CPEPD), in October, 1962 to build a left-center organization which would be able to initiate political activity. As of May 4, 1964, the policies of the ICC were dominated by the CPEPD through Communist Party members who were officers and members of the ICC.

On May 21, 1965 this same source advised the ICC continues to operate under the domination of the CPEPD.

(1)

SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

A source advised on October 22, 1958 that earlier in October, 1958, a Philadelphia Committee of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., (SCEF), was formed with SUSAN FREEMAN chosen to serve as Secretary and the only officer of the Philadelphia group.

A second source reported on October 13, 1961 and May 4, 1962, that the SCEF does not have an organized chapter in Philadelphia, Pa., and it does not maintain an office. It does not maintain a bank account. This source identified LOUISE GILBERT as the Secretary of the Philadelphia Friends of the SCEF. She is assisted by SUSAN FREEMAN. There has been no activity in Philadelphia, Pa., on the part of the Philadelphia Friends, SCEF, since the spring of 1961. The residence of LOUISE GILBERT, 244 South 21st Street, Philadelphia, Pa., is used for correspondence purposes by Philadelphia Friends, SCEF.

The Communist Party, USA, its affiliates and subdivisions, have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

(-)

COMMITTEE TO SECURE JUSTICE FOR MORTON SOBELL

"Following the execution of atomic spies Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in June, 1953, the Communist campaign assumed a different emphasis. Its major effort centered upon Morton Sobell, the Rosenbergs' codefendant. The National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case - a Communist front which had been conducting the campaign in the United States - was reconstituted as the National Rosenberg - Sobell Committee at a conference in Chicago in October, 1953, and then the National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell in the Rosenberg Case'...

("Guide to Subversive Control Organizations and Publications," dated December 1, 1961, issued by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 116.)

In September, 1954, the name "National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" appeared on literature issued by the Committee. In May, 1955, the current name, "Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" appeared on literature issued by the Committee.

The Address Telephone Directory for the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, as published by the New York Telephone Company on April 6, 1961, lists the Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell as being located at 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York.

(1)

PHILADELPHIA BRANCH, YOUNG SOCIALIST LEAGUE

On October 26, 1956, a confidential source advised that the Young Socialist League (YSL) had recently formed a branch of the National YSL in Philadelphia, which branch held its first meeting in Philadelphia on October 1956. On June 25, 1958 this source advised that the YSL still maintains a branch in Philadelphia.

This source on October 8, 1958 advised that the Philadelphia Branch of the YSL in September, 1958, had disbanded and merged with the Philadelphia Branch of the Young Peoples Socialist League (YPSL). The YPSL is publicly known as the Youth Affiliate of the Socialist Party, Socialist Democratic Federation.



THE  
FACTS  
ABOUT THE  
WAR IN VIET NAM

On April 20, 1965, George Beebe, president of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, stated that the American people were not getting "the full story nor the true story" of the war in Vietnam. He went on to say that "editors of this country do object to the contradictions, the double-talk and half-truths that the press is getting, both in Washington and Saigon. . . . In an undeclared war, the United States press in Vietnam faces stronger restrictions than it ever has in wartime."

Our study group believes that Canadians are entitled to know the facts about the war in Vietnam, and wish to do so. This belief has been strengthened by the response to this pamphlet, which has been widely reproduced in Canadian daily, weekly and quarterly publications; has been reprinted in pamphlet form in New Zealand and has, in French and in Japanese translations, acquired a wide circulation in other countries.

October, 25, 1965

PUBLISHED BY  
A SPECIAL STUDY GROUP ON VIET NAM  
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## FOREWORD

As a life-long admirer of the United States, my views and convictions must necessarily be regarded as prejudiced in their favour. In the Americans, I believe, lies the great hope of humanity—an orderly generation and advancement of material and spiritual values.

In the past, the U.S. has provided ample evidence of a capacity for effective, benign leadership and her generosity—though often not entirely devoid of self-interest—is unparalleled in recorded history.

In the lives of all of us at some time there is an unfortunate, misguided hour which, if exposed to antipathetic scrutiny, could stigmatize us forever, basically worthy and decent individuals though we may be.

The United States is passing through such an hour now in Viet Nam. The sympathetic, constructive advice of a friend may be helpful, whereas angry criticisms and uninformed revilings could well extend the hour and increase the danger. I believe that this paper, together with its conclusions and recommendations, is presented in the former spirit.

The somewhat stark presentation of information concerning the United States conduct of their operations in Viet Nam may be unpalatable to some, perhaps even offensive, but the facts, in the main, correspond with my own observations and impressions in North and South Viet Nam between 1961 and 1963.

However, in my view of the picture, the Communists appear darker, the Americans lighter. But, I admit, I am not impartial. And I think that the same may be said of most Western observers—a point which should be borne in mind when evaluating Western reports, from whatever source. Euphemistic reportage is the rule rather than the exception. Distortion and suppression of news is not uncommon on both sides. However, some Communist lies are uniquely horrible, and vilifying in the extreme.

Non-military examples of the opposing propaganda techniques might be the United States Information Services' report of the shocking bombing of the Brink Hotel in Saigon on Christmas Eve and an earlier Hanoi report on the depravity of American forces in Saigon.

According to the U.S.I.S. story, two American officers were killed, seventy-five injured and sixty-eight Vietnamese injured. The North American public was spared the additional shock of learning the details concerning the identity and profession of the Viet Namese.

The Hanoi report, which I can still repeat verbatim, was: "American officers and the Diem clique daily scour the streets of Saigon to prey upon young girls. They take the Viet Namese maidens to their quarters, reap (sic) them, disembowel them, suck the blood from their livers, and cruelly beat them about the breasts with clubs". This report, which depicts all American officers as sadistic fiends, is a vicious lie and so fantastic as to remain in the memory forever, but it is presumably an effective means of instilling fear and hatred in the minds of simple people. Atrocities have been committed on both sides but American officers present at the not infrequent disembowelings have not condoned them, but felt powerless to intervene.

No, I would color the Communists' propaganda darker.

And we Canadians deserve no colour at all.

As a member of the International Control Commission, charged with the grave responsibility of ensuring adherence to the terms of the Geneva agreement of 1954, we have conducted ourselves with a singular degree of spinelessness.

Behaving like affable mediators when the task clearly demanded hard-nosed policemen who would act without fear or favour, we watched the gradual disintegration of potentially peaceful conditions and remained silent. So silent that not even the Canadian public was aware of our continued presence in Viet Nam.

Now, after 13 years, we submit a minority report—such as it is. And we still lack the guts to call a spade a spade!

Our contribution towards peace in the Far East has been a sorry one indeed and this consideration should temper our criticism of others—however justified—with a becoming humility.

But the criticism should be voiced and the facts made known, while there is yet time. If there is.

HUGH CAMPBELL (S/L ret.)  
Campbell River, B.C.  
Canadian Delegate, I.C.C.  
July 1961 - March 1963

# THE FACTS ABOUT THE WAR IN VIET NAM

In calling for negotiations to stop the fighting in Viet Nam, U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, stated:

"Surely, the great American people, if it only knew the true facts and background of the situation in Viet Nam, will agree with me that bloodshed is unnecessary and that political and diplomatic discussions alone will enable the U.S. to withdraw gracefully from that part of the world." (*Vancouver Sun*, Feb. 24, 1965.)

The obvious implication of this statement is that the government of the United States has concealed the truth about its military operations in Viet Nam from its own people.

The official American justification for its policies in South Viet Nam rests on four main arguments:

1. The Americans claim that they have a "right" to be there—that they were invited by the Government of South Viet Nam.
2. They state that this government represents the people of South Viet Nam, while the Viet Cong are "communist terrorists".
3. They claim that North Viet Nam has been guilty of "aggression" against South Viet Nam.
4. The United States, which originally defended air strikes against North Vietnam as retaliatory, now has abandoned this fiction, and speaks of them as pressure necessary to force North Vietnam into "unconditional discussions" to end the war.

The purpose of this paper is to examine these arguments in the light of the facts, and so to determine whether U Thant's charges are justified.

## 1. The Americans have a legal right to be in South Viet Nam

In 1940, Indochina, which had been harshly administered by France for 56 years, was put at the disposal of the Japanese invader by Governor-General Decoux, an Axis-sympathizer. In the war against Japan, our only allies in Indochina were guerrilla forces led by Ho Chi Minh, which by 1945 were in control of the country with the Japanese and French military forces confined to barracks. A constitution was drafted, elections held, the French puppet Emperor Bao Dai agreed to abdicate in favor of the Viet Minh, and Ho Chi Minh became premier of all Viet Nam as leader of a coalition government. The nation enjoyed only a few weeks of peace and independence before the arrival of European forces, when the French re-conquest began.

The forces loyal to Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh, led by General Giap, fought to drive the French out of Indochina. France had at its command an army of half a million men, massive financial aid from the United States, and complete mastery of the air. However, the Viet Minh had the support of the mass of the populace and were finally victorious. This victory further enhanced the popularity of Ho Chi Minh, a Communist and a Nationalist, as a Vietnamese leader who had succeeded in driving a brutal, oppressive colonial power from Indochina. President Eisenhower commented that the "mass of the population supported the enemy" (Viet Minh) to their military advantage and that

"it was almost impossible to make the average Viet peasant realize that the French, under whose rule he had lived for some eighty years, were really fighting a cause of freedom."

In 1954 a peace conference was convened at Geneva, chaired by Britain and the Soviet Union, and with interested great powers invited to participate. The conference made an arbitrary and temporary division of Viet Nam at the 17th parallel, with the Viet Minh armies withdrawing north of the line, and the French to the south. This was to enable the French armies to leave Viet Nam without surrendering, and was to be for a two-year period only. The agreement stated "This demarcation is provisional, and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." (1)

In two years' time, in July, 1956, a national election was to be held by secret ballot, supervised by representatives of the International Control Commission, and Viet Nam was to be reunited under a central government. The Geneva Agreements banned reprisals, and prohibited military agreements with other nations, or any increase in foreign military personnel or armaments. It must be emphasized that the Great Powers which signed these agreements solemnly declared that Vietnam was one sovereign nation, not two.

The United States had been involved in Viet Nam since 1947 when it began to give military and economic aid to France; at the end of the war this had exceeded \$2.6 billion—80% of the cost of the war. It brought pressure on France to extend the war, and in its final year John F. Kennedy twice offered nuclear bombs to the French government. (2) The United States participated in the Geneva Conference but refused to sign the agreements; its actions to sabotage the conference are described in Anthony Lewis' memoirs, "Full Circle". However, it publicly promised to "refrain from the threat or use of force" to disturb the agreements. (3)

The provisional government in the southern half of the divided country was headed by Bao Dai, who had served as "puppet" emperor under both the French and the Japanese occupations, and was universally detested. Ngo Dinh Diem had sat out the war in the United States and in October, 1954, three months after the agreements were signed, he was installed in Saigon to direct a puppet government for the United States. There was much opposition, and on November 17, General Collins, who was President Eisenhower's special representative in South Viet Nam, issued an ultimatum—the South Vietnamese army would receive no more American aid unless it supported Diem (K. R. Brundage, *Contemporary Archives*, 1955, p. 14849). From that time on, the need for American aid kept the army in line, and the army removed or installed rulers in accordance with their degree of subservience to United States policy.

There was no question in anyone's mind that Diem, who was virtually unknown in Vietnam, was an American appointee. Guy La Chambre, Minister for the Interior in the United States, told the French Assembly: "France supported the government of Ngo Dinh Diem at the instance of the United States."

(1) Documents on International Affairs: Oxford University Press.  
(2) *Duel at the Brink*: Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coble, New York 1960.

United States." (New York Times, Dec. 18, 1954). Sam Castan, senior editor of *Look* magazine, was more explicit: "John Foster Dulles picked him, Senator Mike Mansfield endorsed him, Cardinal Spellman praised him, Vice-President Nixon liked him, and President Eisenhower OK'd him." (Jan. 28, 1964).

In 1955 a referendum was held, which was described as "rigged" even in *Time* magazine (Nov. 23, 1960), and in which according to Edgar Snow, less than 15% even of those allowed to vote participated. Diem won an easy victory over Bao Dai. Lincoln White, State Department Press Officer, announced with truly monumental hypocrisy: "The people of Vietnam have spoken, and we, of course, recognize their decision." (New York Times, Oct. 25, 1955).

Immediately Diem began to receive massive military aid from the United States, in violation of the Geneva agreements. Diem proceeded to cut off all trade with the north, and proclaimed his refusal to accept the agreement for a nation-wide election. Instead, he used his police and troops against groups favouring union, jailing their leaders without trial and firing on demonstrators.

With American funds, he opened a military academy to train a new army, with the slogan "We will march to the North".

These open violations of the Geneva agreements not only received American support, but they were in effect an extension of American policy in Viet Nam.

General de Gaulle commented: "It is known that Diem did not carry out the elections which were scheduled in 1956, and that in all fields, particularly in defense, economy and administration, he obeyed Washington." (*Newsweek*, July, 1964.)

The reasons for American opposition to a national election are spelled out in the memoirs of General Eisenhower. He states that every expert whom he consulted agreed that if an election was held possibly 80% of the people of both North and South would vote for the coalition of parties under Ho Chi Minh. (iii)

As for reprisals, the International Control Commission in the first year of the Diem regime itemized 319 losses of human life in the South, and commented that it was able to investigate only a small minority of the large number of incidents brought to its attention. There are no reports of reprisals in the North. The first nine reports listed a whole series of violations by Diem, and reports 8, 9, 10 stated that American arms were pouring in to his government in direct violation of the agreements. As against this, U Thant stated emphatically:

"There was not one single instance . . . let me repeat . . . not one single instance of North Vietnamese providing military assistance or arms to the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam in 1954 or 1955 . . ."

The facts of the situation show that the "government" of South Viet Nam has had no legal basis since the deposition of Bao Dai. It was created and continues to exist in violation of the Geneva Conference. Far from being "invited" into

(iii) *Mandate for Change: Dwight Eisenhower*, Doubleday, New York, 1968. For general background information see *The Other Side of the River* by Edgar Snow, Random House, New York, 1962. The full story of how Diem was placed in office by the United States is told in *How the United States Got Involved in Viet Nam*, by Robert Scheer. Published by the Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, 1965.

South Viet Nam by its legal government, the Americans created this government, and have used it for their purposes ever since.

## II. The Government of South Viet Nam represents the people; the Viet Cong are "communist terrorists".

As Walter Lippman has pointed out, the government of South Viet Nam, even in the beginning when the people of that country were weary of war and willing to accept a rule that was not French, never has had the support of more than 30% of its people. Its base was among military officers, civil servants and businessmen who had collaborated with the French, and businessmen and officials who were making profitable contacts with the United States.

It had the support of large numbers of Roman Catholic refugees from the north, who had fought against the Viet Minh on the side of the French. Their move to the South was directed and financed by the United States.

Diem is now generally admitted to have been typical of a fascist in his mentality and in his methods of rule. But in the early years, before popular opposition to his policies became too strong to be ignored, he was hailed as a hero by the American press. Dubbed "The Asian Winston Churchill" by no less a person than Lyndon Johnson, he was acclaimed by President Eisenhower for "his inspired leadership in the cause of the free world."

From the beginning his government was an American creation, with 75% of its budget obtained from U.S. funds and economic and military aid pouring in at the rate of \$1.5 to \$2 million a day. (As the *London Times* pointed out (Sept., 1964) "Anyone put in power by the Americans would automatically forfeit any hope of mass backing.") Despite this lavish aid, the government of South Viet Nam has never solved the problems of poverty and unemployment. Extremes of wealth and poverty, gambling, prostitution, dismal slums and luxurious places of entertainment, widespread graft and corruption characterize the Saigon regime.

As the Mansfield Senate Subcommittee pointed out in 1960 (and the situation has not changed since then):

"The military aid program has had first and foremost a dominant call on aid funds. In fact the non-military aid programs were developed largely in response to the military call and continue to operate primarily on that basis. By far the greatest part of the so-called economic aid to Viet Nam takes the form of defense support and, hence, has been channeled indirectly into the military aid program."

In the *New York Herald Tribune* (Feb. 2, 1964) General Khanh publicly boasted that he had put aside \$100 million in foreign banks. Other leading figures in the Saigon regime have been found to be using U.S. funds for personal gain; there have been many such scandals.

From the beginning, the government of South Viet Nam has been a military dictatorship. There is no freedom of speech or press. Thousands of opponents of the regime have been arrested and imprisoned without trial. Opposition parties have been outlawed. The persecution, arrest, torture and killing of the Buddhists, which received wide publicity and led to the fall of Diem, was an extension of his methods of dealing with all political opponents. (It is interesting to note that Diem's security police, which was carried on the anti-Buddhist campaigns, received a special

grant of \$3 millions yearly from the Americans, through the C.I.A.)

On November 21, 1960, *Time* magazine commented: "Pleading the Communist threat, Diem has ruled with rigged elections, a muzzled press, and political re-education camps that now hold 30,000."

At the beginning Diem had control over the cities. When he began to move into the villages, at first he had some success. But opposition to his policies developed as the peasants realized that he refused to hold national elections and reunify the country, and that he was conscripting an army for a new war—this time against the north. The landlords, who had been refugees in Saigon, moved back to the countryside to claim land which had been taken over by the peasants during the war. In some cases these landlords, backed up by police and troops, even demanded payment of back rent. As opposition grew, the Diem police became more brutal. Hugo Devillers, a Catholic anti-communist observer, wrote in *The China Quarterly* (March, 1962):

"A certain sequence of events became almost classical: denunciation, encirclement of villages, raids, arrests, plundering, interrogations enlivened by torture, deportation and regrouping of the populace."

Tens of thousands were arrested, tortured, imprisoned without trial. These were the tactics of desperation and failed to achieve their objectives. Opposition grew, and led in 1960 to the formation of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong. So overwhelming was the support for this movement that in two years' time it had taken over control of 80% of the countryside.<sup>(iv)</sup>

Far from being a group of communist "terrorists", the National Liberation Front is a broad organization including almost all political and religious opponents of the Diem dictatorship. Its thirty-one-member central committee is headed by a non-communist lawyer who had spent years in Saigon prisons for his defence of civil rights. Represented are leading Buddhists, Catholics and Protestants, as well as business men and representatives of the three leading opposition parties. Its programme is far from communist in tone—it calls for peace, withdrawal of United States armed forces, democratic elections and eventual reunification with the north around a policy of neutralism.

The actual civil war in Vietnam broke out long before the formation of the National Liberation Front, and was between the Diem regime and the armies of various anti-communist religious sects, some of which have since joined the National Liberation Front forces. It has been pointed out by many competent observers that the National Liberation Front was an indigenous movement growing out of widespread opposition to the Saigon government, and received little of any but moral support from North Vietnam. Apparently there is some bitterness in its ranks over the strict neutrality observed by North Vietnam in the early years of its existence. Hanoi explained this neutrality as necessary in order to avoid violation of the terms of the Geneva Agreements.

The American Government has confirmed this in a State Department White Paper issued in October, 1961:

\*Recently the Save the Children Fund appealed for aid for the starving children of South Viet Nam.  
(iv) "Vietnam: A Country at War", by Robert Sogliano. *Asian Survey*, January 1963.

"It was the Communists' calculation that nationwide elections scheduled in the Accords for 1956 would turn all of Viet Nam over to them . . . the primary focus of the Communists' activity during the post-Geneva period was on political action . . . the refusal (to hold elections) came as a sharp disappointment to Hanoi, whose political program for two years had been aimed at precisely that goal."

Devillers reported that the Communists in the South entered the fight reluctantly, not on orders from Hanoi or Peking, but in response to the terror campaign that Diem had conducted against former members of Viet Minh from the time he first assumed power in 1954. "The insurrection existed before the Communists decided to take part, and they were simply forced to join in. And even among the Communists the initiative did not originate in Hanoi, but from the grassroots, where the people were literally driven to take up arms in self-defense." (*The China Quarterly*, March, 1962.)

Many qualified neutral and American observers have confirmed the mass support for the forces of the National Liberation Front, which now controls and administers most of the territory of South Viet Nam. It is because of this popular support, essential to success in guerrilla warfare, that the United States has been forced into a policy of mass extermination of the civilian population. The *New York Times* reported on June 6:

As the Communists withdrew last Monday . . . U.S. jet bombers pounded the hills into which they headed. Many Vietnamese—one estimate as high as 500—were killed by the strikes. The American contention is that they were Viet Cong soldiers. But three out of four patients seeking hospital treatment afterwards for burns from napalm were village women."

A Reuter's despatch, published in the *Victoria Times*, March 18, 1965:

"Forty-eight persons, including 45 children, were killed Wednesday when South Vietnamese air force planes bombed a village [five miles from the major U.S. air base] at Da Nang. It was regarded as Communist-controlled despite its nearness to the U.S. base.

Heavy civilian casualties have resulted frequently from air strikes on hamlets where Viet Cong are believed to be operating." (Italics ours).

On March 7th the *New York Times* reported from Saigon that officially registered Vietnamese deaths from bombing rose from 276 in January, 1964, to 1,329 in November, and have exceeded 1,000 in each month since. "For some time," the despatch continued, "the attitude has been that if a village supports the Vietcong, the population is culpable." An American officer was quoted "Certainly some civilians get killed. Civilians get killed in every war."

American newspapermen have been barred from the Da Nang Air Base. But they have reported that American planes are systematically bombing villages in both North and South Viet Nam, using napalm and phosphorus bombs as well as conventional explosives. According to the *Washington Post News Service*, March 4th, "U.S. pilots are given a square marked on a map and told to hit every hamlet within the area." "I killed 40 Vietcong today," one pilot told the Associated Press on March 3rd. "That's the number they told me were in the village, anyhow, and I levelled it."

There have been many changes in the personnel of the Saigon regime since the fall of Diem. None of these resulted in democratic reforms; on the contrary, with each coup a small clique of military officers have seized tighter control. Their current spokesman, General Ky, told the British press: "People ask me who my heroes are. I have only one—Adolf Hitler." In a recent C.B.C. television interview this champion of the free world discounted the possibility of a government coming into office in Saigon which might ask the Americans to withdraw. General Maxwell Taylor agreed with this, and pointed out that even if this did take place, the generals would quickly suppress such a government. General Taylor neglected to add that these generals had been on the payroll of the United States since 1954, and that they are being kept in power, not by any popular support, but through a massive American military invasion of their country.

### III. "North Viet Nam is the Aggressor"

This charge by the United States has been so widely repeated that it will come as a shock to most readers to learn that there never has been any evidence that the North Vietnamese or the Chinese are "the aggressors" in the war being waged by the United States in Vietnam.

In fact, all available evidence, including the White Paper issued by the U.S. State Department to justify its air raids on North Vietnam, points the other way.

The invasion of the North has always been an avowed aim of the South Viet Nam military dictatorship since the days of Diem. The Americans have been deeply involved in this aim. They have assisted by violating territorial waters of North Viet Nam (the Tonkin Gulf "attack" on U.S. ships came while they were in North Viet Nam territorial waters within three to eleven miles from shore, and while South Viet Nam vessels were shelling North Viet Nam positions on islands off its coast). American planes have violated North Viet Nam air space on reconnaissance flights, dropping "special troops" by parachute, and in small scale bombing raids long before the United States openly admitted its air attacks.

The pattern is remarkably consistent. The American Government at first denies such acts of aggression, and then is forced to admit them and claim that they are justified. But there is no justification for bombing North Viet Nam towns and villages. A hospital and school were hit on the first big raid.

European correspondents on the scene have confirmed many of North Viet Nam's claims that civilian targets—schools, hospitals, dwelling places, irrigation dams—have been attacked by U.S. bombers. One large leper hospital was completely destroyed in two successive days of bombing raids.

It is ironical that four months before the openly admitted attacks took place Adlai Stevenson told the U.N. Security Council that the U.S. had "repeatedly expressed" its emphatic disapproval of retaliatory raids "wherever they occur and by whomever they are committed." (*I. F. Stone's Weekly*, Aug. 24, 1964). The United States has been directly and indirectly involved in acts of aggression for many years not only against North Viet Nam, but against Laos and Cambodia as well. (1)

(1) See *The Invisible Government* by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, Random House, New York, 1964; and *A Nation of Sheep* by William J. Lederer, W. W. Norton, New York, 1961.

Writing in the *New York Times* (June 27, C. L. Sulzberger, a supporter of American pol Indochina, had this to say:

"In 1961 a South Viet Nam 'First Opera Group' was established under U.S. direction to 'secret operations in North Viet Nam. Now, as have shown in Laos, we contemplate backing sort of action with air support. The problem is the forces dropped in North Viet Nam were unable to establish any base. They had no support from the population, were quickly reported to the military authorities, and were wiped out."

(This last statement is odd in view of the American claim that the Ho Chi Minh regime is a "shaky dictatorship", and his people are yearning for "liberation")

*Aviation Week* (April 6, 1964) reveals the technique used to disguise open American intervention:

"An air cargo company, Air America, is the principal instrument for the extension of the war in Cambodia and North Vietnam. This company 200 aircraft . . . it is airlifting South Viet Nam special troops to various places. These are under the command of U.S. Army General Paul D. Harkins, and the pilots are former U.S. military pilots."

No one denies that fighting men and weapons from the north have found their way to the Viet Cong.

It must be emphasized that this infiltration has been at least until very recently, on a very small scale. Even to date, there is no evidence whatever to substantiate American claims that large numbers of North Vietnamese are fighting in the south. Furthermore, infiltration did not begin after the N.L.F. forces in the south were engaged in open war against the American invaders. The U.S. Department White Paper of October, 1961, admitted that the bulk of the Viet Cong were South Vietnamese people and that their weapons were "largely French or U.S. or hand-made on primitive forges in the jungles."

Writing the same year RAND Corporation researcher George Tanham reported that

"the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail is no more than a series of paths . . . and not suitable for large scale shipments. . . . The Communists have been fighting largely with home-made weapons and with such material of French and American make as they have been able to steal or capture." (Quoted in Robert Schimmelfennig, *How the United States Got Involved in Viet Nam*)

General Paul D. Harkins, who plays a leading role in South Viet Nam, stated in the *Washington Post* (May 5, 1963):

"The guerrillas are not being reinforced or systematically supplied from North Vietnam, China or anywhere else. They depend for weapons primarily on whatever they can capture."

David Halberstam, who won a Pulitzer Prize for reporting on Vietnam, stated in the *New York Times* (March 6, 1964):

"The war is largely a conflict of southerners for control of southern land. No capture of North Vietnamese territory in the south has come to light, and it is generally believed that most Viet Cong weapons have been seized from the South Vietnamese (government) forces."

The *New York World Telegram* stated (Jan. 5, 1964)

"There is not one shred of evidence that the weapons used by the Viet Cong originate in the north. At the outset the Viet Cong used crude homemade weapons, but the bulk of their arms now are captured or otherwise acquired from the woefully inept defenders of South Viet Nam."

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon has opposed United States involvement in Viet Nam from the beginning. On the subject of alleged "aggression" from the north he has stated categorically in the Senate that he had repeatedly cross-examined witnesses from the Pentagon and State Department and has always received the answer that there are no military personnel in South Viet Nam from North Viet Nam, China, Laos, Cambodia or anywhere else. When he asked the question: "Are the Viet Cong South Vietnamese almost entirely?", he was answered "Yes". The same is true of their weapons. Senator Morse concludes that the so-called "supply lines" which Americans are bombing are little more than a myth.

South Vietnamese claims of infiltration, formerly denied by American authorities, were revived in connection with American air attacks on North Viet Nam in a White Paper published by the American State Department and in the minority report made by the Canadian representative on the International Control Commission. The White Paper, which was heralded as containing "conclusive proof" of North Vietnamese aggression, is a curious document. Essentially, it is a rehash of old propaganda stories long discredited. To back up the claim that there are 39,000 North Vietnamese infiltrators, it cites 18 names. Of these, nine were from the south, four from the north, and five not identified. We must remember that the Viet Minh army of 100,000 men, many of them from the southern part of the country, withdrew north of the temporary boundary in 1954. It is little wonder that some of these men have returned to their homes and families, and that they have joined the Viet Cong.

Writing in the *New York Times* (June 21, 1964), Tad Szulc quoted top U.S. officials to say that North Viet Nam has not been sending men into the south.

"The guerrilla units that infiltrate from the north are South Vietnamese who stayed north of the armistice line at the end of the war in 1954."

Following the publication of the White Paper, *J. F. Stone's Weekly* obtained from the Pentagon press office a precise statement of the number of weapons captured from the guerrillas and the number lost to them over the past three years. The figures were as follows:

	Captured from Guerrillas	Lost to the Guerrillas
1962 .....	4,800	5,200
1963 .....	5,400	8,500
1964 .....	4,900	13,700
3-year Total .....	15,100	27,400

Appendix "D" of the White Paper provides a list of weapons, ammunition and other supplies of Communist origin captured from the guerrillas over the 18-month period from June, 1962 to January 29 last year. Out of the total of some 7,500 weapons captured during that period only 179 could be classified as Communist made, and of these only 26 were alleged to have been made or modified in North Viet Nam. The total additional supplies attributed

to North Viet Nam sources included 16 helmets, one uniform and an undisclosed number of mess kits, belts, socks and sweaters. These figures represent less than 2½% of the total weapons captured.

It has been freely admitted in the American press that the South Vietnamese troops, in addition to being unwilling to fight for their government, have deserted to the Viet Cong in large numbers. These troops bring their U.S.-made weapons with them. They are trained in their use by American "advisors", and technical pamphlets on using the weapons have been published in their language. Successful raids on American bases have been made with U.S. mortars and ammunition (this was admitted by the Pentagon). Vietnamese troops stationed in defence of these bases have either not intervened or, in some cases, have helped the Viet Cong raiders.

The U.S. White Paper was a spectacular fiasco—American critics have demonstrated that it proved exactly the opposite of its expressed intention. A more recent propaganda line is that the United States does have proof of aggression but cannot reveal the evidence for "security reasons". It is an interesting commentary on the pro-American bias of the Canadian daily press that some publications have taken this statement seriously.

Even more extraordinary is the text of the Canadian minority report. It refers to "South Viet Nam sources" who charge that 39,000 North Viet Nam soldiers have infiltrated into the South. It is careful neither to "confirm or deny" these allegations. Yet it uses them to defend U.S. aerial attacks on the north. The same curious reasoning might have been used to justify Hitler's invasion of Poland after he had claimed that the Poles were "aggressors".

Speaking at a public meeting in Toronto, Colonel Bradley Webb, a former military advisor to the Commission and a frequent visitor to Viet Nam, said that the Canadian minority report was probably "strongly influenced" by the United States. He said that as far as he was aware "there had been no significant infiltration of North Vietnamese troops or equipment into South Viet Nam." (*Victoria Daily Times*, March 15, 1965).

Neutral observers, and even American officials themselves, have agreed that both China and North Viet Nam have from the very beginning been extremely careful to avoid any action which might be construed as "aggression" in the South.

In fact, China's refusal to be provoked into war over Viet Nam has been discussed repeatedly in the American press—often with sneers about her "weakness" or "cowardice".

Any talk of North Vietnamese "aggression" must explain these stubborn facts:

1. There has never been any evidence that more than a trickle of arms has reached the South, and the number of northern infiltrators there has always been considerably fewer than the number of American "advisors".

2. "North" and "South" Viet Nam are artificial entities, resulting from an agreement which was to last for two years only, and was not in any way to be considered as forming permanent political or territorial boundaries. This boundary still exists because of the refusal of the United States and its government in the South to allow reunification through a national election, in direct violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements. This boundary no longer has any

validity, and the war has become a struggle for national independence against foreign intervention.

#### IV. The United States offers "unconditional discussions".

There has been world wide criticism of American actions in Vietnam. An apparent shift in policy, signalled by President Johnson's speech on April 7 offering "unconditional discussions" with North Vietnam, won a momentary propaganda victory. But since then the United States has "escalated" the war, pouring in additional thousands of troops, no longer euphemistically called advisors, and stepping up bombing raids against both North and South Vietnam. Influential American critics of their own government's policies have concluded that the offer of discussion was "mere verbal trickery, to quell the peace-mongering critics at home and abroad." (*New York Times*, April 25).

Any objective analysis of the American position leads to the same distasteful conclusion. President Johnson's offer was predicated on the assumption that "North Vietnam has attacked the independent nation of South Vietnam." This is simply not true. The government of South Vietnam is not independent. It is an American creation, and could not last a week without American military support. It is fighting, not against North Vietnam, but against the National Liberation Front, which is the effective government in large sections of the country, and controls most of its territory.

Senator Wayne Morse stated, in the Senate on April 7: "I am advised that if an election were held today, Ho Chi Minh would undoubtedly be elected President of both North and South Vietnam, as would have been the case in 1956 when the United States prevented the very election called for by the Geneva accords."

The present U.S. position is not an offer to discuss peace. It is a demand for unconditional surrender.

Even when issuing his appeal for "unconditional discussions", President Johnson laid down three conditions which must be satisfied before the U.S. will cease its war against Viet Nam:

1. South Viet Nam must be recognized by its neighbours as a separate state and no reunification of Viet Nam will be permitted
2. The Government of South Viet Nam must be of a composition satisfactory to the United States, and
3. Peace will be discussed, if at all, only with the governments of the neighbouring countries — there will be no settlement with the National Liberation Front and no alternative for its supporters except submission to the Government of South Viet Nam controlled by Washington.

To these pre-conditions, Secretary MacNamara has since added a fourth—South Viet Nam must continue to serve as a military base for American operations in the Far East, and American forces will not be withdrawn, even if their withdrawal is requested by the Government of South Viet Nam.

The present position of the North Vietnamese government was outlined by Ho Chi Minh in a statement published July 1, 1965:

"The Geneva Agreements are still the basis for the peaceful solution of the war. I think the most important provisions are:

The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Viet Nam must be respected;

No military base under the control of a foreign power may be established in Viet Nam;

Viet Nam shall not join any military alliance;

Democratic freedoms must be guaranteed to create favourable conditions for the restoration of normal relations between North and South Viet Nam with a view to the re-unification of the country."

Ho Chi Minh's statement carried no demand for immediate withdrawal of American forces from South Viet Nam, nor did it set any deadline, like that of 1955, for the re-unification of the country. On the latter subject his statement was:

"We respect the policies of the National Liberation Front and hold that the two zones must take into account their respective characteristics into account, understand each other, restore normal relations between them, and achieve national re-unification."

While the position taken by Hanoi is conciliatory in tone and flexible as to timing, it is nevertheless compatible with the position taken by President Johnson and Secretary MacNamara.

The issue is simple: will South Viet Nam continue to serve as a base for American military operations in the Far East, with its government controlled from Washington?

The war is likely to continue until either the United States abandons this demand or until a large part of the Vietnamese population is exterminated.

#### CONCLUSIONS

1. No Legal or moral grounds exist for prolonging the civil war in Viet Nam.
2. This Study Group accordingly recommends the following: (a) The policy recommended by Prime Minister B. Pearson in his speech to the Canadian Society in New York, on March 5, 1965:

"Today . . . the aim of the international community must be to secure conditions in Southeast Asia which, under international control and international supervision and effective international policies, states in that area can work out their own affairs and conduct their own policies without any interference from any neighbour or any outside power."

And (b) The Policy Statement Re Viet Nam, issued by the World Association of World Federalists, March 1965:

"The acceleration of hostilities in Vietnam threatens the peace of the world and raises the spectre of a new world war III. The current action in Vietnam is another case of force used by individual countries in conflict situations, which is the inevitable consequence of the absence of an effective world security system and of machinery for enforceable world law.

The World Association of World Federalists

1. The re-convening of the Geneva Conference which partitioned Vietnam, in order to achieve a ceasefire and to seek a political settlement safeguarded against outside interference the existing political situation in South-East Asia.
2. To bring the Vietnam situation within the purview of the United Nations and to establish a viable framework for the United Nations as observer and guarantor of any agreement reached by the Conference."

Working Party on Vietnam

December 23, 1967

Mike Marrow

"Current Perspectives" : *Mike*

Merry Christmas!

We are rushing through chapters 1 and 7 with the hope that we can get them into the mail to you with this memo. Adele worked hard on them and I picked at them here and there. Much of my time on Tues. and Wed. was taken in Washington with our Pakistan-India concerns. We are sending three quakers for a six weeks visit to the two countries.

I checked the story (p.1) with Carl Englesby. The new version conforms with his first-hand, eye-witness account. You will be interested to see how the retelling of the story had put it through the filter of American cultural perspectives. Flinging the candy in the face of the soldier was not a Vietnamese act, but an American one. The actual is more forceful in fact, but appears less so to the American reader, thus the paradox of trying to convey meanings and feelings across cultures. I toyed with several adjectives which might help to convey this and maybe you will think of some.

"Probability" Adele and our new editor Barbara Chapin were not averse to leaving the repetitive questions in Chap. 7. I interpret the outcry of certain working party members and the silence of others to mean that we should cut it down somewhat. Take a look at it and see if we should restore in the previous form.

Walc Press is worried about the transparency of our work. They don't seem to realize how much of it is factual and how much we have hedged the fluid parts (is it still). Anyway they have given a reluctant turnaround. We are looking for other publishers and in any case can publish it ourselves if need be and if the Board authorizes it at all.

I will be in the office Monday and Tuesday, Dec. 27 and 28 so please phone in if you have any major suggestions about chaps. 1 & 7. Do not hesitate to have suggested rewording at the tip of your tongue! Call, collect.

100-11392-433

Vietnam - The Current Perspectives

The setting was a small square in the city of Hue, South Vietnam, on a summer day in 1965. The square was known as a rendezvous for American G.I.s and local ladies of pleasure. A couple of military police were on duty to keep order. On this day one had supplied himself with some candy for the children frequenting the place. As he started his distribution a swarm of youngsters, jumping and reaching, pressed around him. With a laugh he tossed the candy out on the cobblestones. A young Vietnamese school teacher happened by at this time. Seeing the scrambling children he spoke to them in stern and emphatic tones. He told them to pick up the candy and give it back to the American. After some hesitation they meekly complied. Then, speaking in measured English with a tone of suppressed anger and scorn, he said: "You Americans don't understand. You are making beggars of our children, prostitutes of our women, and communists of our men!"

This incident is significant in that it reflects the widespread attitude of many people who are offered help and presents that degrade and humiliate them. The emotions revealed here can be seen as symbolic of the physical impact of American involvement in other countries, an impact which often causes grave disruption in the social pattern of the countries involved. In the uproar over Vietnam this reality has been largely overlooked, but it is one Americans must assess. The attitude of the people themselves has a great deal to say about our chance of contributing anything to the development of an independent South Vietnam, which is the stated reason for the United States' military presence in the affairs of that Asian land.

For the most part, Americans look at Vietnam in terms of preoccupation with the post war expansion of Communism, seen as controllable only through the exercise of American military power. We are repeatedly told that our strength requires us to become the champion of the "free," charged with the responsibility

of holding back the "tides of darkness" represented by the aggressive forces of an international political ideology. This is our rationale for being in Vietnam that Southeast Asia is threatened by communist China, operates through its instruments in Hanoi, and the United States is determined to stand by its commitment to the anti-communist patriots of South Vietnam in their defense of freedom against aggression from the north.

This analysis, so easily accepted by Americans, finds less acceptance elsewhere in the world, especially in Vietnam, where viewpoints are shaped by a different set of historic factors. The first such fact to be noted here is that the Vietnamese people, both north and south, are caught up in a profound revolutionary movement. As is true of much of Asia, people are reaching toward a day when men will be free from the burdens of exploitation, poverty, and disease which they have endured for ages. To the peasant, at least 80% of the population of Vietnam, the champion of this revolution is Ho Chi Minh, the national hero. Though a communist, he is regarded as the George Washington of Vietnam, the father of his country, the man who liberated Vietnam from French domination.

The second component of the Vietnamese perspective is <sup>hatred of</sup> what people soon come to regard as the American supported regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Americans can hardly comprehend the impact of the Diem government on the people of South Vietnam. Resentment against its repressive measures was so strong and widespread in rural areas that it became an important factor in driving thousands of villagers from their families into the jungle and swamps to engage in open rebellion. The Diem chapter is one Americans know little about, but it must be taken into consideration if we are to understand the perspective of the Vietnamese people toward the tragedy that now engulfs us all.

The third component of the Vietnamese view of the war is the resentment of the villagers toward the succession of Saigon governments in the last few years. In years past, village affairs had been handled by local officials known to the

people. A kind of basic democracy was present. Early in the Diem regime, however, these officials were replaced by Diem-appointed men brought in from outside, thus giving the villagers their first, but primary, contact with the central government. Since the venal and exploitive character of the government has been and continues to be at its worst on the local level, it is no wonder the villagers consider Saigon the enemy.

The fourth component is the general feeling of war-weariness on the part of people throughout South Vietnam. Horror and devastation are inflicted by the fighting elements - American, South Vietnamese, and National Liberation Front (NLF) forces.<sup>1</sup> The total nature of the destruction wrought has been all too vividly described by a French Catholic priest in an interview reported by Jean Larteguy in Paris-Match, October 2, 1965:<sup>2</sup>

...Today nothing remains of all that region. All is razed. As for the poor mountain people whose villages and rice granaries have been destroyed they can live only as wild boars in the forest. Before the bombardment the loud speakers, in the planes above them, told them not to go into the fields and to stay in their huts. They stayed in their huts and the huts were bombarded anyway. Or again the Viet Cong obliged them to come out and machine-gunned them in the fields. Some villages were warned, others not. I have seen my faithful burned up in napalm. I have seen the bodies of women and children blown to bits. I have seen all my villages razed. By God, it's not possible! (C'est pas Dieu possible)." Suddenly the priest burst into tears. He had given up. He cursed the war and its attendant horrors and atrocities. He railed at the Americans in English, as if they were there to hear him...

These perspectives, then, help explain why the "defense of freedom" in South Vietnam has not been successful. These perspectives also explain the failure of our Asian adversary. One great surprise to Americans is the fighting ability, tenacity and high morale of peasant armies from underdeveloped and backward countries, even when subjected to the kind of modern warfare the United States

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1. "NLF" is the name which the forces opposing the Saigon government assumed in 1960. They have been better known in the West by the pejorative term, Vietcong, or "Vietcong," a name given them by the Diem regime.

2. For full interview, see I.F. Stone's Weekly, November 1, 1965.

currently waging in Vietnam. With our complex industrial technology and affluent society, we find it difficult to understand how an essentially poverty stricken peasantry can hold out so long against the assaults of our various weapons with any indication of weakening. Yet they do so. The South Vietnamese who have taken up arms in rebellion have demonstrated that they are prepared to spend endless years in the jungles and swamps of their country, enduring impossible hardships rather than surrender. Persons who have talked to Vietcong fighters say they are willing to persist, even when confronted with incessant bombings, helicopter and fighter plane attacks. Visitors who have seen tunnels occupied by guerrilla fighters, where men live in caves on a river bank with a tiny breathing hole and an entrance obscured by bushes can also testify to the extent of this fervor.

In North Vietnam the will to resist is equally strong. Western journalists there have observed that the people have now come to the reluctant conclusion that they may have to sacrifice even their principal cities to American bombers. They await the day when American military and political leaders decide to level them. They have already evacuated large numbers of women and children. Factories have been divided into small units which are being moved into excavations in the hills. Like other American bombing actions, it seems clear that the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi will not create a situation in which the North Vietnamese will be inclined to surrender or to negotiate a settlement dictated by the United States government. It is more likely to stiffen their determination to resist.

This situation is a result of the escalation up to the end of 1965, at which time, according to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the United States had 165,700 military personnel in South Vietnam. According to the same authority, South Vietnamese government had about 500,000 men in its armed forces. Besides the United States and South Vietnamese forces there were 1,300 Australian Forces, 300 New Zealand artillery troops and a South Korean division of 14,000 in South Vietnam, a total of 685,000 troops. It is worth noting that, as of November 1965, the figures show twice as many American personnel in Vietnam as there were French

at the height of the French colonial effort. In 1954, the French-directed force that suffered the reverse of Dienbienphu numbered 80,000 Frenchmen, 41,000 Senegalese and 400,000 Vietnamese.

The size of the opposing force was estimated by the Pentagon to be about 165,000 in September 1965. Just how many of this force are southerners and how many are from the north is not definitely known, but it is generally accepted by United States government spokesmen that even though many of the leaders have been trained in the north, the overwhelming majority are southerners. In February 1965 the United States Department of State issued a White Paper intended to document the aggression of North Vietnam. The facts revealed, however, that military equipment coming to the Vietcong from Hanoi and from communist countries was insignificant compared to the American equipment captured, stolen or bought in South Vietnam.

7) One of the major justifications for the American bombardment of North Vietnam which started on February 7, 1965 was to prevent or hamper infiltration of men and material from the north. But in November 1965 the Pentagon's own reports indicated ~~that~~ this infiltration had greatly increased. Reports of parts of regular North Vietnamese army regiments appearing in the south came <sup>into</sup> the news with increasing frequency. <sup>As</sup> Estimates were made and retraced in confusing succession but the highest estimate of North Vietnamese troops made was 14,000, as compared with 165,700 American troops. At the end of 1965 the main part of the well-trained North Vietnam force of between 225,000 and 250,000 men had not as yet been engaged. In a (date) interview in the New York HERALD TRIBUNE and other leading newspapers Secretary of Defense McNamara declared that recent events revealed "a clear decision by Hanoi to both escalate the level of infiltration and raise the level of conflict." He was, he said, "sure that decision must be countered by an increase in the forces opposing the Vietcong." The Secretary referred to a statement made by President Johnson on July 28, 1965 to the effect that the United States would send whatever troops were needed in the war. He left reporters with

the impression that United States troops would soon be increased to 200,000 and that air attacks on the Vietcong supply routes running from North Vietnam through Laos would be intensified. At the same time authoritative sources in Vietnam reported that the United States military men there were demanding even higher escalation and talking in terms of a war which would last five, ten, or twenty

Under such circumstances, the price of "victory" is <sup>typically</sup> indeed high. It will require a rising tempo of slaughter of human beings in Vietnam: people who have been, to use Camus' insight, the "victims" of a succession of "executioners," killing people for what they consider sufficient reasons or even noble causes. We are not intimating that the sole blame rests upon Americans. We are speaking of the reality of the suffering and death to which human beings who happen to be Vietnamese are being subjected and in which Americans are involved. In South Vietnam the number of refugees fleeing into Saigon and coastal areas had, by March 1965, reportedly reached nearly three-quarters of a million people. Some among them are fleeing from Vietcong terror, but by the testimony of Americans and neutral observers alike, the majority are refugees from American napalm bombing and strafing. The Vietcong do not have the means, even if they had the will, to carry out such mass destruction.

new total estimated  
casualties since 1960  
(Viet Report)

The price of "victory" also means burning and killing for every foot of ground gained between the Camau peninsula <sup>to the delta</sup> and the 17th parallel. To subdue and pacify the Vietnamese means in committing a huge ground army <sup>using</sup> massive "counter insurgency," an antiseptic catch-all phrase which covers a <sup>lot</sup> of new military terms. In plain English language these ~~terms~~ mean putting a <sup>to</sup> to villages which maybe potential guerrilla sniper spots, destroying rice crops, dropping a grenade in a tunnel full of women and children, bribing children to reveal the location of hideouts, killing child messengers, torturing prisoners to gain information. These and other actions are explained as "necessary under the circumstances," <sup>Can</sup> <sup>be</sup> are the American people prepared to have such things done in their name?

Silvester

The final price of "victory" is the virtual certainty of increasing alienation from the Vietnamese people. There is ample evidence that the South Vietnamese view the National Liberation Front with some disaffection because of its terrorism, its depredation, heavy taxes, impressment of young men, and continued deferment <sup>then</sup> ~~the~~ benefits it has promised to bestow. But it is also true that the propagandist efforts of the National Liberation Front have succeeded in undermining the American <sup>image</sup> ~~position~~ in rural areas by identifying American involvement in Vietnam as mere continuation of the French colonial enterprise. The Vietnamese villager knows about American support for the French, for Dien, and now for the present Saigon government. Who can blame him for feeling a special resentment toward that "foreign Imperialist," the United States. <sup>soldier</sup> Nor can such alienation and resentment be significantly affected by the positive efforts being made by the United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) and the military to provide technical aid and assistance. For years the United States has tried to help the poor of Vietnam through programs of positive action. A.I.D. has struggled, sometimes heroically, to provide educational facilities, improve agricultural techniques, contribute to public health, and strengthen the economy. But the effort has not changed attitudes, because it has been so small compared to military action, and because it has been thwarted by the conditions under which it has had to work, not the least of which is the lack of support from the Saigon government. For these positive efforts by the United States to successfully provide a foundation for a popularly based political alternative to the National Liberation Front it would be necessary to institute widespread reforms in land tenure and a thorough clean out of corruption. Neither has been possible. United States A.I.D. officials have had to work with a regime which owes its support to the vested interests that still follow the patterns of the French emperor Bao Dai. Ironically, it is the small group in power that benefits from the accelerated conflict and the rising cost of living that increases the despair of the majority. The continued attempt to combine military and social programs under various guises, from "strategic

to "pacification," achieve no net gain, despite the fact that there are both soldiers and civilians who have been able to render sincere and devoted service to the cause in some ways. Yet it is simply impossible to build a house and burn it at the same time. It is not possible to build a peace-time society in a land ravaged by civil war and foreign occupation. The staggering odds against civilian efforts for reconstruction are all illustrated in an article by Norman Sklarewitz, in the WALL STREET JOURNAL of December 16, 1965, where an A.I.D. representative is quoted as saying, "The Pentagon is spending more for just its air strip and docks at Cam Ranh Bay than we've been allocated for the nation's entire reconstruction."

Therefore it seems likely that continuation of the fighting by the United States and the almost certain Vietcong reaction can only produce increasing alienation and resentment among the people on all sides, and will continue to nullify any positive efforts to improve the lot of the Vietnamese or to win their allegiance. These considerations raise an ugly question: even if we win this war, will we lose peace, because those who survive will hate us?

In other words, the question is a moral one, based on our own national orientation: Can the United States be the champion of the "free"? Our historical origins show the glaring paradox. Not so long ago we Americans were scattered settlers, colonists, creating a new nation concerned with independence. In spite of ties to European motherlands, our founding fathers wanted to be left alone. They were aware that some regarded them as backward, inexperienced, unfit to govern themselves, but they were confident and often brash. In this determined spirit they responded to acts of colonial repression from Britain with a declaration of independence and a violent revolution.

The new government was determined to keep the whole western hemisphere free from European interference or domination. Its motto, "no entangling alliances" later became the Monroe Doctrine; a formal, diplomatic statement of our characteristic love of independence.

Then, having achieved independence, the United States spread across the

American continent, next to Alaska, then to Hawaii. Our government began to assert hegemony (control? leadership?) over Latin America, not infrequently enforced by the Marines. The Monroe Doctrine began to be more of an excuse for new colonialism than a safeguard against the old. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, as the aftermath of war with Spain, our once tiny nation established itself not only in the Caribbean, but in the Philippines, where Americans drove out Spaniards and established a base for American power.

Now there is not a spot left in the world where American power and influence do not enter into the calculations of the decision makers of other nations, large or small. The American presence in Vietnam is a part of this decisive fact of modern life. The course of history has brought the United States not only to a dominant position in military power, but also to a place of prime responsibility in the conquest of some of humanity's age-old problems. Most Americans live on a scale far above that of the multitudes of human beings throughout history. We could devote ourselves to wiping out the pockets of poverty in our own country and help in other parts of the world. Instead we find ourselves locked in a brutal struggle, using our military power to contradict the basic elements of our own dream of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" for all. We are not giving the people of Vietnam freedom. On the basis of our present policy, the Vietnamese do not even have a voice in deciding whether the war in which they are involved will ever end. It is openly admitted that the Saigon government, which the United States recognizes, could not exist without the massive military support our government is now providing. To much of the world we, benefactors of revolution, appear to be engaged in the forceful suppression of a nationalistic independence movement.

Our own internal economy already shows signs that military expenditures are, in effect, curbing the "prosperity" to which Americans have become accustomed. Until the escalation of the war stops, we will lack resources to end the poverty in which large numbers of our people live, to improve our schools, to end the deterioration of our cities. A statement by the assistant chief of the war on

poverty, Joseph Kershaw, on December 6, 1965, reveals this situation: "If the military budget goes up anything like what most people suspect, many of the ~~Civil~~ Society projects will have to be severely cut back, if not abandoned."<sup>3</sup> In addition to this, the continuation of war constitutes a threat to our American institutions and the quality of American life. Many people will somehow cling stubbornly to the tradition of criticism and individual conscience. The right to dissent has not yet been drastically curbed. We are not completely locked what Martin Euber called "the speechlessness of slaughter" which characterizes war. However, if the trend toward silencing dissent continues at its present rate, we will all be put under great pressure, forced to resort to unprecedented measures, with all the dangers that this will entail.

Thus the paradox, that at the very moment of our greatest hope, we find ourselves confronted by our gravest danger. The United States presence in Vietnam perpetrates a spiral of cause and effect which threatens to engulf the entire world in a war of such scope and destructiveness that the very fate of mankind hangs in balance. The war is already spreading to Laos and Cambodia. Thailand lies on the brink. If it continues to spread, the direct intervention of China appears certain, in spite of the probability of American nuclear retaliation. At the same time our carefully constructed detente with the Soviet Union in Europe after showing such promise, rears collapse as that country also finds itself, matter how reluctantly, drawn further and further into the war.

Truly, we may ask: How did we ever get ourselves into this situation, and how can we get ourselves out? To such questioning and to the search for some solution, we of the Working Party now commit ourselves.

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3. As quoted in I.F. Stone's Weekly, December 13, 1965.

Possibilities for a Settlement

Since on paper the negotiating positions of the United States, the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam are so close, why has the United States been so positive in its refusal to take advantage of the numerous openings for negotiation? The answer seems clear: negotiations would involve making some concessions and the United States hopes by its present military efforts to win the kind of victory which will make concessions unnecessary. The Working Party first believe that such hopes are unrealistic. They are based on certain premises and assumptions which have shaped our policy toward Vietnam and all Southeast Asia for a number of years.

The first such premise which we consider unrealistic is that this "dirty little war" can be won. The United States seems to feel that by wearing down the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam until the country has been bombed, burned, or starved into submission, a settlement advantageous to the United States and the forces it is backing can be reached. But this is to misread the special nature and the thirty year history of the communist-nationalist movement in Vietnam. As we have said, the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese are filled with the crusading zeal of a national liberation movement. Their fierce determination to resist intrusion renders it impossible to win this war in any real sense. Every escalation on the part of the United States leads to a corresponding effort made by the Vietnamese nationalists and communists, backed by increasing commitments from the Soviet Union and China.

In the meantime, the internal and external pressures on the United States to end the war are bound to grow. No war in American history has been met with such apathy and outright opposition. Its cost in terms of lives as well as the sacrifice of vital internal programs continues to mount with no relief in sight. The State Department has already admitted its disappointment at the lack of support received from even our government's strongest allies. Still more serious is the

potential alienation of the people and governments in the underdeveloped countries as the United States, because of the war, becomes less able to render assistance for their economic development and as it becomes more evident what kind of dejection may befall a country coming under the umbrella of American "protection."

The second premise we believe is false is that this is a war of aggression by the North Vietnamese instigated by China against the south. Such a view disregards completely the development of the conflict, the role of the National Liberation Front in this conflict and the actual relationship between Hanoi and Peking. As has already been discussed, this is a civil war between different elements of the Vietnamese. True, the National Liberation Front now receives support from the North Vietnamese, but the actual revolt in South Vietnam was begun and is still sustained by South Vietnamese revolting against the Saigon government. Resistance against a Saigon government, which is a minority group opposed to any fundamental socio-economic change, will continue, even if it is government with which the United States has allied itself. The National Liberation Front will not disappear from the scene.

False premise number three assumes that if Vietnam falls, all the other countries in Southeast Asia will follow "like a row of dominoes." As pointed out, the situation in Vietnam is unique. What happens there will not necessarily affect developments in other countries. Even if some countries should "go communist" in their own socio-economic revolutions, as has been shown, this need not threaten legitimate American interests. The United States has found it possible to get along with the countries in eastern Europe and thus could presumably coexist with communist countries in Southeast Asia. What the United States wants to halt is the formation of strong hostile alignments. But it is precisely our present military policy which promotes this by preventing natural development and national socio-economic revolutions.

The fourth false premise is that if the United States reneges on its commitment to the Saigon regime, American credibility will be questioned. This

argument is the one most often raised in defense of United States policy. It seems to strike at the very heart of our honor as a nation. But what does this ~~commitment actually mean? The commitment to the Saigon government actually did~~ not exist prior to the Johnson Administration. It was made by that administration albeit in terms suggesting that it was merely a logical continuation of earlier commitments made by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Now the administration insists that an American commitment is at stake and that, this being so, at stake in any settlement in Vietnam is the credibility of the American government. Thus, while there are grounds for doubting the administration's credibility in dealing candidly with the American people over the problem of Vietnam, the public is asked to give unreserved support to the government so that its credibility abroad will remain untarnished.

With what kind of credibility is the administration actually concerned? It is to prove that American military power can be translated into political solutions even where politically requisite conditions do not exist. Does the administration wish to leave the rest of the world with the impression that credibility is to be measured in terms of an unflinching military pursuit of ends, even when these are glaringly unreal and inconsistent with basic political and social facts? Does the administration mean to demonstrate to the rest of the world that our country can be counted upon to pursue a mistaken course doggedly, without swerving, regardless of consequences, to prove that once a direction is taken, we as a people will not alter our course, regardless of the objective social and political facts, regardless of the human suffering we inflict? Is our commitment made to the people of South Vietnam, or is it a promise to prop up whatever anti-communist regime American power is able to keep in Saigon?

To continue our current unqualified, undiscriminating support of Saigon's present military junta only makes credible to the world at large an image of a United States that stands in contradiction to the very political and ethical values upon which America itself is founded.

American military power is credible. Here is the explosive comment of Asian Ambassador in an interview<sup>1</sup> in the summer of 1965 when he was asked what a cessation of bombing by the United States would be interpreted as a sign of weakness:

"Weakness!! With the 7th Fleet and the U.S. Air Force? All Asia--all world--knows the U.S. is the most powerful nation in history, and can do what it wants. You don't have to show us that. We know it, and we don't understand how you can think that anyone will question your power."

What other kinds of credibility are involved? Do Americans realize that our world responsibilities, our military credibility is transcending our credibility for rationality, political maturity, legal and moral responsibility? In the eyes of a very large part of the world, our conduct in Vietnam has already lost the United States much of its credibility with respect to these non-military qualities. Much can be done to restore American credibility and honor if the United States is bold enough to acknowledge its mistake and abandon its clearly calamitous policy of reliance upon military means to achieve impossible political ends.

With policies built on such premises it is understandable how the United States can be moving inexorably along the road to no return. The Working Party feels that this is not the only path open. If the only choice lay between continuance of the present course toward more war, or immediate unilateral American withdrawal, the Working Party would unhesitatingly choose the latter. But the politically relevant dialogue now facing the administration involves whether to continue escalating the war or to start de-escalating immediately and, in accordance with political realities, to make a genuine effort to negotiate a cease fire and a political settlement which will permit the orderly withdrawal of United States military forces. We realize that the latter course is fraught with difficulties, not the least being the need to make clear to the American people both the need for and advantages of such a change. Furthermore, since the situation in Vietnam is changing so rapidly as the war continues to be expanded, unforeseen forces or forces now playing only a minor role are certain to complicate the picture even more in the future. Therefore, keeping in mind that any proposal

this time cannot be rigid but can be, at best, mere suggestions adaptable to changing circumstances. We of the Working Party now address ourselves to exploring possible measures toward a solution.

1. First of all, no solution in Vietnam is possible without a clear and unequivocal pronouncement by the United States that it intends to end the war by means of a settlement that will include eventual withdrawal of its forces. Until such a pronouncement is made, neither the Saigon regime, the National Liberation Front, nor Hanoi will take seriously any overtures on our part to negotiate. This will be especially true of governments in Saigon, such as that headed by Premier Ky, which have consistently maintained they were not prepared to negotiate even while the United States maintained it was. The North Vietnamese are extremely suspicious of American intentions because, so often in the past, talk of our willingness to negotiate has been accompanied by increased military efforts, and because the bases the United States is now building at Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, and Da Nang are of a permanent kind, far larger in scope than required by the present war in Vietnam.

2. Second, the United States must accept the fact that the ultimate decision regarding the future of Vietnam must be made by the Vietnamese themselves. The United States and the Saigon regime must both be willing in advance to say they will sign any final agreement involving all parties concerned. This could erase doubts stemming from the refusal of the United States to do so in 1954. Phan Van Dong, premier of North Vietnam, has insisted on the importance of full United States participation in any agreement.<sup>2</sup> Such an announcement would undoubtedly throw the present stifled political situation in Saigon into a state of flux. No one can foretell what might emerge in terms of local political forces. But certainly the non-military elements which paved the way for the overthrow of the Diem regime, but which have since then been suppressed, will re-emerge and could help speed the process of reaching a settlement.

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2. William Warbey, NY. NEW YORK TIMES, November 28, 1965; William Warbey, MP.

3. An announcement on the part of the American government to end the war through a negotiated settlement will have to be coupled with immediate actions ~~to prove our good faith.~~ These would involve a United States moratorium on initiating military activities, a cessation of bombing both north and south, and a freeze on further troops being sent to Vietnam. In the meantime, American forces would open fire only if attacked.

4. The United States would thus move on to call for a general cease fire for all parties supervised by an international body to keep order and prevent reprisals. Such supervision might be carried on by the International Control Commission (ICC), though it would have to be enlarged or reorganized in order to meet National Liberation Front and Democratic Republic of Vietnam objections to its present composition.

5. At the same time a Geneva-type conference should be called together to reapply the principles of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 to the current situation. The logical group to form such a conference would be the original Geneva powers who could be quickly assembled on request from concerned parties by the co-chairmen, Britain and the Soviet Union. Some difficulties might arise in reconvening the group as originally constituted. For example, the National Liberation Front, which had no place in the framework of the original body, must be included now.

A more complicated problem is the official representation for the present Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam. The present military hierarchy in Saigon can be expected to do all in its power to resist efforts to end the war. At the same time their consistent treatment of any urging by the people of a peaceful settlement as a serious, perhaps a capital crime has made any organized opposition to the war impossible. Some means must be found to permit the large non-communist sector of the population vitally interested in ending the war, of which the Buddhists and intellectual communities represent only a part, to express themselves. This will require a lifting of press censorship, and freedom for political discussion and organization, also the institution of some officially-recognized va

of public representation.

One suggestion for achieving this is for the current Saigon government to establish a council of notables representing a wide cross-section of civilian and religious leaders who, in conjunction with the Saigon government, could form a negotiating authority. Such a council might initiate a representative referendum in Saigon on the issue of whether or not the government should enter into negotiations with the National Liberation Front. A referendum would certainly have to be conducted under international auspices and even then would be faced with grave difficulties because of unsettled political conditions intensified by the large number of refugees in the Saigon area.

If major blocks arose in setting up a new Geneva Conference, it might be necessary to convene a new group of concerned powers, possibly through the good offices of the United Nations. The United Nations itself, however, would hardly be acceptable in fact as an actual power to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, not to mention China. Some exploratory efforts, preferably quiet and private, would clearly be necessary before a decision on the best way to solve this problem could be made.

6. Once the Geneva-type conference has been convened, its first task would be to see that Saigon and the National Liberation Front reach agreement on the formation of a Vietnamese Provisional Executive to maintain temporary administration of South Vietnam with the help of an international presence. This would then be an interim government. As this government took control, American troops would withdraw to three or four enclaves. The presence of the United States in such enclaves would tend to restrain certain militant elements from attempting to sabotage the possibility of negotiations by threats against the negotiators, provocative acts such as bombing raids against the north, or the mass execution of prisoners. Such a presence would also be of help in guaranteeing us reprisals against members of the Saigon regime and its armed forces or against the general populace. The United States must also be prepared to provide temporary sanctuaries

in the enclaves under its control for refugees who fear reprisals once the United States has left.

7. The provisional government would thus be responsible for conducting elections. Under the surveillance of the international presence it would also be responsible for the demobilization or neutralization of armed forces on both sides and the withdrawal of all outside forces. It is at this time that the United States would dismantle its bases and effect the complete evacuation of its troops from the country.

8. It may be that even after negotiations are concluded certain elements in South Vietnam may still feel unsafe. These political refugees would probably be in the United States enclaves already, and the United States would owe an obligation to them. A precedent is already at hand in the case of the Cuban refugees. Special legislation could be enacted to bring them into this country. Other Asian nations could be invited to forego their annual quota of emigrants for a year, so that Vietnamese could be brought to America with minimal legal difficulties. This would be an expensive proposition. But the war is being conducted now, and at much larger expense, partially to protect our allies and friends in Vietnam. Whenever hostilities terminate we must take up our peace-time responsibility to

9. The final act of the conference should be an international agreement guaranteeing the neutralization of Vietnam with no outside interference, including the sending of military missions or establishing of military bases. Major questions such as reunification should be left to the Vietnamese after the establishment of a permanent government in South Vietnam/ and the return to relative stability. It should be made clear that nothing in the agreement precludes eventual reunification of north and south with elections to be held for this purpose whenever the Vietnamese decide to do so.

10. In a statement released by President Johnson on June 1, 1965 concerning his special request to Congress for funds to help in the peaceful economic and social development of Southeast Asia he pointed out:

The sixteen million people of South Vietnam survive on an average income of \$100 per year. More than sixty per cent of the people have never learned to read and write. When disease strikes, medical care is often impossible to find. There is only one doctor for every 20,000 people -- compared with one for every 750 in the United States. This poverty and neglect take their inevitable toll in human life. The life expectancy is only 35 years -- about half that in our own country.

To this indigenous problem has now been added the fantastic destruction of modern war. The American people not only have a great responsibility to assist in the repair of the damage wrought to both South and North Vietnam by the war but it is also imperative that we do so if we are to keep this area from becoming an explosive center for bitter anti-Americanism in the future. This will require vast amounts of United States aid. But this aid must be openly extended with no strings attached, preferably through an international organization such as the Asian Development Bank. The Mekong River project should be given immediate and full support.

In general, the United States will have to seek means to facilitate the economic and social revolution in the entire area, not as part of a tactic to "stop communism" but as part of an enlightened program of dealing with the present problems of the area.



**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

January 27, 1966

FRIENDS PEACE COMMITTEE

CONFERENCE AND VIGIL ON  
UNITED STATES ACTION IN VIETNAM,  
FEBRUARY 11 - 14, 1966,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[REDACTED], "A Call to Friends Conference and Vigil - February 11-14, 1966, Washington, D. C.," issued by the Friends Peace Committee (FPC), 1520 Race Street, Philadelphia 2, Pa., in connection with the Friends Coordinating Committee on Peace (FCCP), 245 Second Street, Northeast, Washington 2, D. C. The call also contains an appeal for funds and states that "Friends are urged to stay at the Sheraton-Park Hotel which will be the Conference headquarters. If enough rooms are rented there will be no expense for Conference meeting rooms, which without hotel patronage would add about \$1500 to the Conference budget."

Copy of the program and call to the conference and vigil in part follows:

100-11392-

ENCLOSURE

# CONFERENCE AND VIGIL—February 11-14 Washington, D.C.

To become informed about the problems in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.  
 To reaffirm our opposition to all war and urge the cessation of bombing and war in Vietnam.  
 To worship together in the Light and seek strength for these times.  
 To witness to the life and power that takes away the occasion of all wars.

## PROGRAM

**Friday, February 11**

4:00-7:30 p.m.

7:30-9:30 p.m.

Chairman, Herbert Huffman, Secretary, Board of Christian Social Service, Friends United Meeting

Registration: Conference headquarters, Sheraton-Park Hotel, 2660 Woodley Road, Washington, D.C.

*Our challenge as Quakers and citizens*  
*Friends facing the challenge of war today—*

Samuel Levering, Chairman, Board of Christian Social Service, Friends United Meeting

*New policy approaches in Southeast Asia—*  
 Stephen C. Cary, Associate Sec'y, The American Friends Service Committee

Chairman, Lyle Tatum, Secretary, Farmers and World Affairs, and Friends Peace Committee, Philadelphia

Meeting for worship

*Understanding the problem in Southeast Asia*

*How the Asians regard U.S. policy—*

Speaker to be announced later

*How shall the United States deal with Communism?—*

Holland Hunter, Economist, Co-Author: *Economies of the World*

*A fresh approach to a negotiated settlement in Vietnam—*

Speaker to be announced later

Lunch in hotel or nearby restaurants

Chairman, George Sawyer, Attorney, Richmond, Indiana

Consideration of concerns—those sent in by individuals, other Quaker groups, those presented from the audience

Five workshops, based on concerns presented at above sessions

Supper and rest period—special concern groups may wish to meet

*A summing up and looking to the Source of power*

Chairman, George Corwin, Executive Sec'y, Friends General Conference

Summary reports of five workshop groups and discussion

*"Strengthen with Might by His Spirit"*—Dorothy Hutchinson

Abington Monthly Meeting, International Chairman of Womens League for Peace and Freedom

*A day of worship and witness*

Unscheduled. We can facilitate interest groups getting together

Meeting for Worship at Sheraton-Park Hotel

Some Friends may wish to attend Meetings in the Washington area

Walk as a group from hotel to Lafayette Park, across from the V

Stand in silent worship in Lafayette Park. The only signs will identify the group. An orderly shift will be arranged so that no

stand more than one hour at a time

Free time

Chairman, E. Raymond Wilson, Secretary Emeritus, Friends Central Conference for National Legislation

Further sharing of concerns and briefing for next day's visitation

Visitation to members of Congress and Administration

Conference headquarters for day, 245 Second Street, N.E.—office

**Saturday, February 12**

*morning*

8:30

9:00-12:30

*afternoon*

12:30-2:00

2:00-3:30

3:30-5:00

5:00-7:30

*evening*

7:30-8:30

8:30-9:30

**Sunday, February 13**

9:00-10:30

10:30-11:30

12:30-2:00

2:00-4:00

4:00-7:00

7:00-8:30

**Monday, February 14**

## FRIENDS CONFERENCE AND VIGIL

ARE WE SENSITIVE  
TO THE SUFFERING  
AND SLAUGHTER  
IN VIETNAM?

IN VIETNAM the bodies of men, women and children are exposed to maiming, burning and slaughter. Hatred smolders and erupts, corroding mind and spirit. Frantic military escalation by both sides has immersed South and North Vietnam in a caldron of tears and blood. The destruction threatens to spread to all mankind. This is the obscene face of war. As members of the Religious Society of Friends and citizens of the United States, have we done all we can to stop the war, bind up the wounds and restore peace?

DO WE UNDERSTAND  
THE PROBLEMS  
INVOLVED?

The causes of war in Vietnam and the power struggle there are complex. We do not pretend to know all the answers. We need to inform ourselves about the problems. We need to consider how threatened humanity can best be served in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

DO WE HONOR  
OUR HERITAGE  
AS CITIZENS  
AND  
QUAKERS?

The United States is not exempt from the ravages of violence. The war is not only destroying fellow human beings in Vietnam; dependence on force and violence in our relations with other nations is weakening the moral fiber and mutilating the souls of people in the United States as well. The United States, with its unprecedented military power, repeatedly finds itself opposing the tides of revolution and change in Asia, Africa and South America.

The early Quakers suffered much in order that freedom of religion and of the spirit might be established in America. They pioneered in an Holy Experiment of free men in the government of colonial Pennsylvania. As their spiritual descendants we find ourselves enmeshed in policies which suppress the aspirations of people in many parts of the globe. We must seek how to break out of this entanglement and help our country live up to its true heritage.

DO WE LIVE  
IN THAT LIFE  
AND POWER?

Traditionally Friends have been opposed to all war. Their faith was not in military weapons and threats of retaliation to prevent war or bring peace. Today when the leaders of our government, with the support of most of the people, are invoking military power as the arbiter of human destiny, it is doubly important that we Quakers publicly proclaim, once again, our opposition to all militarism and war, and work for viable alternatives for solving international conflicts.

Our Quaker peace testimony, at its best, has not been satisfied merely to denounce war and refuse to participate in it. We must be able to assert with George Fox and other great Friends, "I told them . . . that I lived in the virtue of that life and power that took away the occasion of all wars." For, unless we do, in experience, live in the life and power of the Inward Christ, our opposition to war may become confused verbalism; our professions for peace may become escape from responsibility; our loyalty to God and mankind may become diluted with support for the power interests of one nation; and our economic affluence will dull our conscience, while poverty and suffering plague much of mankind.

DO WE SHARE  
AND TEST  
OUR CONCERNS  
AND LEADINGS  
IN THE LIGHT?

We call you to join with other Quakers in a program of worship, study and witness in our nation's capital. May we seek to bring our spirit, mind, will and strength into the spirit of Christ. Friends are encouraged to send their concerns on these issues to the Friends Coordinating Committee on Peace; these will be considered in planning the corporate sharing at the conference and worship sessions. Minutes from Monthly Meetings or other Friends groups will be especially welcome.

Called by  
**FRIENDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON PEACE**

*A consultative and action group of representatives from several Yearly Meetings and Quaker organizations, including American Friends Service Committee, Friends Committee on National Legislation, American Section of Friends World Committee for Consultation, Young Friends of North America, Board of Christian Social Service of Friends United Meeting, and Peace and Social Order Committee of Friends General Conference.*

Xen Harvey, Chairman

George C. Hardin, Secretary

The "Daily Worker," New York, on December 21, 1955, in an article captioned, "Mrs. FDR and 41 Others Call for Smith Act Trials Amnesty, Halt" reflects that a petition for a "Christmas amnesty" for Communist Party (CP) leaders convicted under the Smith Act "commuting the sentence of 16 men and women now in prison to time already served," and a plea for postponement of trial in the more than 100 cases now pending either in trial courts or appeals courts, have been sent to President EISENHOWER at Gettysburg. [REDACTED]

APPENDIX

Characterization of Organizations

EMERGENCY CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications", revised and published as of December 1, 1961, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives, documents the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee as follows:

"To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the \* \* \* Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. When the Communist Party itself is under fire, these fronts offer a bulwark of protection."

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate  
Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans,  
S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91)

A source advised December 21, 1957 and January 6, 1958 that LEONARD BOUDIN, constitutional lawyer and legal counsel for Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, made a speech December 20, 1957, accepting the Philadelphia Associates as a group to work with the national organization. This occurred at a Bill Rights Day celebration sponsored by the Philadelphia Associates, Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, at the Adelphia Hotel, Philadelphia.

A second source advised on May 23, 1962 that the Philadelphia Associates have not been active in the past two years, have no current active membership and do not maintain a headquarters in Philadelphia.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SAC, Oklahoma City

1/31/66

Director, FBI

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*IT*  
*W*

~~STUDENT RELIGIOUS LIBERALS~~  
INFORMATION CONCERNING  
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reurlet 1/19/66.

100-11392

The American Friends Service Committee is a nonprofit organization founded in 1917 by the Society of Friends (Quakers).

You failed to submit sufficient identifying data on the individuals mentioned in relet to enable a check of Bureau indices concerning them. Obtain identifying data and resubmit your request for a check of Bureau files.

BAV:pdb  
(4)

NOTE:

Captioned group is attempting to obtain a charter from Oklahoma State University. It has requested that a representative of the American Friends Service Committee speak before it in the near future. Oklahoma City asked for any pertinent information regarding the American Friends Service Committee and several individuals connected with captioned group. No identifying information concerning the individuals, who have common names, was submitted by that office.

MAILED 4  
JAN 28 1966  
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- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Wick \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

50 FEB 7 1966

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PAGE TWO

JACKSON MISS. THERE WERE TO BE NO BANNERS OR  
POSTERS ON OR IN THE CARS.

FIFTEEN INDIVIDUALS MOSTLY SENIORS AND GRADUATE STUD

WERE TO MAKE UP THE ABOVE GROUP.

~~REDACTED~~ OF THE HOUSTON TEX OFFICE AMERICAN  
FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE WILL MEET THE GROUP IN JACKSON  
MISS. TONIGHT.

A MEMBER OF THE FACULTY OF THE MILLSAP COLLEGE IS  
TO BE IN CHARGE OF THE WORK CAMP IN VALLEY VIEW, MISS.

THE DIRECTOR OF THE COMMUNITY CENTER AND A MEMBER OF  
THE MENNONITE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ARE GOING TO PARTICIPATE  
IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY AT THE CAMP.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, JACKSON,  
MISS. IS ALSO TO SPEAK BEFORE THE GROUP.

END

~~CORR P 1 LINE 11 SXX WD. 2 IS VALLEY AND LIXX PC. 2 DISREGARD~~

~~LINE FEED IN MIDDLE AND 2ND LAST LINE 3RD WD. IS CENTRAL~~

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*cc Mr. Parkins*

APR 11 1954  
RECEIVED



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Antonio, Texas

February 4, 1966

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

TRAVEL OF FOURTEEN STUDENTS  
FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS  
TO JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, AREA,  
JANUARY 28, 1966 - FEBRUARY 4,  
1966, RACIAL MATTER

On January 28, 1966, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Austin, ascer-  
tained that a group sponsored by the University YMCA and  
YWCA, Austin, Texas, is going to the American Friends  
Service Committee Work Camp, Valley View, Northeast Office,  
Jackson, Mississippi, also known as Rural Work Camp. The  
group from Austin is going only during the mid-semester  
break and will return to Austin when the University opens  
for the second semester, 1965-66. It is the intention  
that the program will continue as students are available,  
especially during the summer of 1966. Ten students left  
Austin, Texas, from the University YMCA building in The  
University of Texas area in two cars at 6:00 a.m., January  
28, 1966. A third group left at noon on January 28, 1966,  
from the same place. The three cars are to travel Highway  
79 to Shreveport, Louisiana, and Highway 80 to Jackson,  
Mississippi. There were to be no banners on the outside  
of the automobiles or posters inside the automobiles.

COPIES DESTROYED

5 AUG 23 1973

100-11392-437  
ENCLOSURE

A member of the faculty of the Millsap College is to be in charge of the work camp in Valley View, Mississippi.

The Director of the Community Center and a member of the Mennonite Central Committee are going to participate in an administrative capacity at the camp.

The President of the Chamber of Commerce, Jackson, Mississippi, is also to speak before the group.

There is some indication that one John Henry Young may be included in the above group from Austin, Texas.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

THE  
FACTS  
ABOUT THE  
WAR IN VIET NAM

On April 20, 1965, George Beebe, president of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, stated that the American people were not getting "the full story or the true story" of the war in Vietnam. He went on to say that "editors of this country do object to the contradictions, the double-talk and half-truths that the press is getting, both in Washington and Saigon. . . . In an undeclared war, the United States press in Vietnam faces stronger restrictions than it ever has in wartime."

Our study group believes that Canadians are entitled to know the facts about the war in Vietnam, and wish to do so. This belief has been strengthened by the response to this pamphlet, which has been widely reproduced in Canadian daily, weekly and quarterly publications; has been reprinted in pamphlet form in New Zealand and has, in French and in Japanese translations, acquired a wide circulation in other countries.

October, 21, 1965

PUBLISHED BY  
A SPECIAL STUDY GROUP ON VIET NAM  
OF THE  
VICTORIA BRANCH  
OF THE  
WORLD FEDERALISTS OF CANADA

(Not a Publication of the National Office)

First Edition, March 31, 1965—10,000 Copies

Second Edition, May 25, 1965—7,500 Copies

Third Edition

Additional copies of this pamphlet may be obtained for 25 cents each, 3 for One Dollar, or 20 for Three Dollars from Dr. E. H. Richardson, Chairman Viet Nam Study Group, 4497 Arsens Place, Victoria, B.C., Canada.

COPIES DESTROYED

5 AUG 23 1973

ENCLOSURE

100-11722-440

## FOREWORD

As a life-long admirer of the United States, my views and convictions must necessarily be regarded as prejudiced in their favour. In the Americans, I believe, lies the great hope of humanity—an orderly generation and advancement of material and spiritual values.

In the past, the U.S. has provided ample evidence of a capacity for effective, decisive leadership and her generation—though often not entirely devoid of softness—was unprepared in recent history.

In the lives of all of us at some time there is an unfortunate, unguided hour which, if exposed to antipathetic scrutiny, could stigmatize us forever, basically worthy and decent individuals though we may be.

The United States is passing through such an hour now in Viet Nam. The sympathetic, constructive advice of a friend may be helpful, whereas angry criticisms and uninformal revellings could well extend the hour and increase the danger. I believe that this paper, together with its conclusions and recommendations, is presented in the former spirit.

The somewhat stark presentation of information concerning the United States conduct of their operations in Viet Nam may be unpalatable to some, perhaps even offensive, but the facts, in the main, correspond with my own observations and impressions in North and South Viet Nam between 1961 and 1965.

However, in my view of the picture, the Communists appear darker, the Americans lighter. But, I admit, I am not impartial. And I think that the same may be said of most Western observers—a point which should be borne in mind when evaluating Western reports, from whatever source. Euphemistic reportage is the rule rather than the exception. Distortion and suppression of news is not uncommon on both sides. However, some Communist lies are uniquely horrible, and villifying in the extreme.

Non-military examples of the opposing propaganda techniques might be the United States Information Services' report of the shocking bombing of the Brink Hotel in Saigon on Christmas Eve and an earlier Hanoi report on the depravity of American forces in Saigon.

According to the U.S.I.S. story, two American officers were killed, seventy-five injured and sixty-eight Vietnamese injured. The North American public was spared the additional shock of learning the details concerning the identity and profession of the Viet Namese.

The Hanoi report, which I can still repeat verbatim, was: "American officers and the Diem clique daily scour the streets of Saigon to prey upon young girls. They take the Viet Namese maidens to their quarters, reap (sic) them, disembowel them, suck the blood from their livers, and cruelly beat them about the breasts with clubs". This report, which depicts all American officers as sadistic fiends, is a vicious lie and so fantastic as to remain in the memory forever, but it is presumably an effective means of instilling fear and hatred in the minds of simple people. Atrocities have been committed on both sides but American officers present at the not infrequent disembowelings have not condoned them, but felt powerless to intervene.

No, I would color the Communists' propaganda darker.  
And we Canadians deserve no colour at all.

As a member of the International Control Commission, charged with the grave responsibility of ensuring adherence to the terms of the Geneva agreement of 1954, we have conducted ourselves with a singular degree of spinelessness.

Behaving like affable mediators when the task clearly demanded hard-nosed policemen who would act without fear or favour, we watched the gradual disintegration of potentially peaceful conditions and remained silent. So silent that not even the Canadian public was aware of our continued presence in Viet Nam.

Now, after 13 years, we submit a minority report—such as it is. And we still lack the guts to call a spade a spade!

Our contribution towards peace in the Far East has been a sorry one indeed and this consideration should temper our criticism of others—however justified—with a becoming humility.

But the criticism should be voiced and the facts made known, while there is yet time. If there is.

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July 1961 - March 1963

# THE FACTS ABOUT THE WAR IN VIET NAM

In calling for negotiations to stop the fighting in Viet Nam, U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, stated:

"Surely the only American people who can insist on the right to the Government of their country in Viet Nam are those who have not followed a unilateral policy of intervention and expansion since they have enabled the U.S. to withdraw gracefully from that part of the world." (*Washington Star*, Feb. 24, 1955.)

The obvious implication of this statement is that the government of the United States has contrived the truth about its military operations in Viet Nam from its own people.

The official American justification for its policies in South Viet Nam rests on four main arguments:

1. The Americans claim that they have a "right" to be there—that they were invited by the Government of South Viet Nam.
2. They state that this government represents the people of South Viet Nam, while the Viet Cong are "communist terrorists".
3. They claim that North Viet Nam has been guilty of "aggression" against South Viet Nam.
4. The United States, which originally defended air strikes against North Vietnam as retaliatory, now has abandoned this fiction, and speaks of them as pressure necessary to force North Vietnam into "unconditional discussions" to end the war.

The purpose of this paper is to examine these arguments in the light of the facts, and so to determine whether U Thant's charges are justified.

## 1. The Americans have a legal right to be in South Viet Nam

In 1940, Indochina, which had been harshly administered by France for 56 years, was put at the disposal of the Japanese invader by Governor-General Decoux, an Axis-sympathizer. In the war against Japan, our only allies in Indochina were guerrilla forces led by Ho Chi Minh, which by 1945 were in control of the country with the Japanese and French military forces confined to barracks. A constitution was drafted, elections held, the French puppet Emperor Bao Dai agreed to abdicate in favor of the Viet Minh, and Ho Chi Minh became premier of all Viet Nam as leader of a coalition government. The nation enjoyed only a few weeks of peace and independence before the arrival of European forces, when the French re-conquest began.

The forces loyal to Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh, led by General Giap, fought to drive the French out of Indochina. France had at its command an army of half a million men, massive financial aid from the United States, and complete mastery of the air. However, the Viet Minh had the support of the mass of the populace and were finally victorious. This victory further enhanced the popularity of Ho Chi Minh, a Communist and a Nationalist, as a Vietnamese leader who had succeeded in driving a brutal, oppressive colonial power from Indochina. President Eisenhower commented that the "mass of the population supported the enemy" (Viet Minh) to their military advantage and that

"It was almost impossible to make the average Vietnamese realize that the French, under whose rule he had lived for some eighty years, were really fighting to free him."

In 1954 a peace conference was convened and dictated by Britain and the Soviet Union, and invited great powers invited to participate. The conference made an arbitrary and temporary division of Viet Nam at the 17th parallel, with the Viet Minh army drawing north of the line, and the French to the south. This was to enable the French armies to leave Viet Nam without surrendering, and was to be for a two-year only. The agreement stated "This demarcation is provisional, and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." (1)

In two years' time, in July, 1956, a national election was to be held by secret ballot, supervised by representatives of the International Control Commission, and Viet Nam to be reunited under a central government. The Geneva Agreements banned reprisals, and prohibited military interference with other nations, or any increase in foreign personnel or armaments. It must be emphasized that the Great Powers which signed these agreements declared that Vietnam was one sovereign nation.

The United States had been involved in Viet Nam since 1947 when it began to give military and economic aid to France; at the end of the war this had exceeded \$2.5 billion—80% of the cost of the war. It brought pressure on France to extend the war, and in its final year John Dulles twice offered nuclear bombs to the French government. (2) The United States participated in the Geneva Conference but refused to sign the agreements; its policy to sabotage the conference are described in Author's memoirs, "Full Circle". However, it publicly promised to "refrain from the threat or use of force" to disrupt the agreements. (3)

The provisional government in the southern half of the divided country was headed by Bao Dai, who had a "puppet" emperor under both the French and the Americans, and was universally detested. Ngo Dinh Diem had sat out the war in the United States and in 1954, three months after the agreements were signed, installed in Saigon to direct a puppet government. The United States. There was much opposition. On November 17, General Collins, who was President Eisenhower's special representative in South Viet Nam, issued an ultimatum—the South Vietnamese army would receive more American aid unless it supported Diem. (4) (*Contemporary Archives*, 1955, p. 14849). From that time on, the need for American aid kept the army in place, the army removed or installed rulers in accordance with their degree of subservience to United States policies.

There was no question in anyone's mind that Diem, who was virtually unknown in Vietnam, was an American appointee. Guy La Chambre, Minister for France in the United States, told the French Assembly: "France supported the government of Ngo Dinh Diem at the instance of the United States."

(1) Documents on International Affairs: Oxford University Press.  
(2) Diary of the British: Eleanor Drummond and Gordon Cook, New York, 1964.  
(3) *Contemporary Archives*, 1955, p. 14849.  
(4) *Contemporary Archives*, 1955, p. 14849.

United States" (New York Times, Dec. 28, 1954). Sam Cassin, senior editor of *Look* magazine, was more explicit: "John Foster Dulles picked him, Senator Mike Mansfield endorsed him, Cardinal Spellman picked him, Vice-President Nixon liked him, and President Eisenhower chose him" (Jan. 29, 1964).

In 1955 a referendum was held which was described as "stipulated" over in the Geneva agreement (New York Times, Dec. 28, 1954). It was held in the South, but the results were never published. Later it was announced that the referendum was a sham, and that the people of Vietnam had spoken, and were, of course, recognizing their decision" (New York Times, Oct. 25, 1955).

Immediately Diem began to receive massive military aid from the United States, in violation of the Geneva agreements. Diem proceeded to cut off all trade with the north, and proclaimed his refusal to accept the agreement for a nation-wide election. Instead, he used his police and troops against groups favouring union, jailing their leaders without trial and firing on demonstrators.

With American funds, he opened a military academy to train a new army, with the slogan "We will march to the North".

These open violations of the Geneva agreements not only received American support, but they were in effect an extension of American policy in Viet Nam.

General de Gaulle commented: "It is known that Diem did not carry out the elections which were scheduled in 1956, and that in all fields, particularly in defense, economy and administration, he obeyed Washington." (Newsweek, July, 1964.)

The reasons for American opposition to a national election are spelled out in the memoirs of General Eisenhower. He states that every expert whom he consulted agreed that if an election was held possibly 80% of the people of both North and South would vote for the coalition of parties under Ho Chi Minh. (14)

As for reprisals, the International Control Commission in the first year of the Diem regime itemized 519 losses of human life in the South, and commented that it was able to investigate only a small minority of the large number of incidents brought to its attention. There are no reports of reprisals in the North. The first nine reports listed a whole series of violations by Diem, and reports 8, 9, 10 stated that American arms were pouring in to his government in direct violation of the agreements. As against this, U Thant stated emphatically:

"There was not one single instance . . . let me repeat . . . not one single instance of North Vietnamese providing military assistance or arms to the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam in 1954 or 1955 . . ."

The facts of the situation show that the "government" of South Viet Nam has had no legal basis since the deposition of Bao Dai. It was created and continues to exist in violation of the Geneva Conference. Far from being "invited" into

(14) Mandate for Change: Dwight Eisenhower, Doubleday, New York, 1964. For general background information on "The Other Side of the River" by Edgar Snow, Random House, New York, 1962. The full story of how Diem was placed in office by the United States is told in: How the United States Got Involved in Viet Nam, by Edgar Snow, Published by the Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, 1968.

South Viet Nam by its legal government, the created this government, and have used it for purposes ever since.

11. The Government of South Viet Nam represents the people; the Viet Cong are "communist terrorists".

When the Communists have pointed out the gross inequalities in Viet Nam, even in the southern part of the country, where there is starvation and where the rich and the poor, never has the Communists had more than 5% of its people. Its base was army officers, civil servants and businessmen who had dealings with the French, and businessmen and officials making profitable contacts with the United States.

It had the support of large numbers of Roman Catholic refugees from the north, who had fought against the Communists on the side of the French. Their move to the south was directed and financed by the United States.

Diem is now generally admitted to have been a fascist in his mentality and in his methods of rule. In the early years, before popular opposition to him became too strong to be ignored, he was hailed as "the American Churchill" by no less a person than Lyndon B. Johnson, who was acclaimed by President Eisenhower for "his leadership in the cause of the free world."

From the beginning his government was an extension of American policy, with 75% of its budget obtained from American aid and economic and military aid pouring in at a rate of \$1.5 to \$2 million a day. (As the *London Times* pointed out (Sept., 1964) "Anyone put in power by the United States would automatically forfeit any hope of mass support. Despite this lavish aid, the government of South Viet Nam has never solved the problems of poverty and unemployment. Extremes of wealth and poverty, gambling, prostitution, dismal slums and luxurious places of entertainment, widespread graft and corruption characterize the regime.

As the Mansfield Senate Subcommittee pointed out in 1960 (and the situation has not changed since then):

"The military aid program has had first and foremost a dominant role in aid funds. In fact the non-military programs were developed largely in response to the military and continue to operate primarily on that basis. By far the greatest part of the so-called economic aid in Viet Nam takes the form of defense supplies. Hence, has been channeled indirectly into the military aid program."

In the *New York Herald Tribune* (Feb. 1964) General Khanh publicly boasted that he had \$100 million in foreign banks. Other leading figures of the Diem regime have been found to be using U.S. funds for their own gain; there have been many such scandals.

From the beginning, the government of South Viet Nam has been a military dictatorship. There is no freedom of speech or press. Thousands of opponents of the regime have been arrested and imprisoned without trial. Opposition parties have been outlawed. The persecution, torture and killing of the Buddhists, which received wide publicity and led to the fall of Diem, was an example of his methods of dealing with all political opponents. It is interesting to note that Diem's security policies were carried on the anti-Buddhist campaign, received

grant of \$5 millions yearly from the Americans, through the C.I.A.)

On November 21, 1960, *Time* magazine commented: "Pleading the Communist threat, Diem has ruled with a tight fist on a censored press, and political repression camp. His net worth \$1,000."

At the beginning Diem had control over the cities. When he began to move into the villages, at first he had some success. But opposition to his policies developed as the peasants realized that he refused to hold national elections and reunify the country, and that he was contemplating an army for a new war—this time against the north. The landlords, who had been refugees in Saigon, moved back to the countryside to claim land which had been taken over by the peasants during the war. In some cases these landlords, backed up by police and troops, even demanded payment of back rent. As opposition grew, the Diem police became more brutal. Hugo Devillers, a Catholic anti-communist observer, wrote in *The China Quarterly* (March, 1962):

"A certain sequence of events became almost classical: denunciation, encirclement of villages, raids, arrests, plundering, interrogations enlivened by torture, deportation and regrouping of the populace."

Tens of thousands were arrested, tortured, imprisoned without trial. These were the tactics of desperation and failed to achieve their objectives. Opposition grew, and led in 1960 to the formation of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong. So overwhelming was the support for this movement that in two years' time it had taken over control of 80% of the countryside.<sup>(4)</sup>

Far from being a group of communist "terrorists", the National Liberation Front is a broad organization including almost all political and religious opponents of the Diem dictatorship. Its thirty-one-member central committee is headed by a non-communist lawyer who had spent years in Saigon prisons for his defence of civil rights. Represented are leading Buddhists, Catholics and Protestants, as well as business men and representatives of the three leading opposition parties. Its programme is far from communist in tone—it calls for peace, withdrawal of United States armed forces, democratic elections and eventual reunification with the north around a policy of neutralism.

The actual civil war in Vietnam broke out long before the formation of the National Liberation Front, and was between the Diem regime and the armies of various anti-communist religious sects, some of which have since joined the National Liberation Front forces. It has been pointed out by many competent observers that the National Liberation Front was an indigenous movement growing out of widespread opposition to the Saigon government, and received little of any but moral support from North Vietnam. Apparently there is some bitterness in its ranks over the strict neutrality observed by North Vietnam in the early years of its existence. Hanoi explained this neutrality as necessary in order to avoid violation of the terms of the Geneva Agreements.

The American Government has confirmed this in a State Department White Paper issued in October, 1961:

"Recently the Save the Children Fund appealed for aid for the starving children of South Viet Nam."  
(4) "Vietnam: A Country at War", by Robert Sargis, Atlas Bureau, January 1962.

"It was the Communists' calculation that nationwide elections scheduled in the Accords for would turn all of Viet Nam over to them... primary focus of the Communists' activity during post-Genoa period was of political action... Hanoi's role... Hanoi's political program for Viet had been aimed at precisely this goal."

Devillers reported that the Communists in the entered the fight reluctantly, not on orders from Hanoi, but in response to the terror campaign that had been conducted against former members of Viet Minh the time he first assumed power in 1954. "The initiative before the Communists decided to take power they were simply forced to join in. And even among Communists the initiative did not originate in Hanoi from the classrooms, where the people were literally to take up arms in self-defense." (*The China Quarterly*, March, 1962.)

Many qualified neutral and American observers confirmed the mass support for the forces of the National Liberation Front, which now controls and administers most of the territory of South Viet Nam. It is of this popular support, essential to success in warfare, that the United States has been forced to policy of mass extermination of the civilian population. The *New York Times* reported on June 6:

As the Communists withdrew last Monday U.S. jet bombers pounded the hills into which they headed. Many Vietnamese—one estimate as high as 500—were killed by the strikes. The American intention is that they were Viet Cong soldiers. But out of four patients seeking hospital treatment wards for burns from napalm were village women.

A Reuter's despatch, published in the *Victorian* March 18, 1965:

"Forty-eight persons, including 45 children, killed Wednesday when South Vietnamese air planes bombed a village [five miles from the U.S. air base] at Da Nang. It was regarded as Communist-controlled despite its nearness to the U.S."

Heavy civilian casualties have resulted frequently from air strikes on hamlets where Viet Cong, believed to be operating." (Italics ours).

On March 7th the *New York Times* reported Saigon that officially registered Vietnamese deaths from bombing rose from 276 in January, 1964, to 1,100 in November, and have exceeded 1,000 in each month. "For some time," the despatch continued, "the attack has been that if a village supports the Vietcong, the planes are culpable." An American officer was quoted "Some civilians get killed. Civilians get killed in every village."

American newspapermen have been barred from Da Nang Air Base. But they have reported that American planes are systematically bombing villages in both North and South Viet Nam, using napalm and phosphorus as well as conventional explosives. According to *Washington Post News Service*, March 4th, "U.S. planes are given a square marked on a map and told to bomb a hamlet within the area." "I killed 40 Vietcong, one pilot told the Associated Press on March 3rd. The number they told me were in the village, anything I levelled it."

There have been many changes in the personnel of the Saigon regime since the fall of Diem. None of these resulted in democratic reforms; on the contrary, with each coup a small clique of military officers have seized tighter control. Their current spokesman, General Ky, told the British press, "I don't ask me who my hero would have only one—Adolf Hitler." In a recent CBS television interview this chairman of the free world discredited the possibility of a government coming into office in Saigon which might ask the Americans for aid. General Maxwell Taylor agrees with this and pointed out that even if this did take place, the generals would quickly suppress such a government. General Taylor neglected to add that these generals had been on the payroll of the United States since 1954, and that they are being kept in power, not by any popular support, but through a massive American military invasion of their country.

### III. "North Viet Nam is the Aggressor"

This charge by the United States has been so widely repeated that it will come as a shock to most readers to learn that there never has been any evidence that the North Vietnamese or the Chinese are "the aggressors" in the war being waged by the United States in Vietnam.

In fact, all available evidence, including the Waite Paper issued by the U.S. State Department to justify its air raids on North Vietnam, points the other way.

The invasion of the North has always been an avowed aim of the South Viet Nam military dictatorship since the days of Diem. The Americans have been deeply involved in this aim. They have assisted by violating territorial waters of North Viet Nam, (the Tonkin Gulf "attack" on U.S. ships came while they were in North Viet Nam territorial waters within three to eleven miles from shore, and while South Viet Nam vessels were shelling North Viet Nam positions on islands off its coast). American planes have violated North Viet Nam air space on reconnaissance flights, dropping "special troops" by parachute, and in small scale bombing raids long before the United States openly admitted its air attacks.

The pattern is remarkably consistent. The American Government at first denies such acts of aggression, and then is forced to admit them and claim that they are justified. But there is no justification for bombing North Viet Nam towns and villages. A hospital and school were hit on the first big raid.

European correspondents on the scene have confirmed many of North Viet Nam's claims that civilian targets—schools, hospitals, dwelling places, irrigation dams—have been attacked by U.S. bombers. One large leper hospital was completely destroyed in two successive days of bombing raids.

It is ironic that four months before the openly admitted attacks took place Adlai Stevenson told the U.N. Security Council that the U.S. had "repeatedly expressed" its emphatic disapproval of retaliatory raids "wherever they occur and by whomever they are committed." (*J. F. Stone's Weekly*, Aug. 24, 1964). The United States has been directly and indirectly involved in acts of aggression for many years not only against North Viet Nam, but against Laos and Cambodia as well. (4)

(4) See *The Invisible Government* by David Wise and Thomas E. Ruge, Random House, New York, 1964; and *A Nation of Sheep* by William J. Lederer, W. W. Norton, New York, 1962.

Writing in the *New York Times* (June 27, 1964), C. L. Sulzberger, a supporter of American policy in Indochina, had this to say:

"In 1961 a South Viet Nam 'Five Opera Group' was established under U.S. direction to conduct secret operations in North Viet Nam. News of these operations in Laos, we understand, backing them up with air support. The problem is that the forces dropped in North Viet Nam were unable to establish any base. They had no support from the local population, were quickly reported to the main authorities, and were wiped out."

(This last statement is odd in view of the American claim that the Ho Chi Minh regime is a "shaky dictatorship", and his people are yearning for "liberation.")

*Aviation Week* (April 6, 1964) reveals the technique used to disguise open American intervention:

"An air cargo company, Air America, is the principal instrument for the extension of the war in Cambodia and North Vietnam. This company has 200 aircraft . . . it is airlifting South Vietnamese special troops to various places. These are under the command of U.S. Army General Paul D. Harkins, and the pilots are former U.S. military pilots."

No one denies that fighting men and weapons are being sent to the north have found their way to the Viet Cong.

It must be emphasized that this infiltration has been going on at least until very recently, on a very small scale. Even if that, there is no evidence whatever to substantiate American claims that large numbers of North Vietnamese are fleeing to the south. Furthermore, infiltration did not begin until after the N.L.F. forces in the south were engaged in their war against the American invaders. The U.S. State Department White Paper of October, 1961, admitted that the bulk of the Viet Cong were South Vietnamese peasants and that their weapons were "largely French or U.S. or hand-made on primitive forges in the jungles."

Writing the same year RAND Corporation researcher George Tanham reported that:

"the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail is no more than a series of paths . . . and not suitable for large shipments. . . . The Communists have been fighting largely with home-made weapons and with such material of French and American make as they have been able to steal or capture." (Quoted in Robert Schimmelfennig, *How the United States Got Involved in Viet Nam*)

General Paul D. Harkins, who plays a leading role in the South Viet Nam, stated in the *Washington Post* (Jan. 3, 1963):

"The guerrillas are not being reinforced or systematically supplied from North Vietnam, China or anywhere else. They depend for weapons primarily on whatever they can capture."

David Halberstam, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on Vietnam, stated in the *New York Times* (March 6, 1964):

"The war is largely a conflict of southerners for southern land. No capture of North Vietnamese territory in the south has come to light, and it is generally believed that most Viet Cong weapons have been seized from the South Vietnamese (government) forces."

The *New York World Telegram* stated (Jan. 5, 1964):

There is not one shred of evidence that the weapons used by the Viet Cong originate in the north. At the outset the Viet Cong used crude homemade weapons but the bulk of their arms now are captured or otherwise acquired from the woefully impotent defenders of South Viet Nam.

Senator William Morse of Oregon has exposed US of State involvement in Viet Nam from the beginning. On the subject of alleged "aggression" from the north he has stated unequivocally in the Senate that he has repeatedly cross-examined witnesses from the Pentagon and State Department and has always received the answer that there are no military personnel in South Viet Nam from North Viet Nam, China, Laos, Cambodia or anywhere else. When he asked the question: "Are the Viet Cong South Vietnamese almost entirely?", he was answered "Yes". The same is true of their weapons. Senator Morse concludes that the so-called "supply lines" which Americans are bombing are little more than a myth.

South Vietnamese claims of infiltration, formerly denied by American authorities, were revived in connection with American air attacks on North Viet Nam in a White Paper published by the American State Department and in the minority report made by the Canadian representative on the International Control Commission. The White Paper, which was heralded as containing "conclusive proof" of North Vietnamese aggression, is a curious document. Essentially, it is a rehash of old propaganda stories long discredited. To back up the claim that there are 39,000 North Vietnamese infiltrators, it cites 18 names. Of these, nine were from the south, four from the north, and five not identified. We must remember that the Viet Minh army of 100,000 men, many of them from the southern part of the country, withdrew north of the temporary boundary in 1954. It is little wonder that some of these men have returned to their homes and families, and that they have joined the Viet Cong.

Writing in the *New York Times* (June 21, 1964), Tad Szulc quoted top U.S. officials to say that North Viet Nam has not been sending men into the south.

"The guerrilla units that infiltrate from the north are South Vietnamese who stayed north of the armistice line at the end of the war in 1954."

Following the publication of the White Paper, *F. F. Stone's Weekly* obtained from the Pentagon press office a precise statement of the number of weapons captured from the guerrillas and the number lost to them over the past three years. The figures were as follows:

	Captured from Guerrillas	Lost to the Guerrillas
1962	4,800	5,200
1963	5,400	6,500
1964	4,900	13,700
3-year Total	15,100	27,400

Appendix "D" of the White Paper provides a list of weapons, ammunition and other supplies of Communist origin captured from the guerrillas over the 16-month period from June, 1962 to January 29 last year. Out of the total of some 7,500 weapons captured during that period only 179 could be classified as Communist made, and of these only 26 were alleged to have been made or modified in North Viet Nam. The total additional supplies attributed

to North Viet Nam sources included 16 helmets, one uniform and an undisciplined number of mess kits, belts, socks and sweaters. These figures represent less than 2 1/2% of the total weapons captured.

It has been freely admitted in the American press that the South Vietnamese troops in addition to being untrained for their own government, were deserted to the Viet Cong's force numbers. These troops, being given U.S. military weapons and funds, they are trained in their own geographical "advisors", and technical pamphlets on using the weapons have been published in their language. Successful raids on American bases have been made with U.S. money and ammunition (this was admitted by the Pentagon). Vietnamese troops stationed in defence of these bases have either not intervened or, in some cases, have helped the Viet Cong raiders.

The U.S. White Paper was a spectacular fiasco—American critics have demonstrated that it proved exactly the opposite of its expressed intention. A more recent propaganda line is that the United States does have proof of aggression but cannot reveal the evidence for "security reasons". It is an interesting commentary on the pro-American bias of the Canadian daily press that some publications have taken this statement seriously.

Even more extraordinary is the text of the Canadian minority report. It refers to "South Viet Nam sources" who charge that 39,000 North Viet Nam soldiers have infiltrated into the South. It is careful neither to "confirm or deny" these allegations. Yet it uses them to defend U.S. aerial attacks on the north. The same curious reasoning might have been used to justify Hitler's invasion of Poland after he had claimed that the Poles were "aggressors".

Speaking at a public meeting in Toronto, Colonel Bradley Webb, a former military advisor to the Commission and a frequent visitor to Viet Nam, said that the Canadian minority report was probably "strongly influenced" by the United States. He said that as far as he was aware "there had been no significant infiltration of North Vietnamese troops or equipment into South Viet Nam." (*Victoria Daily Times*, March 15, 1965).

Neutral observers, and even American officials themselves, have agreed that both China and North Viet Nam have from the very beginning been extremely careful to avoid any action which might be construed as "aggression" in the South.

In fact, China's refusal to be provoked into war over Viet Nam has been discussed repeatedly in the American press—often with sneers about her "weakness" or "cowardice".

Any talk of North Vietnamese "aggression" must explain these stubborn facts:

1. There has never been any evidence that more than a trickle of arms has reached the South, and the number of northern infiltrators there has always been considerably fewer than the number of American "advisers".

2. "North" and "South" Viet Nam are artificial entities, resulting from an agreement which was to last for two years only, and was not in any way to be considered as forming permanent political or territorial boundaries. This boundary still exists because of the refusal of the United States and its government in the South to allow reunification through a national election, in direct violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements. This boundary no longer has any

validity, and the war becomes a struggle for national independence against foreign intervention.

#### IV. The United States offers "unconditional discussions".

There has been world wide criticism of American actions in Vietnam. An apparent shift in public opinion by President Johnson's speech on April 7 calling for "unconditional discussions" with North Vietnam was a surprising development. But soon thereafter the United States has "retracted" the war offering in addition to withdrawing its troops, no longer enthusiastically rallied divisions, and stopping its bombing raids against both North and South Vietnam. Influential American critics of their own government's policies have concluded that the offer of discussion was "more verbal trickery, to quell the peace-mongering critics at home and abroad." (New York Times, April 25).

Any objective analysis of the American position leads to the same distasteful conclusion. President Johnson's offer was predicated on the assumption that "North Vietnam has attacked the independent nation of South Vietnam." This is simply not true. The government of South Vietnam is not independent. It is an American creation, and could not last a week without American military support. It is fighting, not against North Vietnam, but against the National Liberation Front, which is the effective government in large sections of the country, and controls most of its territory.

Senator Warren Morse stated, in the Senate on April 7: "I am advised that if an election were held today, Ho Chi Minh would undoubtedly be elected President of both North and South Vietnam, as would have been the case in 1956 when the United States prevented the very election called for by the Geneva accords."

The present U.S. position is not an offer to discuss peace. It is a demand for unconditional surrender.

Even when issuing his appeal for "unconditional discussions", President Johnson laid down three conditions which must be satisfied before the U.S. will cease its war against Viet Nam:

1. South Viet Nam must be recognized by its neighbours as a separate state and no reunification of Viet Nam will be permitted.
2. The Government of South Viet Nam must be of a composition satisfactory to the United States, and
3. Peace will be discussed, if at all, only with the governments of the neighbouring countries — there will be no settlement with the National Liberation Front and no alternative for its supporters except submission to the Government of South Viet Nam controlled by Washington.

To these pre-conditions, Secretary MacNamara has since added a fourth—South Viet Nam must continue to serve as a military base for American operations in the Far East, and American forces will not be withdrawn, even if their withdrawal is requested by the Government of South Viet Nam.

The present position of the North Vietnamese government was outlined by Ho Chi Minh in a statement published July 1, 1965:

"The Geneva Agreements are still the basis for the peaceful solution of the war. I think the most important provisions are:

The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Viet Nam must be respected;

No military base under the control of a foreign power may be established in Viet Nam;

Viet Nam shall not join any military alliance; Democratic freedoms must be guaranteed to all on equal conditions for the resolution of negotiations between North and South Viet Nam and to the reunification of the country."

The Geneva Agreements were signed in 1954 to end the French colonial rule in Vietnam. The National Liberation Front (NLF) was formed in 1960 and has since been fighting against the South Vietnamese government. The Geneva Agreements were intended to provide a framework for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

"We respect the policies of the National Liberation Front and hold that the two sides must take specific characteristics into account, understand and restore normal relations between them, and to achieve national reunification."

While the position taken by Hanoi is conciliatory and flexible as to timing, it is nevertheless compatible with the position taken by President Johnson and Secretary MacNamara.

The issue is simple: will South Viet Nam continue to serve as a base for American military operations in the Far East, with its government controlled from Washington?

The war is likely to continue until either the States abandons this demand or until a large part of the Vietnamese population is exterminated.

#### CONCLUSIONS

1. No legal or moral grounds exist for prolonging civil war in Viet Nam.

2. This Study Group accordingly recommends the bringing of Canadian public opinion to support:

(a) The policy recommended by Prime Minister B. Pearson in his speech to the Canadian Society in New York, on March 3, 1965:

"Today... the aim of the international community must be to secure conditions in Southeast Asia which, under international control and international supervision and effective international policies, states in that area can work out their own affairs, conduct their own policies without any interference from any neighbour or any outside power."

And (b) The Policy Statement Re Viet Nam, issued World Association of World Federalists, March 1965.

"The acceleration of hostilities in Vietnam threatens the peace of the world and raises the spectre of escalation into world war III. The current action in Vietnam is another case of force used by individual countries in conflict situations, which is the inevitable consequence of the absence of an effective world security system of machinery for enforceable world law.

The World Association of World Federalists urges:

1. The re-convening of the Geneva Conference of 1954 which partitioned Vietnam, in order to achieve a firm and to seek a political settlement safeguarding against outside interference the existing political entities in South-East Asia.

2. To bring the Vietnam situation within the purview of the United Nations and to establish a viable role for the United Nations as observer and guarantor of any agreement reached by the Conference."

REC-11

March 4, 1966

100-11372-5

*[Handwritten signature]*

Dear

Your letter of March 1st has been received.

In response to your inquiry, this Bureau is strictly an investigative agency of the Federal Government and, as such, neither makes evaluations nor draws conclusions as to the character or integrity of any organization, publication or individual. In addition, data in our files must be maintained as confidential pursuant to regulations of the Department of Justice. Therefore, I am sure you will understand why I cannot comment as you desire.

Your concern about communism is understandable, and your desire to learn more regarding the nature of this menace is reassuring. A broad knowledge of the objectives and operations of the communist movement is essential if Americans are to effectively resist its influence. In this connection, I am enclosing some literature which contains suggestions all of us can use in combating this evil. Perhaps you may wish to refer to my books, "Masters of Deceit" and "A Study of Communism." These were written to help readers gain an insight into the strategy and tactics of communists, both in this country and abroad. Copies may be available at your local library.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

*[Handwritten signature]*

MAILED 4  
MAR 4 1966  
COMM-FBI

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosures (5)  
1 - Chicago - Enclosure

KLS:bss (4)

MAR 10 1966

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

SEE NOTE & ENCLOSURES next page.

RECEIVED MAILING ROOM

The Faith of Free Men  
Communism--The Incredible Swindle  
Counterintelligence Activities  
Let's Fight Communism Sanely!  
"Faith in God -- Our Answer To Communism"

NOTE: There is no record of correspondent in Bufiles. The American Friends Service Committee has pacifist policies which occasionally parallel the aims of the Communist Party line; however, it has not been investigated by the Bureau, and it is a Quaker organization. Pete Seeger is a well-known singer of folk songs and a banjo player.

1965

The F.B.I.  
Washington, D.C.

To whom it may concern:

I am interested in obtaining  
your official opinion of the American  
Friends Service Committee because  
they are sponsoring a protest given  
by Pete Seeger very soon in Chicago  
and I've heard only heard things  
about this group, which cause me  
great concern. I would like to know  
your opinion of them + I have an  
idea my doubts <sup>about them</sup> will be justified.  
I am deeply concerned about

CORRESPONDENCE

the getting across of Communism in  
this country, and I believe very  
strongly should be well informed as  
it is possible to be.

On the other hand, activities in recent  
days have lowered my opinion of  
him & he is in a position to be very  
influential to large groups of young  
people.

at any rate, I would appreciate  
any information regarding this group.

Thank You.

Sincerely,  


17C  
Oct 31/4/66  
125: djs



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Chicago, Illinois  
March 5, 1966

INTERNATIONAL DAYS OF PROTEST  
MARCH 25-26, 1966

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that the Women for Peace, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, the American Friends Service Committee and other religious and peace groups had met together and formed an Ad Hoc Peace Committee to hold a parade in downtown Chicago and a peace rally at the Chicago Coliseum, 15th and Wabash Streets, Chicago, on March 26, 1966, to protest for peace. The participants in this parade are to assemble at State Street and Wacker Drive at 12:30 PM on March 26, 1966, and at 1:00 PM begin a march down State Street to Congress Expressway. The marchers at Congress Expressway will disband and walk on the sidewalks to the Chicago Coliseum where a Peace Rally will be held.

\_\_\_\_\_ has furnished a leaflet which contains a letter announcing a Peace Walk and Rally to be held on March 26, 1966, in Chicago, Illinois, issued over the name of Marjorie Kinsella, Secretary, March 26th Peace Walk and Rally Committee. A copy of this leaflet which is self-described is attached.

ENCLOSURE

100-11392

The "Chicago's American," a Chicago daily newspaper, on March 7, 1966, carried an article captioned "Map Anti-Viet Protest Here." This article states in part, "two radical groups announced here today that they will march thru Chicago March 25 and 26 in protest against the War in Vietnam.

"Simultaneous marches will be held in other American cities and in capitals abroad according to C. Clark Kissinger, 25, chairman of the National Interim Committee of the Students for Democratic Action, and Hugh Fowler, National President of the DuBois Clubs of America (DCA).

"They announced the plans at a press conference in the Pick-Congress hotel."

INTERNATIONAL DAYS OF PROTEST  
MARCH 25-26, 1966

Attached is the leaflet referred to above, which was furnished by the third source. Also attached is information concerning the JCCC, DCA and Wisconsin Socialist Club.

JEWISH CULTURAL CLUBS OF CHICAGO

A source advised on May 11, 1965, that the Jewish Cultural Clubs of Chicago (JCCC) have offices at 3300-3314 West Lawrence Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. MAX NAIMAN is President. SAM CHEIFETZ is Executive Secretary. A City Committee of elected officers from the nine affiliated Clubs comprises the governing body. JCCC is a membership organization. Membership includes many former members of the Jewish People's Fraternal Order-International Workers Order (JPFO)(IWO).

While the JCCC claims it is not responsible or a part of any other organization of a similar character, and pays no dues to a national body and receives no directives from same, the National Secretary of the Jewish Cultural Clubs and Societies of New York was the main speaker at the 1965 Annual Conference of JCCC and noted there were 129 clubs in "our movement." The "National Office" was also thanked for sending the National Secretary to the Conference.

This source advised on May 11, 1965, that the perspectives of the JCCC adopted at the Annual Conference of the JCCC on October 22, 1961, remain the same. They include positions on peace, civil rights, growing anti-Semitism, and rising pro-Nationalist tendencies. Perspectives urge support for the peace movement against the threat of a third nuclear war and call for intensification of cultural activities.

The JPFO and IWO have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source has advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party (CP), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates to this meeting were cautioned against the germ of anti-Soviet and anti-CP ideologies. These delegates were also told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second conference of over 20 persons met in Chicago on December 28-29, 1963, for the purpose of initiating a "call" to the new youth organization and planning for a founding convention to be held in June, 1964.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention. The aims of this organization, as set forth in the preamble to the constitution, are, "It is our belief that this nation can best solve its problems in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence, complete disarmament and true freedom for all peoples of the world, and that these solutions will be reached mainly through the united efforts of all democratic elements in our country, composed essentially of the working people allied in the unity of Negroes and other minorities with whites. We further fully recognize that the greatest threat to American democracy comes from the racist and right wing forces in coalition with the most reactionary sections of the economic power structure, using the tool of anti-Communism to divide and destroy the unified struggle of the working people. As young people in the forces struggling for democracy, we shall actively strive to defeat these reactionary and neo-fascist elements and to achieve complete freedom and democracy for all Americans, thus enabling each individual to freely choose and build the society he would wish to live in. Through these struggles we feel the American people will realize the viability of the socialist alternative."

The constitution further states that this new organization shall be a membership organization open to individuals, and if five or more people so desire, a chapter can be formed which shall in turn be guided by the policies and principles of the parent organization.

As of October, 1965, the headquarters of the DCA was located at 954 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California.

Over the Labor Day weekend, 1965, the DCA held a conference in Chicago, Illinois. According to a third source, a new slate of national officers was elected at this conference, which included Chairman HUGH STERLING FOWLER, II

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

INTERNATIONAL DAYS OF PROTEST  
MARCH 25-26, 1966

WISCONSIN SOCIALIST CLUB

On December 10, 1957, a source described the Wisconsin Socialist Club (WSC) as then a duly registered and authorized student campus organization at the University of Wisconsin (UW) with a chapter membership of 21, including MATTHEW CHAPPERON and RONALD RADOSH, who prior to the dissolution of the Labor Youth League (LYL) were publicly known as officers of the UW chapter of the IYL.

On June 23, 1958, another source described the WSC as an organization founded primarily on principles closely allied with those of English socialists, with many of its members genuine socialists, but source observed there existed a pro-Marxist element in the club, including [REDACTED] which element had taken the lead in policy-making functions of the WSC. On September 20, 1960, this source reported that RADOSH and CHAPPERON had been elected President and Secretary, respectively, of the WSC for the 1960-1961 school year.

The September 25, 1962, issue of the "Daily Cardinal," student organ at the UW, identified the 1962-1963 officers of the WSC as JUDD GINSBERG, President; GENE DENNIS, Vice President; DOUGLAS KORTY, Treasurer; and ELSIE CHANDLER, Secretary. The "Daily Cardinal," issue of February 6, 1963, reported that JUDD GINSBERG had been suspended from the UW for reporting a false address in Madison to the UW and living in an apartment in violation of the UW rules. Another source advised on February 20, 1963, that PAUL BRINES had taken over GINSBERG's position as President of the WSC.

INTERNATIONAL DAYS OF PEOPLE  
MARCH 25-26, 1966

WISCONSIN SOCIALIST CLUB

Issues of the "Daily Cardinal," during the 1962-1963 school year indicated that WSC continued to function as a student campus organization, and during 1962-1963 sponsored off-campus speakers including HERBERT APTEKKE, described by the "Daily Cardinal" as "leading spokesman for the American Communist Party," and DANIEL RUEIK,

The LYL and CP, USA have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Call for **TALK and RALLY TO DEMAND PEACE IN VIETNAM**

**SATURDAY, MARCH 26, 1966**

In times like these, silence is consent to the war. As Americans, we must tell our government

**We Oppose the War in Vietnam!**

Because the war we pursue in Vietnam destroys the lives and homes of the Vietnamese people, blocks their desire for national independence and a better life.....

Because the war violates international obligations like the 1954 Geneva Agreements (which call for free elections as a basis for reunification) and the United Nations Charter in which we renounce war as a means of foreign policy....

Because the war we pursue turns our youth and resources to destruction at the very moment they must be devoted to building a just and free society here....

Because the war in Vietnam threatens to escalate into a world-wide nuclear conflict which can destroy mankind now when we have the power to end poverty and oppression....

Therefore, we must speak out and act to:

**BRING OUR BOYS HOME NOW!**

**Let us join together to End the War in Vietnam NOW!**

There are many different ideas on steps necessary to end the war:

Some believe only immediate American withdrawal will do.

Some believe the U. S. government must participate in negotiations for peace.

However, we stand united:

Against continuation of American bombings, crop destruction, use of gas in Vietnam.

For the full participation of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) in any peace negotiations and settlement.

Believing our government has an opportunity to act decisively for peace, we demand:

1. An immediate cease fire.
2. Clear demonstration of its support of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. This includes the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and self-determination of the Vietnamese people which is the right to elect any group or individual to government and the right to ~~yes~~ reunification of their country.
3. That it provide economic aid for the reconstruction and development of Vietnam, regardless of the form of government chosen by the Vietnamese people.
4. That it declare its support for international guarantees of a cease-fire; for the peaceful selection of a new government in free elections in South Vietnam; for the rights of minorities.

**LET US DEMAND A STOP TO WAR AND POVERTY!**

Let us demand the \$12,500,000,000 Vietnam War Budget be placed into the hands of American people for better education, housing and hospitals. Use the money for building and not destroying.

Let us join together to act now for **PEACE and FREEDOM**

in Vietnam, Mississippi and Chicago.

APR 20 1966  
ORIGINAL-REMAIN

Dear Friend:

On Tuesday, January 25, representatives from Peace organizations, students, unions, church groups, civil rights and academicians, met at Roosevelt University to plan Chicago's participation in the National Day of Protest Against the War in Vietnam, Saturday, March 26, 1966.

The arrangements made, were for a WALK and a RALLY, the walk to culminate in a rally at the Coliseum, 15th and Wabash, where, Staughton Lynd, Professor of History at Yale, who just recently returned from a fact-finding mission in North Vietnam, and Rep. -elect Julian Bond, barred from his seat in Georgia House of Representatives, will speak. The remainder of the program will be planned in the immediate future. You and your organization will be notified as soon as final program is arranged.

You too can help. Please fill out the coupon below and mail within the next few weeks so that we can go to the printer with the final leaflet. We want as many organizations listed as Co-sponsors as a means of involving the entire Chicago community. We hope we can count on you to join us in this demonstration against the war in Vietnam.

Sincerely for Peace,

Marjorie Kinsella, Secretary  
March 26th Peace Walk and Rally Committee

Please tear off, fill in and mail to: Marjorie Kinsella,  
2552 North Southport; Chicago, Illinois 60614

1. We \_\_\_\_\_ (name of org.)  
wish to be listed among the Co-sponsoring organizations.
2. I, \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ (org.)  
wish to be listed as an individual sponsor.
3. Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ copies of the Call for mailing to my org.
4. Enclosed find \$ \_\_\_\_\_ payable to March 26 Peace Demonstration.

REPRODUCED ORIGINAL RETURN

APR 20 1971

# CALL FOR



ENCLOSURE

100-1131-001

# PEACE WALK & RALLY SATURDAY, MAR. 26, 1966

### WILL YOU PARTICIPATE:

1. Endorse the Call, and have your organization become a CO-SPONSOR for the WALK and RALLY.
2. Endorse the Call and become an individual sponsor, with your group listed for identification only.
3. Indicate how many copies of the Call you will need for your mailing list.
4. Financial support. (Tear-off is on back page.)

The CALL (inside) will be the basis for leaflets for Mar. 26.

This year the threat of an escalating war hangs over our heads.

We must all join together to stop the war.

REPRODUCED ORIGINAL RETURN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-11392)

DATE: 3/28/66

*[Handwritten initials]*

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-39771) (RUC)

SUBJECT: AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

IS - C  
(OO:PH)

*[Handwritten initials]*

ATTACHED

The Metropolitan Area Telephone Directories list the Davis House, 1822 R Street, N.W., as the Washington Office of the AFSC.

*[Handwritten mark]*

100-11392-443

14 MAR 29 1966

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

WFO 100-39771

[REDACTED], Washington, D.C., on 3/17/66,  
by SA [REDACTED] revealed that SCHNEIDER remained in  
Philadelphia, Pa., and did not attend the dinner, but that [REDACTED],  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did attend.

WFO indices indicate that SCHNEIDER, [REDACTED], and  
[REDACTED] are all affiliated with the AFSC, Philadelphia, Pa.

The above is submitted for the information of Philadelphia

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: March 11, 1966

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR HOUSING FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

Mr. Raymond Albrecht of the Personnel Section in the Department forwarded to me the enclosed pamphlet on housing opportunities for Negro and white families in the National Capital Area published by the Metropolitan Washington Housing Program of the American Friends Service Committee. Albrecht said this organization is planning a meeting in the Personnel Office of the Department at 10:30 a. m., 3-14-66, and he invited the Bureau to be represented.

The pamphlet includes a quote of John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, urging that Federal offices cooperate with fair housing groups to assure that all Federal employees have equal access to housing of their choice. However, the organization sponsoring the meeting is not a Federal organization. Bureau records contain no record on the Metropolitan Washington Housing Program. The parent organization, American Friends Service Committee, is a Quaker organization founded in 1917 which has pacifist policies occasionally paralleling the aims of the Communist Party line. The pamphlet names five other organizations in Washington and nearby Maryland and Virginia which can be turned to for assistance in securing equal opportunity in housing. One is Neighbors, Incorporated of 5802 Georgia Avenue, Northwest. While it is a legitimate organization established in 1958, it was founded by Marvin Caplan

Also, members of Neighbors, Incorporated and the Cooperative Jewish Children's School of Greater Washington discussed interracial problems and some of the officers of the latter named group have been identified as Communist Party members in the past.

Since the organization sponsoring the meeting in the Department is not Federal constituted and since the general background of the organization as well as that of Neighbors, Incorporated suggests that we would want to stay clear of any possible activities they sponsor, it is believed we should not be represented at the meeting.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. Feeney

RGH:mif

Enclosure

53 APR 19 1966

REC-48

10 APR 13 1966

FBI  
SEARCHED

(OVER)

*[Handwritten initials]*

Memorandum Adams to Callahan  
Re: Equal Opportunity for  
Housing for Federal Employees

RECOMMENDATION:


That the Bureau not be represented at the meeting sponsored by the  
Metropolitan Washington Housing Program of the American Friends Service Committee

*Callahan advised  
3/11*

*✓*

*concur. JPM  
3/11*

*G.A.H.*



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 7, 1966

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON  
NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
(FCNL)

A source advised on April 6, 1966, that at the annual meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) at Philadelphia, Pa., March 27, 1966, it was announced that Quakers in Philadelphia and elsewhere would initiate a program of weekly trips to Washington, D.C., to protest the war in Vietnam. Source said this program of weekly trips to Washington, D.C., would be coordinated and carried on by the FCNL and is not specifically a Philadelphia operation.

The visitors are urged to arrive in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday night, have a briefing at FCNL Headquarters, 245 2nd Street, N.E., Washington, D.C., and the next day call on their particular representative or Senator in groups and talk them out of voting for war appropriations and otherwise influence their Congressmen to work for peace and against the war in Vietnam in accordance with the briefing by the FCNL. This program will be implemented by a wide mailing list throughout the country to all meetings of the Society of Friends calling upon members who are able to visit Washington, D.C.

Source also furnished a pamphlet captioned, "The Open Door" issued by the FCNL, which states that during 1965 FCNL had over 700 interviews with members of Congress or assistants and officials of the Executive Branch, testified before seven committees of Congress on arms control and disarmament agencies, immigration law, overseas aid programs, planning for peace legislation, and amendments to the U.N. Charter; prepared, printed, and distributed 43,900 copies of reprints, action bulletins, Senate speeches, and memos. This was in addition to the 18,000 copies of the FCNL Washington Newsletter.

The pamphlet goes on to state that for 1966 priorities are:

Page 1 of 1

ENCLOSURE

100-11392-

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON  
NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
(FCNL)

- (1.) To end the war in Vietnam
- (2.) Strengthen food for peace program
- (3.) Change U.S.-China policy.  
The FCNL will be working for United States Support of the representation of Mainland China in the United Nations, establishment or normal diplomatic relations, and resumption of travel, trade, and cultural contacts.
- (4.) Progress toward world disarmament.
- (5.) Other areas of concern and action included ratification of four United Nations human rights conventions, expansion of technical assistance and development aid, civil rights legislation, Senate approval of U.S.-USSR consular convention, opposition to current and expanded civil defense program, protection of the rights of conscience, equitable Indian legislation, and abolition of capital punishment.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 13, 1966

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON  
NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
(FCNL)

Reference is made to Philadelphia communication dated April 7, 1966.

A source furnished on April 12, 1966, the following literature received from the FCNL, 245 Second Street, N.E., Washington, D. C., concerning a program of weekly trips to Washington, D. C., to protest the war in Vietnam.

A letter dated March 30, 1966, from EDWARD F. SNYDER, Executive Secretary, relative to the first orientation session of some 25 visitors to Washington.

Item two is a flyer captioned "Wednesdays in Washington on Vietnam," which explains the program of the weekly trips to Washington to protest the war in Vietnam.

Item three is a leaflet captioned, "How to Visit Your Congressman" issued by FCNL. A copy of the above items follow:

100-11392 -  
ENCLOSURE



FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON  
NATIONAL LEGISLATION

248 SECOND STREET, N.E. • WASHINGTON D. C. 20002 • LINCOLN 7-4343

CHARLES J. DARLINGTON  
Chairman, General Committee  
28 Bowen Avenue  
Woodstown, New Jersey

SAMUEL R. LEVERING  
Chairman, Executive C  
Ararat, Virginia

March 30, 1966

Dear Friend:

We need your help.

The enclosed flyer explains "Wednesdays in Washington." This program grew out of a conviction that there should be an unremitting effort to lay before Members of Congress the concern that the tragic Vietnam war be ended.

You can help by


- a) calling together a small group of community leaders to develop a statement on Vietnam, and selecting one or two of your number to come to Washington to share your concerns with your Congressmen;
- b) encouraging others to do the same.

At our first orientation session last night, some 25 persons from Vermont, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland heard Rep. George E. Brown, Jr., of California. Today interviews are being held on Capitol Hill. A number of people from other organizations will be cooperating on future Wednesdays.

David Hartsough will be heading up this program in our office. Please write or call him when you need information or assistance. Further details are on the flyer.

We look forward to seeing you in Washington.

Sincerely yours,



Edward F. Snyder

Enclosure - "Wednesdays in Washington"

2

E. RAYMOND WILSON  
Executive Secretary Emeritus

EDWARD F. SNYDER  
Executive Secretary

CHARLES H. HARKER  
Administrative Secretary

JEANETTE HADLEY  
Assistant Secretary

FRANCES E. NEELY  
Legislative Assistant

## HOW-TO-VISIT YOUR CONGRESSMAN

You can influence decision-making in Washington. A visit to your Representative and two Senators can be a very rewarding and satisfying experience. It can be the beginning of a long and fruitful relationship with your elected Representatives. Or it may be a frustrating experience. But whatever the results, you will have taken an important step in bringing your views before those who help to make the life and death decisions facing our world today. It can be the first step in your own political career.

### *The Interview In Washington*

**Making The Appointment.** It is best to write in advance, telling your Congressman when you will be in Washington and asking for an appointment. Give him alternatives. The address:

Senator _____	Representative _____
Senate Office Bldg.	House Office Bldg.
Washington 25, D.C.	Washington 25, D.C.

The House transacts most of its major business Tuesdays through Thursdays. Saturday afternoon and Sunday are the least likely times for interviews.

The best hours to see your Congressman are usually before he goes to a Committee meeting at 10 a.m., or in late afternoon, after the session has concluded. The House and Senate usually convene about noon and may meet for a few minutes or for 10 to 12 hours, depending on the legislative schedule. If you cannot see the Member in his office, you may call him off the Senate or House floor; his office will tell you how to do this.

During the closing days of a session, generally in late summer, Members of both Houses

are extremely busy and it is very difficult to see them. Some are in town even in the fall when Congress is not in session.

**When You Arrive in Washington.** Telephone the Member's office, at Capitol 4-3121, to confirm your appointment, or make it, if necessary.

**Planning The Interview.** General conversation is a good opener, but let your Congressman know soon that you want to discuss specific ideas or legislation.

As a rule, no more than two or three subjects should be discussed in one interview. *Be prepared with background information and know something of the Member's voting record.* You have a much better chance of affecting the Congressman's thinking on a subject if you talk to him before his opinions have been formed.

The staff at the FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION, located one-half block from the New Senate Office Building, will try to help you be informed on the issues and the Member's voting record if you stop by our office before visiting your Congressman.

**The Interview.** Be on time. Be positive. Be constructive. Be friendly. Begin with areas of agreement. Commend him for stands he has taken of which you approve.

State your views clearly and concisely. Tell of personal experiences you have had which illustrate your points. Congressmen are interested in what people back home are thinking. Tell him if your church, organization or club has taken a stand on the issue under discussion. Many Members are especially interested in what high school and college students are thinking.

Don't be afraid to take a stand based on religion and morality, and state it forcefully. Often the depth of conviction behind the words can be more persuasive than the words themselves.

*Suggest that he do some specific thing, like voting for or against a pending bill, sponsoring a bill, inserting an article in the Congressional Record, or meeting with some particular group when he returns home.*

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

### Why Not Visit Him At Home?

Many Members maintain offices in their State or District. You may wish to become acquainted with the Member's field representatives and alert them to your concerns. These people are often in almost daily telephone contact with the Washington office and can pass along information to the Senator or Representative.

If the Member has a home office, you can arrange for an appointment through it, or write directly to the Member in Washington and arrange for a meeting the next time he is home.

In an interview at home, you may want to bring in representatives of other organizations so that there is a broadly based citizens group. This will entail more preparation in terms of choosing issues and selecting a spokesman, but the results can be rewarding. You will be bringing to the Senator's or Representative's attention a viewpoint shared by many responsible people.

You may also wish to invite the Member to speak to your Church, organization or club on a particular subject related to your concern. In preparing his remarks, the Member may become more aware of the issues than he would have been through an interview.

During campaigns you may wish to base your interviews with the candidates on questionnaires. By comparing and publishing the answers, you and your fellow citizens have a sounder basis for casting your vote on election day.

For more copies of "How-to-Visit Your Congressman", "How-to-Work in Politics" or "How-to-Write a Letter to the Editor," write:

#### FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

245 Second Street, N.E., Washington 2, D.C.

#### AREA OFFICES:

2160 Lake Street, San Francisco 21, Calif.

122 North Hudson Avenue, Pasadena 4, Calif.

4100 Warren Avenue, Hillside, Illinois

Cost: 5¢ each; quantity rates available

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
6/62/P1

If possible, leave the Senator or Representative some printed material which summarizes at least some of the points you want to make. This might be your own statement, a statement of an organization, or a reprint of a newspaper or magazine article. Don't assume that because you have seen the article he has.

If the Senator or Representative is not available, talk to his assistant. These people are often very knowledgeable, and quite influential in helping form the Member's views. At the least you will have a better opportunity to hear where the Member stands on particular issues as reflected by his assistant's comments.

**Visiting The Gallery.** You will need a pass to listen to Senate and House debate from the galleries. Pick up your passes from the office of one of your Senators and of your Representative.

**Visiting Hearings.** A major part of Congress' work is done in Committees. While in Washington you should try to attend at least one Congressional Committee hearing. *The Washington Post* prints a daily list of Committee hearings on the page opposite the editorial page. You can visit any "open" hearing; no pass is needed. You cannot visit executive hearings. About one-third of Congressional hearings are closed to the public for security or other reasons.



FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

# Wednesdays in Washington

ON

# VIETNAM

If you are asking, "But what can I do?" we urge you to

Come To Washington  
To Spend Wednesday  
On Capitol Hill

Many crucial decisions are being made in Washington to whether the war in Vietnam will continue, whether it escalate, or whether it will be resolved by negotiation. Your Senators and Congressmen help shape those decisions and you have a citizenship responsibility to share your concerns, insights and views with them.

## WHEN

Every Wednesday, March 30 through June 22, 1966 (except April 13, when many Congressmen will be home for Easter recess. If you can't come to Washington, try to see them at home during this period).

## PREPARATION

1. Write members of Congress in advance, requesting an appointment. (Send a copy to FCNL, 245 Second St., N.E., Washington, D. C. 20002)
2. Read FCNL's "How to Visit Your Congressman."
3. Study the issues (see other side for suggestions).
4. Develop a statement on Vietnam by a local group of Friends, a local Council of Churches, or other concerned citizens. (See other side for details.)

## SCHEDULE

Orientation session \_\_\_\_\_ 7:30 p.m. Tuesday  
FCNL's headquarter  
Meeting for Worship \_\_\_\_\_ 8:30 a.m. Wednesday  
'at F  
Interviews on  
Capitol Hill \_\_\_\_\_ 9:00 a.m.

and on through the  
Those who can do so are urged to stay  
Thursday and Friday

## ARRANGEMENTS

- Friends Meetings in the Washington area provide some hospitality. Advance notice is necessary, telling who is coming, arrival time, length of stay, whether relying on private car or public transportation, etc.
- Individuals who cannot come and Friends Meetings may wish to share by helping with travel and other expenses. • Some groups may wish to bring a carload to Washington and include several community leaders.

*This is a cooperative program of:*

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

FRIENDS GENERAL CONFERENCE, PEACE AND SOCIAL ORDER COMMITTEE

FRIENDS UNITED MEETING, BOARD ON CHRISTIAN SOCIAL CONCERNS

YEARLY MEETING COMMITTEES

## WHY DEVELOP A STATEMENT?

This is a very important step. As Friends and others sit down to prepare a statement, individual views are clarified and the process of community education and understanding takes place. When such a statement is given to the Congressman it can form the basis for discussion with him. If it is signed by several community leaders it will indicate a breadth of concern on this issue. It also paves the way for the group to talk with the Congressman on his return to his home. If several groups are coming to Washington from the same

Congressional District, these statements, individually prepared, will emphasize that those who come represent different towns or areas in Member's District or State.

## ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL

AFSC regional offices can supply Vietnam statistics and AFSC's new "Peace in Vietnam—A New Approach in S.E. Asia." 95¢. FCNL can supply "Suggested Guidelines for Discussion" and excerpts from the Congressional debates. So Yearly Meetings and other Friends bodies have issued statements.

*"Without illusions as to the prospect of success, we must try nonetheless to bring reason and restraint into the emotionally charged atmosphere in which the Vietnamese war is now being discussed. . . ."*

SEN. J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARKANSAS

*"I suggest that it is the imminent threat of a third world war, as I interpret events, which has disturbed me; and, I dare say, it is the imminence of this threat which is causing more and more Senators to express their views publicly.*

*"Unless the threat of such a catastrophe bestirs men to action, and unless men's souls are aroused by these events, what on earth could arouse them to action and impel them to take a position which for the moment may be unpopular with a great many people? . . ."*

SEN. ALBERT GORE, TENNESSEE

*"This \$13 billion [supplemental Vietnam appropriation] is only the first drop in the bucket. . . . Besides increased taxation and conscription, we must be prepared to accept the concentration of powers and restrictions on our liberties which inevitably accompany any major war."*

SEN. GEORGE D. AIKEN, VERMONT

*"The civilian hospitals in South Vietnam are crowded with bombing victims, with little children with their legs, arms blown off; men, women, and children with their faces and their bodies horribly burned and scarred with napalm bombs."*

SEN. GEORGE McGOVERN, SOUTH DAKOTA

*"For nearly a year now, we have sacrificed to this effort [Vietnam] all serious possibility for improvement of our relations with the Soviet Union, with all this implies from the standpoint of the ultimate danger of nuclear war. . . . We have placed a great and deeply regrettable strain on the friendship and confidence of the Japanese people. A pall of discouragement has been cast over those responsible for the conduct of the work of the United Nations. Constructive treatment of the great problems of Germany, of nuclear disarmament, of the future of the United Nations and of China in the wider sense has everywhere been placed largely in abeyance in deference to this one remote involvement."*

GEORGE KENNAN

For additional copies write:

**FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION**  
245 2nd Street, N.E. • Washington, D. C. 20002

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : *[Handwritten initials]*  
SAC, DENVER ~~██████████~~

SUBJECT: *[Handwritten initials]*

DATE: April 13, 1966

CITIZENS COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM  
INFORMATION CONCERNING  
IS

There is enclosed herewith Page 31 of the April 12, 1966 issue of the Denver Post, entitled "Our Aim Is to Help our Country," and sets forth information and signatures of individuals who are opposed to the present foreign policy in Vietnam.

REC-18

REC-36

REC-20

REC-28

REC-37

REC-27

~~██████████~~ reported on March 23, 1966, that ~~██████████~~ a group of individuals held a meeting on March 20, 1966, at the University of Denver. The purpose of the meeting was to obtain contributions for a one-page ad to be placed in the Denver Post originally on March 26, 1966, in connection with the International Days of Protest. This group of individuals called themselves the Citizens Committee on Vietnam and it is sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee.

The attached is being furnished for Bureau's

- 2 - Bureau (RM) (Enc. 1) (AM) HED
- 1 - Denver ENCLOSURE

JCL:grs  
(3)

AGENCY REC'D

REP'T FORW

BY BOF

REC 12-100-113

ST-109

APR 14 1966

enc to esc

97 MAY 5

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

# OUR AIM IS TO HELP OUR COUNTRY

This message is an attempt by citizens of Colorado to contribute constructively to public discussion of our policy in Viet Nam. We believe such discussion can strengthen decision-making in a democracy and we feel that you should take part in it. Our aim is to help our country, not to hurt it.

There is little question that our country is being hurt by the war in Viet Nam. President Johnson recognizes that this is so and has made extensive efforts to bring the war to an end through negotiations. We commend him for these efforts and for his determination to avoid escalating the war.

We believe, however, that our government has not done all that it ought to do to end the war on honorable terms. Unless a more determined and more realistic peace effort is made, we fear that our country will become irretrievably committed to a long and costly war on the continent of Asia in which the Red Chinese and even the Russians may eventually become involved.

The buildup up of our troops may well pass the half million mark before the year ends. Our air attacks on North Viet Nam have been resumed and those on South Viet

nam have never ceased. We are building bases and ports and air strips that appear to be aimed at all Asia. If the Communists respond to our buildup, as they very likely will, by increasing their own manpower and arms in South Viet Nam, we are likely to go still further, and there is no telling where it will end. Secretary of State Dean Rusk has said that it is up to the Communists. WE BELIEVE THE DECISION SHOULD BE MADE BY OUR BETTER IN OUR OWN HANDS, RATHER THAN IN THEIRS. We recognize that the President is pledged to keep the war limited in scope and we do not believe that it is possible in view of the buildup of troops and facilities that it is now under way. If the struggle is to be halted short of a full-scale Asian land war, we must take steps now to de-escalate it instead of allowing it to pass beyond our control. We therefore suggest:

- First
- Second
- Third
- Fourth
- Fifth

- that we halt the bombing of North Viet Nam, which is violent and unnecessary, and that we do not increase our manpower in Viet Nam;
- that we make clear that we are willing to talk with the regime in Hanoi and the leadership of the National Liberation Front;
- that we urge the reconvening of the Geneva Conference and to arrange for free elections in South Viet Nam;
- that we make it clearer than we yet have to the enemy that the negotiations we seek are for the purpose of working out a compromise not for the purpose of obtaining an unconditional surrender.

We offer these suggestions without any extravagant claims that they will bring peace to Viet Nam. They may accomplish nothing immediately, but in time they may accomplish a great deal. By observing military restraints on the one hand and by pursuing negotiations persistently on the other, we might yet bring about the peace talks we have failed to obtain through our present war method.

We believe that these suggestions will be in the best interests of the well-being of the United States and that we have recommended them by allowing ourselves to be guided by the interests of our country and of other peace-directed alternatives.

- |  |   |   |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|--|---|---|
| <p>John G. ...<br/>         Albert ...<br/>         Frank ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...</p> | <p>John G. ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...</p> | <p>Walter ...<br/>         Helen ...<br/>         Rev. J. H. ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...</p> | <p>George ...<br/>         Wallace ...<br/>         George ...<br/>         Florence ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...</p> | <p>...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...</p> | <p>...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...<br/>         ...</p> |
|--|---|---|--|---|---|



Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-11392) DATE: 4/18/66

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-4899)

SUBJECT: AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE (AFSC) IS - C

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
 m...  
 [Signature]  
 [Signature]

Re Philadelphia letter to Bureau, 11/21/66.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau is one copy of an AFSC booklet entitled, "Peace in Vietnam," with subcaption, "A New Approach in Southeast Asia, A Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee."

This book is very critical of U. S. action in Vietnam.

Enclosed also for the Bureau are three copies of an article from the "Daily Pennsylvanian," of 3/22/66, a student newspaper of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., captioned, "Mirsky, Rickett Speak Out against Escalation of War in AFSC Booklet." MIRSKY and RICKETT have previously been outspoken against U. S. policy in Vietnam.

ST-104

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED  
 ENCLOSURE  
 ENC-42 100-11392-447

- 2 - Bureau (100-11392) (Enc. 4) (RM)
- 3 - Philadelphia

APR 20 1966


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INT. SEC.

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
# Peace in Vietnam


**A NEW APPROACH  
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

*A Report Prepared for the  
American Friends Service Committee*

95¢


**Peace in Vietnam**





. . . for the world, which seems  
To lie before us like a land of dreams,  
So various, so beautiful, so new,  
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,  
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;  
And we are here as on a darkling plain  
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,  
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

—*Dover Beach*, Matthew Arnold




# Peace in Vietnam

A NEW APPROACH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

*A Report Prepared for the  
American Friends Service Committee*




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
FIRST EDITION APRIL 1966

Manufactured in the United States of America



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## Preface

The United States is locked in a military struggle in Vietnam which increases in extent and virulence day by day. How did we get into this situation? How can we get out?

The American Friends Service Committee first publicly expressed its concern over Vietnam in 1954, at the time of Dienbienphu and the Geneva Conference. A statement was issued at that time warning against United States military involvement in these terms:

The American Friends Service Committee is profoundly disturbed with the pressures for United States military intervention in Indo-China. On the basis of long Quaker experience in international service we are convinced that nothing but disaster lies down this road. The destructiveness of modern war can produce nothing but hatred, even among those on whose behalf the fighting ostensibly is undertaken, and hatred is no foundation upon which freedom and democracy can be built.

We urge our fellow citizens to remember that a real victory for freedom in Indo-China, as elsewhere, depends upon winning the minds and hearts of the Indo-Chinese. This requires that America first understand that the legitimate yearnings of Asian peoples are for independence and for a better standard of life. These are the fundamental issues in the present raging Indo-Chinese revolution and they are not issues that can be met by military threats.

In December 1964 the American Friends Service Committee

sent copies of the article "Vietnam: The Fourth Course," reprinted from the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, to over one thousand influential persons, including President Lyndon B. Johnson. This article pointed to the remarkable degree of cooperation between hostile nations in planning international development of the Mekong River Valley under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. The author suggested that this experience might help provide a constructive and positive basis for seeking negotiation and neutralization of the area. Responses from the State Department and the White House emphasized that the "Fourth Course," however attractive, was not a viable option until the political and military situation was more secure. On April 7, 1965, President Johnson announced United States support for enlarged Mekong River development and for regional economic cooperation in Southeast Asia, but the escalation of military activity in Vietnam continued.

In October 1965 the American Friends Service Committee issued "An Appeal for the People of Vietnam," which called upon all parties to stop the fighting and enter into negotiations. Copies were sent to the United States government, to the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi, to the government of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, and to the National Liberation Front. The statement also said that this Quaker organization intended to try to aid the victims of war in both North and South Vietnam. The statement stressed that humanitarian activity could not absolve Americans from facing "the awful fact of the United States involvement in war and of what this is doing to the moral fibre of this nation." Finally the statement urged that the United States "revise its policies in Southeast Asia so as not to rely on military force."

The Board of Directors of the American Friends Service Committee appointed a working party to study in depth the complex problems of ending reliance on military force. The authors brought together for this purpose have undertaken to prepare a document that would speak to the political realities. Certain ethical and religious assumptions are implicit though not emphasized. It is assumed, for example, that questions of international relations and world strife should be considered in terms of ethical and human

PREFACE

ix

values as well as in terms of economic and political power. In nation-to-nation relations men should give humanity itself highest rating in their scale of values. National interest in our interdependent world should be construed in broad terms. Americans cannot disregard the people of Vietnam in the name of some ideological or world-political aim. The interrelationship of ends and means is always important; it becomes crucial if the goal of a free, independent South Vietnam can be achieved only through widespread destruction in South Vietnam.

With these assumptions and principles in the background, the essay deals first with a diagnosis of the current situation. The perspectives of the Vietnamese people are contrasted with the American view. The price of victory through military escalation is measured in human terms. The need to explore how the American people became entangled in Vietnam leads to an analysis of the underlying movements of nationalism and socioeconomic change in Southeast Asia, which have been inadequately understood and often misrepresented in American newspapers and magazines. A section on China recapitulates points made in a prior study for the American Friends Service Committee<sup>1</sup> and applies them to the Vietnam struggle. This introduces the story of the twenty years of accumulating mistakes in American policy in Vietnam.

To the question, "Why belabor the past mistakes, when it is the present that we have to deal with?" the answer comes clearly that the present United States policy is encumbered with misconceptions of the past. The false premises that guide American thinking make a constructive resolution of the conflict difficult. Threading their way through the tangle of negotiation attempts and the stated positions of the contending parties, the authors suggest proposals for a settlement in which the welfare of the Vietnamese people takes top priority.

Throughout the study, undertaken during the period from November 6, 1965, to January 20, 1966, we have been alert to each day's headlines. In such a rapidly moving situation, it is impossible to be completely up-to-date, yet we believe the basic analysis and general line of solution will be relevant for some time to come.

<sup>1</sup> *A New China Policy: Some Quaker Proposals* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

We have not tried to document the many points made. These can be verified in the extensive literature on Vietnam, some of which is listed in the bibliography. In certain sections in which we are largely dependent on newspapers and magazines, we have inserted footnotes so that the reader can corroborate points.

Members of the working party came to the task from differing backgrounds, but with a common concern for the people of Vietnam and a common anxiety over the American involvement. Two of the group are businessmen, three come from universities, and three are in organizational work in international relations. Two members were in South Vietnam in the summer of 1965; two have lived in China; one has spent extended periods of time in Southeast Asia. Further data on the writers is given in Appendix IV. From varied exposures and viewpoints we have come to a high degree of unity in our analysis of problems and in our policy recommendations. We hope that the writing will convey the persuasiveness of an eleventh-hour appeal for sanity.


BRONSON P. CLARK, Convener  
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

*Minutes of the Board of Directors, January 5, 1966:*

The Board of the American Friends Service Committee, mindful that it does not speak for all Friends, endorses the general point of view embodied in this report. It approves the publication of this study as a contribution to the dialogue now under way on the war in Vietnam.


GILBERT F. WHITE, Chairman  
 Board of Directors  
 American Friends Service Committee

Peace in Vietnam





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## 1: Vietnam—Current Perspectives

The scene was a small square in the city of Hué, South Vietnam, on a summer day in 1965. The place was known as a rendezvous for American GI's and Vietnamese girls. A couple of military police were on duty to keep order. On this day one of them had supplied himself with some candy for the children who played in the square and crowded around the Americans. As he started his distribution in a friendly mood, a swarm of youngsters, jumping and reaching, pressed about him. With a laugh he tossed the candy out on the cobblestones. Immediately the children descended like locusts, each intent on grabbing a piece. A young Vietnamese school teacher happened by at this moment, and seeing the scrambling children, he spoke to them in stern and emphatic tones. He told them to pick up the candy and give it back to the American. After some hesitation they sheepishly complied. Then, facing the soldier and speaking in measured English with a tone of suppressed anger and scorn, he said: "You Americans don't understand. You are making beggars of our children, prostitutes of our women, and Communists of our men!"

This incident reflects a widespread attitude of the Vietnamese people when confronted by the efforts of Americans to help them. The emotions revealed indicate something of the impact of American involvement in Vietnam, a physical and cultural impact that has caused grave disruption in the social patterns of the country. In the uproar over Vietnam this reality has been largely over-

looked, yet it is one Americans must assess. The attitude of the people themselves has a great influence on our chance of contributing anything constructive to the development of an independent South Vietnam—the stated reason for the United States' military presence in the affairs of that sorely afflicted land.

Americans, on their side, look at Vietnam in terms of preoccupation with the postwar expansion of Communism, which they think can be stopped only by American military power. We are repeatedly told that our strength requires us to become the champion of the "free," charged with the responsibility of holding back the "tides of darkness" represented by the aggressive forces of an international political ideology. This is our rationale for being in Vietnam: Southeast Asia is threatened by Communist China, operating through its instruments in Hanoi; and the United States is determined to stand by its commitment to the anti-Communist patriots of South Vietnam in their defense of freedom against aggression from the North.

This analysis, so easily accepted by Americans, finds little acceptance elsewhere in the world and especially in Vietnam, where the perspective has been shaped by a set of historical factors that Americans do not usually consider. The first such factor is that the Vietnamese people, both North and South, are caught up in a profound social revolution. As is true for much of Asia, people are reaching toward a day when men will be free from the burdens of exploitation, poverty, and disease, which they have endured through the ages. To many peasants, who constitute at least 80 per cent of the population of Vietnam, the national hero and the champion of this revolution is Ho Chi Minh. Although he is resented by others who associate him with repressive land reforms in North Vietnam, he is still widely regarded as the George Washington of Vietnam, the father of his country, the man who fought Japanese occupation of Vietnam in World War II and then liberated it from French domination in 1954.

The second factor of the Vietnamese perspective is the hatred of the regime of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, who was installed and supported by the United States. Americans have little knowledge of the impact of the Diem government on the people of South Vietnam. Resentment against its repressive measures was so strong

and widespread in rural areas that it became an important factor in driving thousands of villagers to engage in open rebellion. Though Americans would like to forget the Diem chapter of history, it must be taken into consideration if we are to understand the perspective of the Vietnamese people toward the tragedy that now engulfs us all.

For years past, village affairs had been handled by local officials known to the people. A degree of basic democracy was present at this local level that existed nowhere else in Vietnam. Early in the Diem regime, however, those officials were replaced by Diem-appointed men brought in from the outside as instruments of control. These officials were all too often harsh, venal, and exploitative. Because they were the villagers' primary contact with the central government, Saigon came to be regarded as the enemy, especially after the Diem government rejected the Vietminh's *de facto* land reform in favor of a program requiring retroactive compensation for the former landlords. The succession of Saigon governments in the last few years has not improved the situation materially, and the resentment continues unabated.

The third factor shaping the Vietnamese perspective is the general feeling of war-weariness on the part of the people throughout South Vietnam. Horror and devastation are inflicted by all the fighting elements—American; South Vietnamese; and National Liberation Front, or Vietcong.<sup>1</sup> A common reaction of the people is to wish that the war would end no matter who wins. The total nature of the destruction wrought in one particular place has been vividly described by a French Catholic priest in an interview reported by Jean Larteguy in *Paris Match*, October 2, 1965:

Today nothing remains of all that region. All is razed. As for the poor mountain people whose villages and rice granaries have been destroyed, they can live only as wild boars in the forest. Before the bombardment, the loud speakers, in the planes above them, told them not to go into the fields and to stay in their huts. They stayed in their huts and the huts were bombarded anyway. Or again the Viet Cong

<sup>1</sup> National Liberation Front is the name which the forces opposing the Saigon government assumed in 1960. They have been better known in the West by the pejorative term, Vietnamese Communists or "Vietcong," a name given them by the Diem regime.

obliged them to come out and machine-gunned them in the fields. Some villages were warned, others not. I have seen my faithful burned up in napalm. I have seen the bodies of women and children blown to bits. I have seen all my villages razed. By God, it's not possible. (*C'est pas Dieu possible.*) Suddenly the priest burst into tears. His nerves had given way. He cursed the war and its attendant horrors and absurdities. He railed at the Americans in English, as if they were there to hear him. . . .

These perspectives help explain why the "defense of freedom" in South Vietnam has encountered grave difficulties. These perspectives also explain the fervor of our adversary. One great surprise to Americans is the fighting ability, tenacity, and high morale of peasant armies from underdeveloped and backward countries, even when subjected to the kind of modern warfare that the United States is currently waging in Vietnam. With our complex industrial technology and affluent society, we find it difficult to understand how people living at a low level of subsistence can hold out so long against the assaults of our various weapons without indications of weakening. Yet those South Vietnamese who have taken up arms in rebellion have demonstrated that they are prepared to spend endless years in jungles and swamps of their country, enduring hardships, rather than surrender. Vietcong fighters are willing to persist, even when confronted with incessant bombings and attacks from helicopters and fighter planes. This fervor affects only a minority, but it exerts a powerful influence over the larger population and constitutes the principal problem with which those substantial numbers of South Vietnamese who support the Saigon government must contend.

In North Vietnam the fervor of resistance is much more widespread, because the attack is more clearly from a foreign power. Western journalists there have observed that the people have now come to the reluctant conclusion that they may have to sacrifice their principal cities to American bombers. They have already evacuated large numbers of women and children and await the day when American military and political leaders decide to level the cities. Factories have been divided into small units, which are being moved into excavations in the hills. Like other American bombing actions in North Vietnam, it seems clear that the bomb-

ing of Haiphong and Hanoi will not persuade the North Vietnamese to negotiate a settlement dictated by the United States government. It is more likely to stiffen their determination to resist.

This is the background which explains the failure of escalation policies to bring a quick end to the war. Despite frequent assurances by American leaders that one more step would bring success, we have been driven to ever greater military commitment in Vietnam, and the end of the war has moved further and further into the future. According to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, this commitment had by November 1965 brought a total of 165,700 United States military personnel to South Vietnam. According to the same authority, the South Vietnamese government had about 500,000 men in its armed forces. Besides the United States and South Vietnamese forces, there were 1,300 Australians, 300 New Zealand artillery troops, and a South Korean division of 14,000 in South Vietnam—a total of 685,000 troops. It is worth noting that, as of November 1965, the figures show twice as many American personnel in Vietnam as there were French at the height of the French colonial war effort. In 1954 the French-directed army that suffered the reverse of Dienbienphu numbered around 80,000 Frenchmen, in a total force of 520,000, most of whom were Vietnamese.

The size of the opposing force was estimated by the Pentagon to be about 165,000 in September 1965. Just how many of this force are southerners and how many are from the North is not definitely known, but it is generally accepted by United States government spokesmen that even though most of the leaders have been trained in the North, the great majority are southerners. Corroboration of this can be found in the White Paper issued by the United States Department of State in February 1965. The document estimates the total of Vietcong forces as 95,000 to 115,000 at the end of 1964. Of these, approximately 35,000 are said to be "hard-core forces," most of whom have infiltrated from the North; the rest, 60,000 to 80,000, are "local forces." The paper does not make clear that most of the hard-core infiltrators are southern in origin—persons who went north at the time of partition or more recently—but this is admitted indirectly by the statement: "Increasingly the forces sent into the South are nat.

North Vietnamese who have never seen South Vietnam." The White Paper, which was intended to document the aggression of North Vietnam, also attempted to prove that Hanoi has been a major source of military equipment for the Vietcong. The facts presented in the paper reveal, however, that the amount of equipment coming from the North and from Communist countries up to that time, namely the end of 1964, was insignificant compared with the amount of American equipment captured, stolen, or bought in South Vietnam.

One of the major justifications for the American bombardment of North Vietnam, which started on February 7, 1965, was that it would prevent or hamper infiltration of men and materiel from the North. Clearly this was a miscalculation. In November 1965 the Pentagon's own reports indicated that this infiltration had greatly increased since the time of the White Paper. Reports of parts of regular North Vietnamese army regiments appearing in the South came in the news with increasing frequency. Estimates were made and retracted in confusing succession, but the highest estimate of North Vietnamese regulars was 14,000, as compared with 165,700 American troops. At the end of 1965, the main part of the well-trained regular army in North Vietnam numbering between 225,000 and 250,000 men had not as yet been engaged. In an interview on November 29, 1965,<sup>2</sup> Secretary of Defense McNamara declared that recent events revealed "a clear decision by Hanoi to both escalate the level of infiltration and raise the level of conflict." He was, he said, "sure that decision must be countered by an increase in the forces opposing the Vietcong." The Secretary referred to a statement made by President Johnson on July 28, 1965, to the effect that the United States would send whatever troops were needed in the war. He left reporters with the impression that United States troops would soon be increased to 200,000 and that air attacks on the Vietcong supply routes running from North Vietnam through Laos would be intensified. At the same time authoritative sources in Vietnam reported that the United States military men there were demanding much higher escalation and talking in terms of a war which would last five, ten, or twenty years.

<sup>2</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, November 30, 1965.

Under such circumstances, the price of "victory" is indeed high. It will require a rising tempo of slaughter of human beings in Vietnam: people who have been, to allude to the title of Camus' famous essay, the "victims" of a succession of "executioners," all killing people for what they consider sufficient or even noble reasons. Responsibility for this tragedy rests on many shoulders, but as Americans we must face the reality of the suffering and death to which millions of human beings who happen to be Vietnamese are being subjected. In South Vietnam the number of refugees fleeing into coastal areas and Saigon had, by November 1965, reportedly reached nearly three-quarters of a million people. Some among them are fleeing from Vietcong terror, but by the testimony of American<sup>8</sup> and neutral observers alike, the majority are refugees from American napalm bombing and strafing. The Vietcong do not have the means to carry out such mass destruction.

The price of "victory" also means burning and killing for every foot of new ground gained between the Camau Peninsula and the 17th parallel. To subdue and "pacify" the Vietnamese means committing a huge ground army and undertaking massive "counter-insurgency," an antiseptic rubric that in plain English means putting a torch to some villages that may be potential guerrilla sniper spots, destroying rice crops by spraying herbicides from the air, dropping grenades in tunnels that may be full of women and children, bribing children to reveal the location of hideouts, and torturing prisoners to gain information.

The final price of "victory" is the virtual certainty of increased alienation from the Vietnamese people. There is ample evidence that the South Vietnamese view the National Liberation Front with some disaffection because of its terrorism, depredations, heavy taxes, impressment of young men, and continued deferment of the benefits it has promised to bestow. Large numbers of people in the cities and certain rural areas have continued to support the Saigon government and have resisted the appeal to join in the

<sup>8</sup> Statement of former Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman, Professor of Government, Columbia University, New York, New York. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, September 30, 1965.

revolutionary movement. But it is also true that the propagand efforts of the National Liberation Front had ready-made opportunities to identify American involvement in Vietnam as a continuation of the French colonial enterprise. The Vietnamese village knows about American support for the French, for Diem, and now for the present Saigon government. Who can blame him for feeling a special resentment toward the white foreigner whose presence spells massive destruction and economic chaos?

Nor can such alienation and resentment be significantly countered by the positive efforts to provide technical aid and assistance being made by the United States Agency for International Development (AID) and by some military men. For years the United States has tried to help the poor of Vietnam through programs of positive action. AID has struggled, sometimes heroically, to provide educational facilities, improve agricultural techniques, contribute to public health, and strengthen the economy. But this effort has not changed attitudes significantly, because it has been so small compared to military activity and because it has been thwarted by the conditions under which it has had to be done, not the least of which is the lack of support from the Saigon government. For these positive efforts by the United States to succeed in providing a foundation for a popularly based political alternative to the National Liberation Front, there would need to be widespread reforms in land tenure and a thorough cleaning out of corruption. Apparently neither has been possible. United States AID officials have had to work with a series of regimes that owe their support to much the same vested interests that were associated with the government of the French puppet emperor Bao Dai. Ironically, it is the small group in power that benefits from the accelerated conflict and the rising cost of living which, at the same time, increase the despair of the majority.

The continued attempts to combine military and social programs under various guises, from "strategic hamlets" to "pacification," achieve no net gain, despite those soldiers and civilians who have been able to render sincere and devoted service to the people in certain areas. It is simply not possible to build a house and burn it at the same time. It is not possible to build a peacetime society in a land ravaged by civil war and foreign occupation.

The staggering odds against civilian efforts for reconstruction are illustrated in an article in the *Wall Street Journal* of December 16, 1965, where an AID representative is quoted as saying, "The Pentagon is spending more for just its air strip and docks at Cam Ranh Bay than we've been allocated for the nation's entire reconstruction."

Therefore, continuation or escalation of the fighting by the United States, and the almost certain Vietcong reaction, seems likely to produce only increasing alienation and resentment among the people on all sides and will continue to nullify any positive efforts to improve the lot of the Vietnamese or to win their allegiance. These considerations raise an ugly question: even if we win the war, will we lose the peace, because those who survive will hate us?

In other words, can the United States, by applying its global military power, be the champion of the "free" in Vietnam? A glance back at our own historical origins shows the paradox of our present position. Not so long ago we Americans were scattered settlers, colonists creating a new nation concerned with independence. In spite of ties to European motherlands, our founding fathers wanted to be left alone. They were aware that some regarded them as backward, inexperienced, unfit to govern themselves—but they were confident and often brash. In this determined spirit they responded to acts of colonial repression from Britain with a declaration of independence and a violent revolution. The new government was determined to keep the whole western hemisphere free from European interference or domination. Its motto was "no entangling alliances."

Now there is not a spot left in the world where American power and influence do not enter into the calculations of national decision makers. The American presence in Vietnam is a part of this decisive fact of modern life. Under our present policy, many Vietnamese do not even have a voice in deciding whether the war in which they are involved will ever end. It is openly admitted that the Saigon government could not exist without the massive support our government is now providing. To much of the world we, beneficiaries of revolution, appear to be engaged in the forceful suppression of a nationalistic independence movement.

The course of history has brought the United States not only to a dominant position in military power, but also to a place of prime responsibility in the conquest of some of humanity's age-old problems. Most Americans live on a scale far above that of the multitudes of human beings throughout history. We could devote ourselves to wiping out poverty in our own country and in other parts of the world. Instead we find ourselves caught in a miserable struggle, using our military power to contradict the basic elements of our own dream of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" for all.

At the same time, military expenditures threaten to unbalance the American economy with attendant risks of inflation. The escalation of the war diverts resources needed to end poverty, to improve our schools, and to halt the deterioration of our cities. A statement by the assistant chief of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Joseph Kershaw, on December 6, 1965, reveals this situation: "If the military budget goes up anything like what most people suspect, many of the Great Society projects will have to be severely cut back, if not abandoned."


In addition to this, the continuation of war constitutes a threat to our American institutions and the quality of American life. Many people will somehow cling tenaciously to the tradition of criticism and individual conscience. The right to dissent has not yet been drastically curbed. We are not yet completely locked in what Martin Buber called "the speechlessness of slaughter" that characterizes war. We are drifting in this direction, however; and if the war spreads, the trend toward silencing dissent will accelerate correspondingly with all the dangers that such silencing entails.

Thus the paradox—at the very moment of our greatest hope, we find ourselves confronted by our gravest danger. The United States presence in Vietnam perpetuates a spiral of cause and effect that threatens to engulf the entire world in a war of such scope and destructiveness that the very fate of mankind hangs in the balance. The war has already spread to Laos, where we are attacking supply routes, and to Thailand, where American bases are the major origin for raids on North Vietnam; and Cambodia lies on the brink. If war continues to spread, the ultimate intervention of China appears increasingly likely in spite of the probability of

American nuclear retaliation. At the same time, our carefully constructed détente with the Soviet Union in Europe, after showing promise, is lost in a new cold war wave as that country finds itself, no matter how reluctantly, drawn further and further into the war.

Is there any way to escape this dismal entanglement, any way which returns the future of Vietnam to the Vietnamese and offers some prospect for peace and stability in Southeast Asia? Certainly there is no easy formula to assure such a result, but there may be initiatives open to us that offer more hope than the barren cycle of mutual retaliation that characterizes the tactics of escalation. Before such initiatives can be formulated, however, it is important to analyze the underlying forces that are shaping events in Vietnam, for no solution will be viable that does not take these into account.

We therefore turn to a consideration in the next chapters of the three realities that dominate the Southeast Asian scene: the rise of nationalism, the drive for social revolution, and the advent of a militant and reawakened China. When these forces have been explored, we can attempt to assess the adequacy of recent United States policies in Vietnam and to arrive at positive recommendations for a more hopeful future.



## 2: Nationalism in Southeast Asia

The American government has so consistently imposed its own cold war views and values upon interpretations of developments in Southeast Asia that the American people are not aware of how profoundly the international viewpoints and ideological priorities of most of the people of this area differ from those expressed by the United States.

Throughout Southeast Asia, with the possible exception of Laos, nationalism has been by far the most important political factor. Its appeal has decisively overshadowed that of Communism or anti-Communism. Nationalism has provided the most important barrier to the growth of Communism or the influence of outside Communist powers, and it has been much more effective in countering intervention than any action or lack of action so far taken by the United States.

There has been one exception to this pattern: Vietnam. There, outside pressures have been so overwhelmingly powerful that nationalism has fused with Communism. If we generalize from Vietnam about the rest of Southeast Asia, we violate the facts of recent history.

Yet the administration calls Vietnam "a critical test of the Communist technique of military subversion" and says that if America fails this test, Communists throughout the underdeveloped world will be emboldened to take up arms in attempts to seize power. Such a view, sometimes referred to as the "domino theory," as-


sumes that Communists elsewhere lack relevant local experience to guide them and naively regard their own domestic conditions as so similar to those in Vietnam that they must await the outcome of this test before proceeding. But, as Senator Church has stated, "Communist guerrilla wars did not begin in Vietnam and won't end there, regardless of the outcome of this particular struggle." If more American policy makers were better versed in the recent history of Southeast Asia, they might appreciate the fact that the series of Communist "wars of liberation," begun in 1948 in Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya, all failed—and failed decisively. The major reason in each case was that the insurrectionists were unable to secure significant nationalist support and, in fact, ran counter to the mainstream of nationalism. As a consequence, Communist leaders learned more than a decade ago that no insurrection in Southeast Asia can succeed unless it comes to terms with local nationalism.

American postwar policy has been characterized by constant warnings of the danger of Communist Chinese expansionism. Yet the people of Southeast Asia look back over the past decade and see that the power which has most frequently intervened to influence their political destinies has been the United States. In every state of Southeast Asia, America's political presence has been clearly evident, and America's military presence has been infinitely more visible and formidable than that of Communist China or the Soviet Union. In the one area that Americans know well, the Philippines, this intervention has been reasonably consistent with political realities, and relatively enlightened and effective. But the people of Burma and Indonesia, and, to a lesser extent, of Cambodia, are alienated already by American meddling in their domestic affairs. America's military presence in Vietnam has made them even more apprehensive. Indonesia, which incorporates nearly half of Southeast Asia's area and population, and strategically located Burma have come to fear the threat of American political and military interference far more than that of Communist China or the Soviet Union. Although largely unknown to the American public, United States intervention in their affairs has been both recent and flagrant. The strong adverse reaction of the Burmese and Indonesians is only human. Both governments have sup-

pressed Communist insurgencies on their own initiative. The last thing they want is American support in their efforts. They fear that such American involvement would boomerang, weakening their own public support and providing local Communists with more substantial local backing.

Indonesians of all political views have long been persuaded that Ho Chi Minh is the genuine voice of Vietnamese nationalism and the man whom most Vietnamese, South as well as North, would prefer to support if given the chance. They see many affinities between their own armed struggle against the Dutch and that of the Vietnamese against the French. Moreover, their attitude toward American policies is strongly influenced by the United States encouragement and backing of anti-Sukarno rebels in Sumatra and Celebes in 1957-58. United States Central Intelligence Agency activities involved sea- and air-borne supplies of military equipment to the rebels, and CIA pilots flew for rebel forces in the bombing of Indonesian naval vessels and the city of Ambon. Such American intrusion into national affairs—well known in Indonesia, but little known by the American public—has had an enduring effect upon Indonesia's attitude toward the United States and has heightened its sensitivity to American intervention anywhere in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. Opposition to United States policy in Vietnam is shared by all Indonesian groups—anti-Communist as well as pro-Communist. Americans who applauded Indonesian Defense Minister General Nasution's crackdown on the Indonesian Communist Party beginning in October 1965 well may ponder the fact that he and his military colleagues are strongly critical of American military support of the Saigon government.

The Burmese, whose country was the most devastated in all of Southeast Asia by the fighting in World War II, are sensitive to the situation in Vietnam and anxious to escape such a fate themselves. They have now secured what they consider an eminently fair boundary settlement with the People's Republic of China, with China waiving previous territorial demands. Such a settlement is one which Chiang Kai-shek's government was never prepared to countenance and which, in fact, it explicitly repudiated. Of equal importance to the Burmese leaders, the United States subordinated Burmese national interests to its anti-China policy in the



years before 1961 and encouraged and provided a continuing supply of arms to the forces of Chiang Kai-shek which ravaged Northeast Burma from 1950 to 1961. On the other hand, the Burmese remain grateful that Peking refused to regard the basing of Chiang Kai-shek's troops in northeast Burma as a pretext for sending Chinese Communist forces into Burma after them, even though Chiang Kai-shek's troops made a few probes into China in the early 1950's. This has understandably influenced the Burmese view of current and potential American policy toward China and Vietnam. It is ironic, but true, that for years the American-supported Chinese Nationalist (*Kuomintang*) forces in Burma kept the Burmese government so preoccupied that they could not deal effectively with their country's own dissident Communist groups.


Not only Burma and Indonesia are concerned about American involvement. Having seen the devastation and the casualties inflicted upon the civilian public in Vietnam by America's anti-Communist actions, people in other Southeast Asian countries are anxious to escape such "protection." As the *New York Times* said in its editorial of November 21, 1965, "Even in Thailand and other countries under constant Communist threat, there may be second thoughts about whether conquest by Communists would be more painful than defense by Americans."

It is not merely distrust of the United States, born of its post-war intrusion into their political life, that has affected the attitudes of Southeast Asian countries toward American global anti-Communist policies and, in particular American hostility toward Peking. Much more relevant to the national interests of the peoples of Southeast Asia than cold war issues are the traditional quarrels between the individual countries, often originating centuries before the colonial period, but in several cases exaggerated by or actually born from colonial experience. For example, the intense Cambodian antipathy toward Thailand and Vietnam arises from the fact that these states annexed sizable parts of Cambodian territory in the last century and even today control a large number of Cambodian people. This annexation helps explain why the American arming of South Vietnam and Thailand causes such anxiety to Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia. It is also the reason,

despite his anti-Communist internal policies, he seeks an accommodation with Communist China to serve as a counterpoise to American backing of South Vietnam and Thailand. Sihanouk would prefer to see American power remain available for deployment in the general area of Southeast Asia, with the Seventh Fleet in a position to deter the Chinese should they ever consider sending their armies across his borders; yet he is convinced that the imminent and palpable threats to his kingdom come from the Vietnamese and Thai armies rather than from those of Communist China. Cambodia has consistently supplied abundant proof of its ability to control Communist internal subversion, for the leadership has been in full harmony with the country's nationalism and has taken steps in social and economic reform that undercut Communist appeals. Indeed, all those who tend to regard American power and American dollars as the best weapons against Communist subversion might note that Cambodia, which has rejected both, continues to maintain a level of internal security unmatched in Southeast Asia.

Sihanouk's confidence in the United States is limited by his belief that the CIA once worked with the Thai and South Vietnamese to overthrow him. He was keenly disappointed at the refusal of the United States to support his proposal for an international conference aimed at providing an international guarantee of Cambodia's borders—a decision the United States later regretted. Cambodian leaders will continue to feel insecure about their border with Vietnam, whether that country is controlled by Communists or anti-Communists. There remains scope for an enlightened and realistic American policy toward Cambodia so long as this is concerned with Cambodia's territorial integrity as such, and not as something subordinate to American cold war plans.

In Thailand, the king remains the symbol of Thai nationalism and the monarchy still works closely with the military and bureaucratic elite of Bangkok. Whatever the shortcomings of the Bangkok regime, Thai nationalism has not been and still appears not to be in danger from any competing form of Thai leadership, and the Communists have made no significant inroads. If the Thai government can be induced to take steps to convince the Lao-speaking majority of northeast Thailand that they are no longer regarded as



second-class citizens, there is little likelihood of significant Communist gains. Promised American assistance in developing the resources of the Mekong River Valley may not yet be feasible in Vietnam or in parts of Laos, because of security conditions, but there is plenty of scope for such development in Thailand's economically backward northeast regions. If the Bangkok government can be encouraged to couple reform of local administration with such economic development, Lao-speaking agents of any Communist regime will find little basis for stirring up political dissidence. Communists would undoubtedly have even less reason to intrude if the great American airbase at Udorn in northeast Thailand were not being used for American bombing runs into Laos and North Vietnam. Time has by no means run out in Thailand. As in Cambodia, there is opportunity for enlightened American policies to produce fruitful results.

In considering Laos, we must keep in mind the fact that approximately half the territory is already under the control of pro-Communist elements, the Pathet Lao. We must also acknowledge that the area we refer to as Laos has never constituted a nation. If one uses linguistic and cultural criteria in speaking of a Laotian nationalism, there are at least four times as many Lao in Thailand as in Laos. The Lao-speaking half of the population of Laos is concentrated almost exclusively in the western half of the country, adjacent to Thailand, and especially in the Mekong Valley. Ethnic, linguistic, and historical ties incline this element toward Thai and away from Vietnamese influence. On the other hand, most of the non-Lao, hill-dwelling peoples have generally sought to resist Lao efforts at overlordship, and many of them have close ethnic and linguistic affinities with non-Vietnamese minority groups across the border in Vietnam.

The possibility for a really viable neutralist regime embracing all of Laos, such as Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma endeavored to establish in 1957-58, has now been lost. In the last few years Souvanna Phouma has had good reason to criticize North Vietnam and China for their support of the Communist-oriented Pathet Lao—the Laotian group that has become the major rival to his government. But he cannot be expected to forget that, although the United States in 1961 finally came around to supporting the